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Intellectual Property Rights in Data?
J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51 (1997)
The Authors trace the evolution of hybrid intellectual property rights protect-
ing the contents of noncopyrightable databases from early European Commission pro-
posals sounding in unfair competition law to the strong and potentially perpetual ex-
clusive property right embodied in the final E.C. Directive on Databases adopted in
March 1996. Also examined are parallel legislative proposals pending before Congress
and the draft international treaty on the legal protection of databases to be considered
at a Diplomatic Conference hosted by the World Intellectual Property Organization in
December 1996.
The Authors endorse the need to provide some ancillary legal relief for inves-
tors in the generation and distribution of digitized data over telecommunications net-
works, lest free-riders appropriate the fruits of these investments. They deplore, how-
ever, the creation of strong legal barriers to entry in a field of endeavor already charac-
terized by a pronounced lack of competition and by the preponderance of sole-source
database providers. They show that, under both the existing and proposed sui generis
regimes, most commercially valuable compilations of data will never enter the public
domain, despite the 'Limited Times" Clause of the U.S. Constitution; that the depend-
ence of the scientific and educational communities on plentiful and affordable supplies
of data has been virtually ignored, despite the constitutional mandate "to promote the
progress of science and [the] useful arts;" and that the very existence of value-adding
use industries in this sector would be jeopardized, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's procompetitive mandate in Feist and Bonito Boats. For these and other rea-
sons, the proposed regimes to protect investments in databases-though requiring no
creative achievement as a precondition of eligibility-have paradoxically applied one of
the strongest and most anti-competitive intellectual property rights ever conceived to
the elementary particles and building blocks of knowledge.
The Authors re-examine the economic and legal justifications for providing in-
vestors in information goods with a measure of artificial lead time that would enable
them to recuperate their investments and turn a profit in a digitized environment.
They conclude that a weak intellectual property right-consistent with first amendment
values and with other constitutional constraints-could overcome the risk of market
failure without creating legal barriers to entry. To this end, they propose two alterna-
tive models, one based on simple unfair competition principles, and the other on a more
refined set of default liability principles. Either model could increase the level of
investment in the production and distribution of databases, while stimulating, rather
than discouraging, the formation of more competitive market segments. The Article
ends with a detailed analysis of the exceptions and other measures favoring science and
education that will become indispensable under any sui generis regime protecting the
contents of databases if the United States is not to jeopardize it pre-eminent role in
basic science and the downstream technological innovation to which it gives rise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The international intellectual property system founded on the
Paris and Berne Conventions in the late nineteenth century1 has been
dominated by the patent and copyright paradigms, which articulate
the legal protection of technological inventions and of literary and
artistic works, respectively. Although this patent-copyright dichot-
1. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 ("Paris Convention");
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Berne Convention"). The international
intellectual property system was recently strengthened and broadened by the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations whose intellectual property component, known as the "TRIPS
Agreement," builds on the Paris and Berne Conventions. See Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Negotiations, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IC, Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement'), in Results of the
Uruguay Round 6-19, 365-403 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994).
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omy was never as strictly observed abroad as in the United States,2 it
nonetheless charted a relatively clear theoretical line of demarcation
between legal incentives to create and the public interest in free
competition. 3 Any publicly disclosed technologies or information
products that failed to meet the eligibility requirements of the domes-
tic patent and copyright laws became public domain matter that any-
one could freely appropriate.
4
By the end of the twentieth century, in contrast, this line of
demarcation had empirically broken down. The developed market
economies, including the United States, enacted numerous special
purpose intellectual property laws to protect industrial designs, plant
varieties, integrated circuit designs, and other matter that typically
failed to meet the eligibility requirements of either the patent or
copyright models. 5 The latest, and arguably most deviant, examples
2. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2432, 2455-65 (1994) (discussing hybrid intellectual property regimes adopted
outside the United States).
3. See J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 Cardozo Arts &
Enter. L. J. 475, 480-96 (1995) (explaining how the patent and copyright paradigms have his-
torically balanced competition and innovation policies). For a different and more restrictive
view of the economic function of copyright, see generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining
Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483 (1996).
4. Copyright law protects only original works of authorship that manifest some creative
expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 ed.); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991) (holding that white-page listings of a telephone directory lacked
sufficient creativity to qualify for copyright protection as an original work of authorship).
Patent law requires that a technical device or process be novel and nonobvious. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102-03 (1994 ed.) (discussing conditions for patentability). Devices or designs not meeting
copyright or patent law standards that are disclosed in publicly distributed products are
generally considered freely appropriable. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1989) (striking down Florida statute forbidding use of "plug molds" in the
manufacture of boat parts as disruption of federal patent policy concerning subject matter
Congress left in the public domain); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32
(1964) (preventing use of Illinois unfair competition law to block the free copying of an unpat-
entable "pole lamp"); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964)
(indicating that state unfair competition laws may not protect unpatented designs embodied in
publicly available products in the absence of confusion about the source of origin). See also
Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2448-53 (cited in note 2) (discussing positive and negative
economic premises of the dominant paradigms).
5. See, for example, Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98
Stat. 3347 (1984), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1994 ed.); Plant Variety Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980)
and by Pub. L. No. 103-349, 1087 Stat. 3136 (1994), codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321 et
seq. (1994 ed.). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to
Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 897, 899 (1988). The United States is
the only developed country that has never enacted special laws to protect either industrial de-
signs appealing to the eye or functionally determined industrial designs known as "utility
models." See, for example, J.H. Reichman, Industrial Designs and Utility Models Under the
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of this trend toward "sui generis" intellectual property rights 6 are the
European- and United States-sponsored initiatives in both national
and international forums calling for creation of a new form of legal
protection for the contents of databases.7
These initiatives aim to rescue database producers from the
threat of market-destructive appropriations by free-riding competitors
who contributed nothing to the costs of collecting or distributing the
relevant data." Unlike the classical intellectual property models,
European Communities' Proposed Initiatives: A Critical Appraisal, paper presented to the Third
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Fordham University
School of Law (Apr. 20-21, 1995) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). See generally Reichman,
94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2453-500 (cited in note 2).
6. Sui generis means "of its own kind or class." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (West, 6th
ed. 1990). The literature refers to special purpose intellectual property laws deviating from the
patent and copyright paradigms as "sui generis" regimes. See, for example, Pamela Samuelson,
Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property Law: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to
Computer Programs, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 471 (1985) (discussing the sui generis character of the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act).
7. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 CE.C. Directive on Databases" or
"Final E.C. Directive"). Even before the E.C. Directive on Databases was finalized, the
European Commission submitted a proposal based on the then-pending draft to the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Committee of Experts for International Treaty
Provisions on the Legal Protection of the Contents of Databases. See Proposal Submitted by the
European Community and its Member States to the World Intellectual Property Organization
Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Sixth Session, Geneva,
WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/V1113, February 1-9, 1996 ("European Proposal on Databases"). The United
States submitted a similar proposal to the WIPO Committee of Experts in May, 1996. See
Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Proposal of the United
States of America on Sui Generis Protection of Databases, Geneva, May 22-24, 1996, WIPO Doc.
BCP/CEVII/2-INRICE/VI/2, May 20, 1996 ("U.S. Proposal on Databases"). The U.S. proposal
was submitted to WIPO even before Congressman Carlos Moorhead introduced legislation in
Congress for a new form of legal protection for the contents of databases on May 23, 1996. See
Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. Rep. No. 3531,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). A draft treaty on the legal protection of databases was made
public on August 30, 1996. See Basic Proposal for the Substantative Provisions of the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, Memorandum Prepared by the Chairman of the
Committee of Experts, August 30, 1996 ("WIPO Draft Database Treaty"), to be considered by the
Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Geneva,
Switzerland, December 2-20, 1996. The Conference postponed action on the Draft Database
Treaty. See WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/88, Dec. 20, 1996.
8. See, for example, E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 20 (cited in note 7)
(noting, in Recital 7, the high cost of database development and the low cost of appropriating
content as an important factor favoring sui generis protection). In the absence of special
legislation, courts will sometimes stretch existing legal regimes to avoid such appropriations.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991), some federal courts had extended copyright protection to unoriginal data
compilations on a "sweat of the brow" theory. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial
Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1868-69 nn.13-14,
1895-1900 (1990) (citing cases where courts found works copyrightable due to the amount of
labor expended by the plaintiff and discussing the history of "sweat work" as the basis for
copyrightability). For the tensions in foreign law, see, for example, Alain Strowel, Droit
d'auteur et copyright: divergences et convergence-etude de droit comparg, 29-30, 264-66, 391-474
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which seek "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and [the] useful
Arts,"9 the database laws do not condition protection on a showing of
some creative or technical achievement. Rather, these laws would
protect anyone who makes a substantial investment in the develop-
ment of a database against unauthorized extractions, uses, and reuses
of the whole or substantial parts of its contents. 10
The Authors of this Article are not unsympathetic to many of
the goals that the sui generis database regimes are meant to achieve.
We have elsewhere argued that the traditional intellectual property
models, as supplemented by classical trade secret laws, often fail to
afford those who produce today's most commercially valuable in-
formation goods enough lead time to recoup their investments. The
risk of market failure inherent in this state of chronic under-protec-
tion tends to keep the production of information goods at suboptimal
levels."
While this Article accordingly agrees that database makers
need a new form of legal protection, it contends that the current
European and United States initiatives 2 are seriously flawed.
Implementing these initiatives would confer a far broader and
stronger monopoly on database developers than is needed to avert
market failure. It would create an exclusive property rights regime of
virtually unlimited durations that would be subject to few, if any,
public policy limitations.14 It would jeopardize basic scientific re-
search, 5 eliminate competition in the markets for value-added prod-
ucts and services, 6 and convert existing barriers to entry into insu-
(E. Bruylant, 1993); M. Frank Gotzen, Grand orientations du droit d'auteur dans les Etats
membres de la C.E.E. en matiare de banques de donnies, in Banques de Donng Droit et d'Auteur
85-98 (IRPI ed., 1987).
9. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See, for example, E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 20-21 (cited in note
7) (Recitals 7-12). See also Charles Clark, General Counsel of the International Publishing
Copyright Council, The Copyright Environment for the Publisher in the Digital World 7 (1996)
(stressing present "legal vacuum" facing publishers and the importance of E.U. database protec-
tion laws for future investments).
11. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2525-27 (cited in note 2) (discussing
this phenomenon generally); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, and J.H.
Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 2308, 2337-41 (1994) (discussing this phenomenon in relation to computer programs).
12. See E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 20-28 (cited in note 7); H.R. Rep.
No. 3531 (cited in note 7).
13. See notes 143-66, 225-35 and accompanying text.
14. See notes 169-90, 248-65 and accompanying text.
15. See notes 282-329, 451-88 and accompanying text.
16. See notes 330-63 and accompanying text.
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perable legal barriers to entry.17 The pending European and United
States initiatives could thus lead to relatively high prices for the use
of public goods. Economic efficiency, however, calls for very low prices
for such use and favors minimum incentives to provide the needed
investment and services.' 8 Serious questions also exist about the con-
stitutionality of the pending U.S. legislation. By investing compilers
of databases with absolute and virtually perpetual protection, this
legislation would violate both the limited times proviso of the
Enabling Clause of the Constitution' 9 and its express justification for
grants of intellectual property rights in terms of the advancement of
scientific and technical progress. 20 The pending U.S. legislation also
undermines principles embodied in the First Amendment that courts
applying copyright law have long sought to accomodate.21
This Article proposes either the use of unfair competition
principles to protect database contents, or the adoption of an intellec-
tual property regime based on more refined liability principles, rather
than on exclusive property rights,22 that would reconcile the need for
legal incentives to invest with a calculus of net social benefits. Either
approach would provide those who develop commercial databases
with enough lead time to recoup their investments and make suffi-
cient profits to enable further investments. At the same time, these
alternatives would not retard scientific research or educational activi-
17. See notes 293-97, 364-99 and accompanying text.
18. See, for example, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 108-18 (Scott
Foresman, 1988) (recognizing alternative theories based on nonintervention or restricting
competition to single producers). See also Jeffrey I. Mackie-Mason and Hal R. Varian,
Economic FAQS About the Internet, J. Econ. Perspective 75, 85-89 (1994).
19. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. The authors generally favor a flexible interpretation of the Enabling Clause of the
Constitution, such as that put forward in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, A Wiseguy's Approach to
Information Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent Into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual
Property, 1992 S. Ct. Rev. 195 (1993). The claim advanced in this Article is that the database
proposals conflict with even this flexible approach.
21. See notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
22. See notes 410-50 and accompanying text. A property entitlement or right precludes
third parties from appropriating the object of protection, whereas a liability rule regulates the
means by which they can engage in certain potentially harmful acts on certain conditions. See
generally Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) (discussing the differ-
ences between property entitlements, liability rules, and inalienability rules). If one has
"rightful possession of some thing-such as an automobile or a home under an exclusive prop-
erty right another person ordinarily cannot take it without permission;" but under a liability
rule, others may engage in acts that "create risks of harm and thus constitute probabilistic
invasions of property interests"-for example-nuisances, while obligating them to pay damages
for harm under specified circumstances. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 716 (1996).
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ties, impede the development of follow-on products and services, or
otherwise create legal barriers to entry.
To understand why some form of legislative action is neces-
sary, Part II of this Article will discuss the limited proprietary rights
available to database compilers under existing legal regimes, whose
rules were formulated in the pre-digital era. This Part will show how
digital technologies have destabilized the status quo and why this
threatens investments in compilations of data.23 Part III will report
on current initiatives to adopt a sui generis intellectual property
regime covering noncopyrightable database contents.24  This Part
traces the evolution of the pending legislative initiatives from a mod-
est set of early proposals sounding in unfair competition law to an
absolute monopoly reinforced by ancillary technological means of
enforcement. 25 It also shows that current proposals for international
treaty provisions to protect database contents are consistent with
other U.S. and E.U. initiatives that would confer ever broader and
stronger protection on digital information products. 2
6
Part IV will analyze the adverse implications of current data-
base protection proposals for science and education, for competition in
the market for value-added information products and services, and for
other socially desirable reuses of information. 27 It emphasizes the
ways in which the current initiatives undervalue the abiding impor-
tance in the information age of a relatively free flow of information as
a precondition for technological progress and democratic social dis-
course .28
Part V will explain why the exclusive property rights approach
embodied in current proposals should be abandoned in favor of either
an appropriate unfair competition law or, preferably, the pro-com-
petitive, market-enhancing principles of a more refined liability re-
gime. 29 This Part will discuss the principal elements of such an alter-
native framework for protecting the contents of databases from mar-
ket-destructive appropriations without creating legal barriers to entry
or unduly interfering with the open exchange of data among sci-
23. See notes 30-94 and accompanying text.
24. See 95-281 and accompanying text.
25. See notes 108-90, 222-65 and accompanying text (stressing intensive lobbying efforts
by U.S. and U.K. database producers to this end).
26. See notes 191-265 and accompanying text.
27. See notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
28. See also James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of
the Information Society i-iv (Harvard U. Press, 1996).
29. See text accompanying notes 400-88.
1997]
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entists. It will also show that a sound legal framework for protecting
the contents of databases cannot be formulated without solid and
continuing inputs from the scientific and educational communities.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT INITIATIVES
The success of private-sector technological development in the
United States has stemmed in good measure from massive public
investments in basic research and development that were made after
the late 1950s in response to cold war pressures and national security
interests.30 This strategy provided funding for academic institutions
and specialized laboratories whose research products often paved the
way for private industrial applications.31 That federal funding largely
defrayed the costs of collecting and disseminating raw scientific data
merits particular attention in this context.3 2 To the extent that this
country became the world's leading producer of technological goods,
the government's role in ensuring the free and open supply of data to
the scientific community on favorable economic conditions was a con-
stant, but seldom articulated, stabilizing factor.
A. Information Goods in the Pre-Digital Era
The government generates data in two ways: directly, as when
agencies compile information in the course of their missions, and
indirectly, through grants or other subsidies to researchers, particu-
larly for scientific endeavors.33 The resulting compilations have gen-
erally not been regulated by intellectual property norms. This obser-
vation follows in part because copyright rules forbid the U.S. govern-
30. See generally Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government,
Technology and Economic Performance: Organizing the Executive Branch for a Stronger
National Technology Base (1991).
31. See, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1018 (1989) (recognizing that academic
research has attracted and accelerated the commercial development of biomedical discoveries
which could be marketed commercially).
32. See, for example, Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data,
U.S. National Committee for CODATA, and National Research Council, Bits of Power: Issues in
Global Access to Scientific Data 1-24 (National Academy Press) (forthcoming 1997) C'Bits of
Power") (discussing technical, economic, and legal impediments to the free flow of scientific and
technical data in electronic environments). Some government data compilations, of course,
serve as "raw material" for value-adding providers who claim proprietary rights in the end
products. See note 289 and accompanying text (discussing protection strategies of such firms).
33. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
[Vol. 50:51
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ment from copyrighting works generated by its employees, 34 and in
part because norms widely shared by members of the scientific and
educational communities favor relatively unfettered extractions and
reuses of data.35 Only in cases where members of these communities
authored discursive scientific works or otherwise participated in
applied technological innovation were they likely to encounter legal
rules governing commercial applications of data.36 In such cases,
existing legal institutions proved relatively stable in the pre-digital
epoch, and the scientific community, among others, has taken this
stability largely for granted.
In the private sector, by contrast, commercial compilers of data
have long suffered from a risk of market failure owing to the intangi-
ble, ubiquitous and, above all, indivisible nature of information
goods. 37  Compilers could, of course, secure the commercial value of
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994 ed.) ("Copyright protection under [Title 17] is not available
for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not
precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or
otherwise.").
35. See, for example, Anne W. Branscomb, Who Owns Information? From Privacy to
Public Access 159-73 (Basic Books, 1994). See also Dorothy Nelkin, Science as Intellectual
Property: Who Controls Research? 5-6 (Macmillan, 1983); Harvey Brooks, The Research
University: Doing Good, and Doing It Better, Issues in Sci. & Tech. 49, 50-51 (Winter, 1988);
J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright
Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 639, 641-48, 710-23 (1989).
Most compilers of scientific data have been more concerned about obtaining credit or recog-
nition for their contributions than about securing the economic fruits of their efforts. Both
international copyright law under the Berne Convention and the domestic laws of most devel-
oped countries require that authors of literary works obtain a "moral right" to proper attribution
for their published creations. See, for example, Berne Convention, Art. 6bis (cited in note 1).
Congress has so far declined to comply with this obligation except with regard to visual or
graphic artists. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994 ed.) (creating protection for the authors of visual
art). This leaves the question of attribution largely to the vagaries of unfair competition law.
36. Until the 1980s, there was a fairly clear-cut distinction between theoretical and ap-
plied science in the universities, and the inclination to patent or otherwise commercialize
research results was less pronounced than at present. Even where patenting had taken root, a
well-established judicial tradition denied patent protection to mathematical formulas, mental
steps, and data as such, including mathematical algorithms. See, for example, Robert P.
Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 Social
Phil. and Pol. Found. 145 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.
J. 1025, 1028-29 (1990) (considering the patentability of mathematical algorithims).
37. Information goods have the properties of so-called public goods: they are ubiquitous,
inexhaustible, and indivisible or nondepletable. A second comer's use of a new information good
does not diminish or exhaust it. Once disclosed to the world, anyone can use an information
good without the originator's permission and without reimbursing him or her for the costs of
research and production. See, for example, Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 108-18
(cited in note 18). Unless the state limits the ability of third parties to copy a given literary
production and sell the copied good for less than the originator, neither the author nor the
publisher may have sufficient incentives to create or invest in the dissemination of cultural and
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
some data sets by keeping them secret or by only revealing them in
the course of a confidential relationship, as routinely occurs with
regard to firms engaged in industrial applications of scientific discov-
eries. In such cases, trade secret laws or equivalent laws of confiden-
tial information provide innovators and investors with no exclusive
property rights.38  Rather, they permit third parties to reverse-
engineer any unpatented industrial product by proper means in order
to reveal the process by which it was obtained, and to use that process
to manufacture equivalent goods. 39
To the extent that an innovative product derived from com-
mercial applications of scientific data kept that were under actual or
legal secrecy, a competitor always remained free to generate the same
data and to apply them to similar products or uses. Legal liability
attached only to third parties who engaged in improper means of
reverse engineering, such as bribing employees or resorting to
industrial espionage. 40 In such cases, the free-riding offender had to
compensate the innovator only for lost profits likely to accrue during
the hypothetical period that would have been required to reverse
engineer the product in question by honest means.
41
Trade secret law thus provides qualifying originators with no
legal immunity from direct competition. It merely confers a "head
start," that is, an uncertain period of natural lead time during which
originators seek to recoup their investment in research and develop-
ment while establishing their trademarks as symbols of quality that
consumers recognize. In this and other respects, trade secret law
operates as a liability regime that discourages certain types of con-
information goods. See, for example, Paul Goldstein, 1 Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice
§ 1.2 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1996); William Kingston, Innovation, Creativity and Law 83-85
(Kliiwer Academic Publishers/Dordrecht, 1990). See also Ejan MacKaan, Economics of
Information and Law 115-17 (Kliiwer-Nijhoff, 1982) (noting market distortions ensuing from
public good problems and uncertainties that would require a higher expected return).
38. See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 39-45 (1993) (restating
the norms of trade secrecy law). Some countries that lacked trade secret laws as such would
protect information disclosed in confidence against abuses of that confidence. See, for example,
Allison Coleman, The Legal Protection of Trade Secrets 5-28 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992); Eric
Golaz, L'initation servile des produits et de leur presentation" dtude compar~e des droits
frangais, allemand, belge et suisse 267-79 (Librairie Droz, 1992).
39. See, for example, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 14 ULA § 1(4) (1985) ('U.T.S.A."). See generally J.H. Reichman, Overlapping
Proprietary Rights in University-Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer
Programs, 17 Columbia-VLA J. L. & Arts 51, 93-98 (1992).
40. See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (cited in note 38).
41. See, for example, id. § 45.
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duct rather than as an exclusive property right that may create a
legal barrier to entry.
4 2
Once data are disseminated to the public in print media, how-
ever, they normally forfeit even the limited protection of trade secret
laws and related laws of confidentiality, except insofar as two-party
contracts may otherwise provide. 43  Not surprisingly, commercial
compilers in such cases have found it difficult to appropriate the
fruits of their investment unless either copyright laws or unfair com-
petition laws afford them a limited shelter against wholesale duplica-
tion.44
Data compilers in the United States and the United Kingdom
had, in the past, experienced some success in protecting their in-
vestments in publicly distributed compilations by means of copyright
law.45 One line of decisions expressed concern that without copyright
protection there would be inadequate incentives to invest in socially
42. See note 22. For an analysis of trade secret law as a default liability regime governing
relations between originators and borrowers of subpatentable innovations, see Reichman, 94
Colum. L. Rev. at 2334, 2335-44, 2519-29 (cited in note 2). The injunction available under trade
secret law applies only to the party who improperly obtained the undisclosed know-how, but it
never impedes other parties from reverse engineering that know-how by proper means. An
injunction valid against the world would presumably be held unconstitutional in the absence of
a patent. See, for example, Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc. v. D.E.V. Industries, 925 F.2d 174
(7th Cir. 1991). See also David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, and Richard Posner, Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 61-62 (Winter 1991) (discussing the difference
between patent and trade secret protection).
43. See notes 86-94 and accompanying text for further discussion of two-party contracts.
44. The classic American decision on unfair competition protection for compilations of
information was International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-42 (1918)
(enjoining news service from appropriating hot news from competing newspapers under certain
circumstances). The extent to which state or federal unfair competition laws can still provide
some supplementary relief against the unauthorized copying of commercially valuable data that
are not protected by trade secret or copyright laws remains an unsettled question. See, for
example, Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat'? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 367-74 (1992) (questioning
Congress's constitutional authority to protect compiled data outside the limits of the Patent-
Copyright Clause); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 165 (1992) (proposing the creation of a misappro-
priation tort for malcompetitive copying that would provide supplemental protection); Dennis S.
Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2594,
2601-08 (1994) (focusing on misappropriation to fill the gap of protection between patent and
copyright law). But see Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm
of Intellectual Property Law, 75 U. Minn. L. Rev. 875 (1991) (identifying gaps in the analytical
framework of the misappropriation doctrine). Unfair competition law has sometimes been
available in Europe to protect data compilations. See, for example, J.H. Reichman, Electronic
Itformation Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 25 Int'l Rev. Indus.
Prop. & Copyright L. 446, 450 nn. 2, 11-16 (1993). See also Golaz, L'imnitation Servile at 239-55
(cited in note 38).
45. See Ginsburg, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 1873-93 (cited in note 8) (discussing the historical
protection of "low authorship" of works in the United Kingdom and the United States).
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desirable compilations of data that require industrious effort to
produce. 46 The decisions protecting compilations on a "sweat of the
brow" rationale, however,47 violate a basic premise of the mature
copyright paradigm, which claims to protect only the original expres-
sion that authors embody in information products.4 8  The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized this principle in its 1991 decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., which repudiated
the "sweat of the brow" rationale for protecting compilations of data.41
Functionally dictated collections of data or other compilations
that do not manifest a creative selection or arrangement are, there-
fore, at least in principle, ineligible for copyright protection.5 Even
when compilers of data satisfy the originality requirement, moreover,
copyright law affords them only weak protection because ancillary
rules exclude their ideas and factual discoveries 5i from the scope of
the copyright monopoly. In addition, numerous exceptions to and
limitations on the copyright owner's exclusive rights also favor certain
uses of protected works, such as those for face-to-face teaching
activities, library and archival uses, and other public interest pur-
suits.52 In U.S. copyright law, there is also a general "fair use" excep-
46. See, for example, Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.
1937) (protecting telephone listings). See also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of
Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 528,
539-40 (1981) (commenting on the need to encourage production of these works and to minimize
unjust enrichment).
47. This rationale provides copyright protection based upon the labor expended by the
compiler. See note 8.
48. See, for example, Paul Edward Geller, Copyright in Factual Compilations: U.S.
Supreme Court Decides Feist Case, 22 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 802, (1991) (noting
that the United Kingdom remains "the most significant exception to this consensus").
49. 499 U.S. at 359-60. The implications of Feist are explained generally in Dreyfuss, 20
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 897 (cited in note 5), Ginsburg, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 338 (cited in note
44), and Pamela Samuelson, The Originality Standard for Literary Works Under U.S. Copyright
Law, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 393 (Supp. 1994).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b); Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60 (finding that copyright protection
extends only to those portions of a data compilation that are original to the author and not to
the facts themselves); Guy Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe 213-14 (Sweet & Maxwell,
1996) (noting the robust standard of originality in some E.U. countries, especially Germany).
The E.C. Directive on Databases recognizes this same principle, and uses it as a point of depar-
ture for its sui generis regime. See E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 20, 25 (cited
in note 7) (Recitals 4-12 and art. 3(1)).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-64 (allowing a second comer to use
disparate data in value-adding directory of its own making).
52. See, for example, 17 U.S.C. §§ 108 (reproduction by libraries and archives), 109(a)
(first-sale doctrine), 110(a) (face-to-face teaching activities), 110(b) (broadcasts of nondramatic
literary or musical works for certain educational purposes), 114 (limiting rights and scope of
protection in sound recordings), 115 (compulsory license for musical works recorded on sound
recordings), 117 (archival uses of computer programs), 118 (exemptions for use by noncom-
mercial broadcasters), 120 (right to photograph architectural works).
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tion "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing... scholarship, or research.
53
Taken together, these and other features of the mature copy-
right paradigm usually afford protection only against wholesale copy-
ing of the original selection and arrangement underlying any eligible
compilation of data. This, in turn, greatly diminishes the value of
copyright protection even to database publishers who satisfy the
eligibility criteria. The exclusive reproduction and derivative work
rights, as construed by the Supreme Court, will not normally prevent
unauthorized extractions of disparate data for either competing or
value-adding uses.54 In the United States, this doctrine of weak or
"thin" protection for factual works has been reinforced by first
amendment concerns, which some courts and commentators view as
further mandating broad access to the disparate facts that result from
a compiler's efforts. 55
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 ed.). While the availability of other statutory exceptions usually
varies with the nature of the subject matter at issue, the fair use exception applies to all subject
matter categories. Even so, overriding the copyright owner's exclusive rights in the name of fair
use remains an atypical result contingent on a judicial evaluation of the special "purpose and
character of the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount and substantiality of
the portion used" and the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." See, for example, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors to be considered); Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169-79, 127 L. Ed. 2d 500, 525 (1994) (finding a
commercial parody a fair use within the meaning of the § 107); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (finding the use in question not fair under § 107).
54. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (2) (1994 ed.); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-51 (discussing the
limitation of copyright of factual compilations); Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that copyright protection
with respect to factual compilations after Feist appears "thin"); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937
F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a variant format for baseball game data did not in-
fringe copyright in original format); Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d
671, 674 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that charts of winning numbers from gambling activities did not
meet standards for copyright protection); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1446 (11th Cir., 1993) (holding that the use of a
telephone directory as a guide for business solicitation did not violate copyright standards). If
courts strictly apply Feist at both the eligibility and scope of protection phases, and thus con-
tinue to reject stronger protection based on "sweat-of-the-brow" investment theories, the effect
is to "strip[] ... away or sharply reduce[] ... the copyright protection afforded a variety of
'information products,' from directories and mailing lists to computerized databases." Ginsburg,
92 Colum. L. Rev. at 339 (cited in note 44). See also Denicola, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 516 (cited in
note 46) (advocating compiler's copyright to overcome lack of incentives); Ginsburg, 90 Colum.
L. Rev. at 1907, 1924 (cited in note 8) (advocating copyright protection of low-authorship factual
works, including databases, but proposing compulsory license for derivative users of data).
55. See, for example, Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (stressing adverse effects on free flow of
information by "creat[ing] ... monopol[ies] in public domain materials"); Harper & Row v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (stressing first amendment interest in unrestricted
availability of facts); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204,
207 (2d Cir. 1986) (stressing "risk [ofl putting large areas of factual research material off limits
and threaten[ing] the public's unrestrained access to information"). See also Philip H. Miller,
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Lately, however, some federal appellate courts have begun to
rebel against Feist and to reinstate stronger copyright protection for
factual compilations and databases by subtle doctrinal manipula-
tion.56 As our previous work has shown, these cyclical fluctuations
between states of under- and overprotection are a characteristic
response to borderline subject matters that fit imperfectly within the
classical patent and copyright paradigms.
57
B. Destabilizing Trends in the Information Age
By the late 1980s, digital technologies and new telecommuni-
cations networks had combined to produce "the greatest changes in
the way information is distributed since the invention of printing by
movable type in the fifteenth century. ' 5 The use of computers made
it economically feasible to collect, store, manage, and deliver huge
amounts of data at a time when continuously expanding databases
have become the building blocks of knowledge, especially in the obser-
Note, Life After Feist: Facts, the First Amendment, and the Copyright Status of Automated
Databases, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 507, 509 (1991) (discussing the relationship between the
freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment and the author's right to copyright); Michael J.
Haungs, Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment, 23 Colum.
J. Law & Soc. Probs. 347, 364 (1990) (discussing "[tihe tension between copyright law and the
First Amendment's protection of free exchange of ideas. . ."); Denicola, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 540
(cited in note 46) ("Copyright does not significantly interfere with first amendment
values .... ). For the view that legal protection of facts and data as such is consistent with the
First Amendment on certain conditions, such as the availability of noncommercial fair use and
compulsory licenses, see Ginsburg, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 384-87 (cited in note 44).
56. See, for example, CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting the low threshold of originality required for copyright
protection); Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the high degree of correlation between compilations violated copyright law). See
also Samuelson, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. at 397-413 (cited in note 49).
57. See, for example, Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 512-17, 513 n.176 (cited
in note 3).
Factors pulling for over- or underprotection already exist on both sides of the classical
line of demarcation [between the patent and copyright subsystems]. On the copyright
side ... for example, a broad derivative work right sometimes overprotects by favoring
overlapping claims to incremental innovation while restricting access to ideas, methods
and processes by indirect means and for a very long duration.... Yet, underprotection
can result from the inability of copyright-like models to protect the internal dynamic
features of technological innovation, in which idea and expression merge, and also from
the lack of any exclusive right to control end use .... Similarly, on the industrial prop-
erty side ... , "overprotection results from the progressive monopolization of ever
smaller aggregates of inventive activity, which elevate social costs in return for no
clearly equilibrated social benefits. Yet, the nonobviousness standard and its variants
can also induce states of chronic underprotection by excluding the bulk of the incre-
mental innovations that underlie today's most promising technologies."
Id. (quoting Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2504 n.401 (cited in note 2)).
58. Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright and the National Information Infrastructure in the United
States, 18 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 120 (1996).
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vational sciences. 9 Electronic databases further blur the line between
the collection and application functions by allowing users to make
their own tailor-made extractions from the mass of data available in
the collection as a whole. In other words, digital technologies break
through the functional rigidities of print media by providing users
with "extraction tools that enable them to sort and arrange data in
ways meaningful to them."60  By thus extending "the manipulative
abilities of the information user's mind," these tools allow users to
"add... immense value to what would otherwise be masses of inco-
herent, disparate data.
'61
Moreover, the latest value-adding data products, once dissemi-
nated worldwide via the Internet and other media, frequently lead to
the rapid production of new technical innovations, which result in the
generation of more data. Electronic publishing thus broadly advances
the revolutionary process that computerization began, and it makes
both data and research results potentially available at very low cost
all over the world.
62
As this digital and telecommunications revolution created vast
new markets for electronic information goods and tools,63 it outpaced
the legal infrastructure, which remains geared to the slower-moving
print media.64 This strain manifests itself in two contradictory ways.
59. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
60. Gregory M. Hunsuker, Raising a Toll Fence to Protect the "Noncreative" Labors of
Database Makers: The European Database Directive, Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L.
J. (forthcoming, 1997).
61. Id. See also text accompanying notes 328-54 (discussing these issues).
62. See, for example, Paul A. David and Dominique Foray, Accessing and Expanding the
Science and Technology Knowledge Base, 16 Sci., Tech. & Ind. Rev. 3, 38-59 (OECD ed., 1995);
Paul Ginsparg, Winners and Losers in the Global Research Village, paper presented to
Conference held at UNESCO headquarters, Paris, Feb. 19-23, 1996 (1995) ("UNESCO Paper")
(on file with the Authors). See also Cristiano Antonelli, The Economic Theory of Information
Networks, in Cristano Antonelli, ed., The Economics of Information Networks 5-28 (Elsevier
Science Publishing Co., 1992).
63. See, for example, Hunsuker, European Database Directive (cited in note 60) (quoting
sources that estimate the value of the global information industry will reach $3 trillion by early
in the next century); W. Joseph Melnick, A Comparative Analysis of Proposals for the Legal
Protection of Computerized Databases: NAFTA vs. the European Communities, 26 Case W. Res.
J. Int'l L. 57, 59 n.14 (1994) (quoting sources that estimate the E.C. database market at $10.2
billion, which represented about 30% of the world market in 1994).
64. See, for example, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:
The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 211 (Sept. 1995) ('U.S. White
Paper") (noting the difficulty in keeping intellectual property laws up-to-date with technology);
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of
Technology: Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action COM (88) 172 Final (June 7, 1988).
The Authors have elsewhere argued that the legal problems presented by electronic data-
bases are assimilable to those of industrial designs, computer programs, plant varieties, bioge-
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Sometimes digital technology aggravates the basic market failure
characteristic of information goods and thus deepens a chronic state
of underprotection. This occurs, for example, when second comers
download the originator's data and enter the market with a competing
product that free-rides on the originator's investment.65 At other
times, however, digital technology so thoroughly overcomes the threat
of market failure that it endows the initial investor with abnormal
market power that can result in a chronic state of overprotection.
This occurs, for example, when sole-source data providers charge
monopolistic prices or oblige libraries and research institutions to
accept terms and conditions that effectively waive both the special
privileges and the fair use exceptions set out in the Copyright Act of
1976.66
1. The Vulnerability of Publicly Distributed Electronic Databases
Only modest familiarity with the capabilities of digital tech-
nologies is required to understand the vulnerabilities of publicly
distributed electronic databases to market-destructive appropria-
tions.6 7 Once compilations of data are electronically disseminated in
netically engineered products, and numerous other forms of design-dependent, subpatentable
innovations that fall into a widening penumbra between the increasingly obsolete patent and
copyright paradigms. See Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2504-58 (cited in note 2) (proposing a
third intellectual property paradigm based on liability principles); Samuelson, Davis, Kapor,
and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2365-2420, 2429-31 (cited in note 11) (proposing such a
regime for computer programs).
65. See, for example, CCC Information Services Inc., 44 F.3d at 72 (stating that CCC took
"virtually the entire compendium" of Maclean's used car valuations and "effectively offer[ed] to
sell its customers Maclean's Red Book through CCC's database"); Warren Publishing, Inc., 52
F.3d at 955 (indicating that statistically, Microdos's work contained from 96 to 99% of Warren's
data on nationwide cable television services), vacated on other grounds, 67 F.3d 276 (11th Cir.
1995).
66. See, for example, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Finding a Balance:
Computer Software, Intellectual Property, and the Challenge of Technological Change 166-79
(U.S. G.P.O., 1992) (describing controversy surrounding the conduct of software licensors in
obliging libraries to abrogate "rights described in the copyright law"); U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electonics and Information
163 (U.S. G.P.O., 1986) ("OTA Repore'); William R. Cornish, Copyright in Scientific Works
(Scientific Communications, Computer Software, Data Banks): An Introduction, in Max Planck
Gesellschaft, ed., European Research Structures-Changes and Challenges: The Role and
Function of Intellectual Property Rights 50 (1994) (despite case for a measure of free reprogra-
phy for purposes of academic research, "academic institutions are regarded as relatively soft
targets by publishing interests [in U.K.], which have looked at them as suitable points for
inserting initial wedges"). See generally Reichman, 25 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. at
461-68 (cited in note 44); Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright
Misuse, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1087, 1094 (1994) (noting the judicial criticism of some software
copyright plaintiffs for engaging in monopolistic practices).
67. See, for example, Final E.C. Directive, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 20 (cited in note 7)
(describing the need for granting legal protection to the makers of databases in Recitals 7-12);
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databases that are made available to the public, second comers can
easily and cheaply copy or manipulate the contents of such databases
and disseminate the resulting products to large numbers of people.6
With access to global information networks becoming ubiquitous in
developed nations, compilers of publicly disseminated databases face
diminishing prospects for commercial success unless they obtain the
legal or technical means to thwart egregious forms of free-riding.69
When, moreover, second comers employ existing technology to
make different selections from, and arrangements of, the data 0 con-
tained in electronically published databases, they may avoid infring-
ing the originator's own copyrights, if any, and in some jurisdictions,
even qualify for copyrights of their own in the resulting products.
Second comers can then exploit their versions in competition with the
database provider from whom they appropriated the data.71 Because
of the widespread availability of scanning and other conversion
equipment, even print compilations can readily be converted to elec-
tronic form and manipulated with the same electronic information
tools. 72
To the extent that government-generated or university-gener-
ated data remain noncommercialized, their vulnerability to techni-
cally refined means of accessing, downloading, or duplication may be
of relatively little importance. Presumably, the originators want the
broadest possible distribution of their data sets. Even here, however,
there are some concerns that are likely to grow over time. For
example, governments may impose cost recovery conditions on the use
Information Industry Association, Database Protection: An Industry Perspective on the Issues
(Aug. 1995) ("IIA Report").
68. IIA Report at 3 (cited in note 67).
69. See, for example, id. at 32. See also U.S. White Paper at 130-54, 177-90 (cited in note
64); Paul Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31 (1992).
70. See, for example, Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2414
(cited in note 11).
71. See, for example, Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 607, 609 (1992)
C'Under the Supreme Court's analysis [in Feist], a competitor would be infringing no copyright if
it simply stole the data and left the base."); Pamela Samuelson, Legal Protection for Database
Contents, 39 Communications of the ACM (forthcoming Dec. 1996).
72. At first, the European Commission proposed a sui generis right only for electronic
databases. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Legal Protection of Databases, COM (92) 24 final--SYN 393, art. 1 (1992) ("First E.C.
Proposal on Databases"). The Commission did not explain why later drafts of the database
directive broadened the term "database" so that the sui generis right would apply to print data
compilations as well as electronic databases. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 1(2), 1996
O.J. (L 77) at 24 (cited in note 7). It is reasonable to assume, however, that the publishing
industries must have brought scanning technologies and the like to the Commission's attention.
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of data that third parties who obtain unauthorized access could
avoid.73 Additionally, unauthorized users who introduce errors into a
new product could also inadvertently corrupt the original database,
perhaps leading to liability.74
Over time, moreover, the distinction between "pure" or non-
commercialized data and data applied to industrial pursuits seems
likely to break down, as has routinely occurred in other disciplines,
notably computer science and biotechnology.75 Universities and other
research institutions may view data compilations generated in the
course of research as potential revenue sources, especially in an era of
declining government support for research endeavors, just as they
have done with regard to patentable inventions. 76 As more scientific
data are commodified, the data collectors must necessarily distinguish
between sources that are made publicly available without charge and
those that are not.77 Otherwise, even the providers that do not charge
for data could disrupt contractually controlled applications of their
own data downstream, not to mention the risk that the non-charging
government or academic generator might inadvertently infringe on
third parties' proprietary domains.
A related trend is for some governments around the world to
commercialize their data, regardless of whether other governments
follow suit.78 As this occurs, the former will become concerned about
the vulnerability of their data even if the latter are not. By the same
token, the providers that still choose not to charge for their services
will increasingly come into contact with-and, perhaps, conflict
73. See, for example, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget
Memorandum by Alice M. Rivlin, Implementing the Information Dissemination Provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Sept. 29, 1995) ("OMB Implementing Memo"); notes 307-09
and accompanying text.
74. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 3 (cited in note 32).
75. See, for example, Allen Newell, Response" The Models Are Broken! The Models Are
Broken!, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1023, 1026 (1986) (discussing the lack of a gap between basic and
applied science as regards computer program algorithms and noting that the patent system has
traditionally rewarded only industrial applications of scientific discoveries). See also Joseph
Straus and Rainier Moufang, Deposit and Release of Biotechnological Material for the Purpose of
Patent Procedure 95 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990) (discussing biotechnological research
and development); Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the
Procrustean Bed, 17 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L. J. 1, 33-34 (1991) (noting the difficulty in dis-
tiguishing products from processes for patentable biotechnological inventions).
76. See notes 283-97 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical benefits to science
from commodifying data collections).
77. See, for example, John Browning, Cyber View: Playing Facts and Loose, Sci. American
30, 32 (June 1996) (warning about unintended effects of legal restrictions on searching and
gathering data).




with-the legal and technical fences that states bent on commercial-
izing data may erect. As one observer put it, "the division between
the two regimes" could become "a dam over which information will not
easily flow," whereas worldwide economic growth seems to require
that "[m]ore than perhaps any other commodity, data must be allowed
to move without barriers. 79
To the extent that databases are commercialized, whatever
their origin, the refined digital technologies that enhance the com-
piler's power to collect and disseminate the data contained in the
database have equally enhanced the free-riding competitor's power to
appropriate the fruits of the compiler's investment.80 The second
comer who purchases the originator's product, say, in the form of a
CD-ROM, may electronically extract and recompile the data in ques-
tion at a fraction of the originator's collection and distribution costs.
The second product may then be sold for less than the first, because
its publisher has contributed nothing directly or indirectly to the costs
of research and production. Digital technology also enables second
comers to extract and recombine the originator's data into value-
adding products that improve on the original or that compete in
different and sometimes distant market segments.81 In some cases,
third parties may simply extract the compiler's data in order to make
them available over telecommunications networks, a gesture that can
destroy any residual incentives to invest.8 2
79. Charles von Simson, Feist or Famine: American Database Copyright as an Economic
Model for the European Union, 20 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 729, 768 (1994). In this context, govern-
ments that have not commercialized data in the past may decide to do so in order to have rights
to trade when seeking access to data collections that are commodified elsewhere. The asymme-
try likely to occur if one government can take all of another's data while restricting the appro-
priation of its own data may give rise to data trade wars.
80. If the second comer independently generates its own data, or combines its inputs with
the first comer's data to produce value-adding applications, the former contributes knowledge,
capital, and skilled efforts to the data-generating communities' overall endeavor. These second
comers who do not merely duplicate or "clone" the first comer's product are hardly free-riders
even when they do not contribute directly to the first comer's production costs under a licensed
royalty transaction. See generally Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2521-23, 2535-39 (cited in
note 2).
81. See generally Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2417-20
(cited in note 11) (proposing a market-oriented legal regime for protection of industrial designs
of software).
82. In one recent case, for example, a database maker spent about $10 million to compile
some ninety-five million residential and commercial listings from some 3,000 telephone directo-
ries. A purchaser who paid a minimal amount for compact discs of these listings electronically
extracted the data and then made their listing available over the Internet. ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Hunsucker, European Database Directive
(cited in note 60).
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2. Relative Invulnerability of Many Privately Controlled
Electronic Databases
While none of the legislative initiatives under review have
spawned an empirical study of the economics of the database indus-
try, all the anecdotal evidence-including evidence recently collected
by the National Research Council-suggests that the market for com-
mercially distributed databases is almost universally characterized by
a distinct absence of competition.8 3 The reasons for this phenomenon
have yet to be clarified. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is
that startup and servicing costs have typically proved so high in rela-
tion to the relatively small size of specialized user markets that it has
discouraged second comers from hazarding the risks of entry.84
Whatever the truth of this hypothesis, once the threshold level of
investment has been crossed, the first comer tends to take the rele-
vant market segment as a whole. The private database industry is
thus largely characterized by niche marketers who supply and domi-
nate specific market segments.8 5
When a database maker is the sole source for the data in ques-
tion, and substitute databases cannot readily be compiled from public
domain sources, digital technology can greatly strengthen a supplier's
already formidable market power. By restricting access to identifi-
able online subscribers, for example, and by "placing conditions on
access and [using technology] to monitor... customer usage," the
publisher can largely restore the power of the two-party contractual
deal that the advent of the printing press had appeared to destroy.8
In effect, publishers in this position may not need copyright law at all,
even if they qualify for protection. They may prefer contractually to
reject the state-imposed cultural bargain87 and override both its fair-
83. See National Research Council, Bits ofPower at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Litman, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 611 (cited in note 71) ("Indeed, a large number of on-
line database ... [publishers] availed themselves of those strategies well before the Feist deci-
sion.").
87. See, for example, Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps
Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law,
29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 595, 599-600 (1996) (stressing the "economic and cultural bargain
between authors and users.., at the heart of U.S. [copyright] law, as reflected in the Patent
and Copyright Clause [of the Constitution], and a parade of Supreme Court precedents... ").
See also Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theomy, 43 UCLA L.
Rev. 1, 6-22 (1995) (discussing the incentive structure of copyright law).
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use provisions and its specific exemptions favoring the public interest
in teaching and research. 88
Moreover, electronic publishers may have virtually no transac-
tion cost problems to overcome because digital technology enables
them to track and charge for every instance of electronic access, even
for browsing and scientific uses that were previously exempt.8 9 The
resulting market power then allows the publisher to impose monopoly
prices and potentially oppressive terms on users, including libraries,
academies, institutes, and research centers, and to ignore the social
consequences that ensue from the inability of research organizations
to pay for such access. °
Whether contractual attempts to reduce users' access to scien-
tific and cultural products that copyright laws had promoted in the
past will survive legal challenges on such grounds as federal pre-
emption of state law or misuses of copyright (allied to antitrust law)
remains to be seen.91 Equally unclear is the role that libraries will
play once information providers "can connect directly to the user" via
digital transmission over telecommunications networks. 92 Some ob-
servers see the changing role of libraries as grounds for allowing
publishers virtually unfettered discretion to impose contractual condi-
tions on libraries' access to networked transmissions. 93 Others see the
88. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text; Reichman, 25 Intl. Rev. Ind., Prop. &
Copyright. L. at 461-67 (cited in note 44) ("Public Interest at Odds" with the "Two-Party Deal");
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls?: Speculations on Literary Property in the Library
of the Future, 42 Representations 53, 60-63 (Spring 1993). The resulting social harm is
magnified by the absence of competition.
89. Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway-From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 223-24
(Hill & Wang, 1994); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L.
J. 29, 31-32 (1994) (reviewing the National Information Infrastructure Task Force Draft Report
and arguing that its recommendations would enhance copyright owners' control over uses of
digitalized works).
90. See OTA Report (cited in note 66) (stressing similar concerns); Kurtz, 18 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rev. at 124 (cited in note 58). See also notes 298-319 and accompanying text.
91. See, for example, Kreiss, 43 UCLA L. Rev. at 32-34 (cited in note 87) (discussing the
argument that all copyrighted works should be accessible); Leaffer, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. at
1106-07 (cited in note 66) (arguing antitrust law is properly the "sole regulator" of anti-competi-
tive conduct in copyright cases); David A Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy:
Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 543, 622-28 (1992) (considering whether preemption analysis is affected by contract context
or relationship). See also Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe at 411-35, 635-63 (cited in
note 50). But see 17 U.S.C. § 108(0(4) (allowing contractual obligations to override specified
library privileges).
92. Ginsburg, 42 Representations at 60 (cited in note 88).
93. See, for example, id. at 60-63 (suggesting that publishers may condition libraries'
access to digitally delivered information on compliance with a variety of restrictions, regardless
of principles such as fair use, and that information providers need not resort to libraries as
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dependence of users on digital transmissions for the future acquisi-
tion of scientific knowledge as grounds for generalizing some of to-
day's library and fair use privileges to online users everywhere. 94 In
any event, the foregoing analysis shows that digitalized transmission
of data over telecommunications networks may do more than expose
originators to free-riding duplication. In many other cases, it may
foster the potential abuse of market power or the misuse of an
intellectual property right.
III. THE DRIVE FOR LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES
The copyright laws of most developed countries exclude func-
tionally determined databases and do not protect disparate data even
when a given compilation as a whole happens to satisfy the eligibility
requirements of those laws.95 This leaves a perceived gap in the
worldwide intellectual property system, at least to the extent that
commercial data providers cannot rely on contracts and encryption
devices to prevent the technically refined forms of free-riding dis-
cussed above.9 6 Proposals are, therefore, being put forward to protect
conduits for digital information in the future except, perhaps, as a "full-service 'help-line' "). But
see Jane C. Ginsburg, Surveying the Borders of Copyright, 41 J. Copyright Soc'y, 322, 325-26
(arguing for some legal restraints on such contractual conditions).
94. See, for example, Goldstein, Celestial Jukebox at 230 (cited in note 89) ("Exemptions
and compulsory licenses for research and educational uses recognize the transcendent claim
these uses have on a copyright system whose founding premise is that a culture can be built
only if toilers in the vineyard are free to draw on the works of their predecessors."); Marci A.
Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement. Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 27 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 613, 623-33 (1996) (emphasizing the need to construct a "free-use zone.., in the
on-line era"). For the view that developing countries should formulate tailor-made doctrines of
misuse to govern information providers' contracts, see J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair
Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.
(forthcoming 1997).
95. See notes 50-57 and accompanying text. This principle was incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement of 1994, art. 10, in Results of the Uruguay Round at 370-71 (cited in note 1),
which requires copyright protection when "the selection or arrangement of... contents consti-
tute intellectual creations," but stipulates that such protection "shall not extend to the data or
material itself." Id.
96. The extent of the "gap" is controversial, in part because the U.S. dominates the world
market, despite its lack of legal protection for the contents of databases. The U.K., which is the
only country in Europe that confers full copyright protection on virtually all databases, domi-
nates the market in the European Union. See, for example, Debra B. RosIer, The European
Union's Proposed Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases: A New Threat to the Free Flow
of Information, 10 High Tech. L. J. 105, 139 (1995) (identifying the growing regional disparity
within the European information industry). Increasingly, moreover, "a vigorous contract regime
may afford the information provider the incentive to seek, develop, and commercialize informa-
tion that, under a copyright regime might not have been worth pursuing." Ginsburg, 41 J.
Copyright Soc'y at 325-26 (cited in note 93). In the absence of empirical data to clarify the
underlying economic realities the need for database protection remains speculative. Compare
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noncopyrightable databases under ad hoc or sui generis intellectual
property regimes that deviate from the classical patent and copyright
models underlying the Paris and Berne Conventions. 97 These pro-
posals are, in turn, logical constituents of a larger project to create a
national and global information infrastructure that is pending at both
the domestic and international levels.
9 8
The impetus for the database initiative came from the
Commission of the European Communities, whose member states
have embraced a policy of commercializing government-generated
data.99 This policy is diametrically opposed to the traditional policy of
the United States, which has favored free and open access to scientific
data. 00
Starting in the 1990s, the Commission of the European
Communities began to reevaluate the legal status of databases, espe-
cially electronic databases, in the process of formulating an overall
strategy for information technologies known as the Information
Market Policy Action Program (IMPACT). 101 The Commission found
Laurence M. Kaye, The Proposed E.U. Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases: A
Cornerstone of the Information Society?, 12 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 583 (1985) (viewing legal
protection as economically indispensible) with von Simson, 20 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. at 767-68
(cited in note 79) (predicting that protected database producers will lose ground on the world
market to producers operating under more competitive conditions).
97. See notes 5-11 and accompanying text. For the official line of demarcation between
"writings" and "products" that underlies the Paris and Berne Conventions, see note 1, and its
gradual disintegration under pressure from a proliferating set of hybrid (i.e, sui generis) regimes
that deviate from the patent and copyright models, see Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J.
at 480-551 (cited in note 3). See also Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2448-2519 (cited in note
2).
98. See notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
99. While the Commission claims that a key motive is the need to harmonize E.U. law,
critics debunk this claim because Article 10 of the TRIPS Agreement partly performed this func-
tion, and because the E.C.'s database regime, as finally adopted, actually discourages harmoni-
zation on the crucial issue of fair use. See, for example, Charles R. McManis, International
Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology: Taking TRIPS on the
Information Superhighway, Vill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996). The predominant objective, among
those stated, is to increase the share of European database producers in the world market. See,
for example, First E.C. Proposal on Databases at 2-14 (cited in note 72) (Explanatory
Memorandum emphasizing goal of promoting E.C. database industries). See also E.C. Directive
on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 20 (cited in note 7) (noting in Recital 11 that "there is at
present a very great imbalance in the level of investment in the database sector").
100. See, for example, Bits of Power at 1 (cited in note 32). See also notes 33-36 and
accompanying text.
101. See, for example, Commission of the European Communities, 1991 Report on the
IMPACT Program: Main Events and Developments in the Electronic Information Services
Market, COM (93) 156 final (1991); Commission of the European Communities, Working
Program of the Commission in the Field of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, COM (90) 584
final (1990); Rosler, 10 High Tech. L. J. at 105, 107, 110-13 (cited in note 96). The IMPACT
program specifically addressed the goal of improving the position of the European Union's
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that European database producers had to overcome several compara-
tive disadvantages in order to expand their share of the world market
and to catch up with the U.S. industry, which dominated the market
and was growing at a faster rate than its European counterpart. To
overcome these disadvantages, the Commission stressed the need for
a single, integrated market, undistorted by differing regulatory
approaches, and for higher levels of intellectual property protection,
tailored to the needs of potential investors in database production,
which might stimulate additional investment in this sector.
10 2
Another unstated premise in the Commission's thinking was, per-
haps, that privatizing the government's role in the collection and
distribution of data might also generate income streams that could
help to offset the shrinking availability of public funds for research
and development.
The Commission decided both to harmonize the domestic copy-
right laws insofar as they applied to compilations of data and to re-
quire that the member states also adopt sui generis intellectual prop-
erty laws to protect the contents of noncopyrightable electronic data-
bases. 0 3 In this regard, the Nordic countries had already experi-
mented with short-term, copyright-like protection of noncopyrightable
compilations-known as the Nordic "catalogue rule"-with a view to
curbing commercial piracy without extending full copyright protection
to borderline literary productions that lacked creative authorship.10 4
member countries in the emerging global market for information goods. Among the strategies it
endorsed were proposals to strengthen intellectual property rights, to protect new technologies,
and to stimulate both international trade and European economic development.
102. See, for example, First E.C. Proposal on Databases at 2-4 (cited in note 72); Rosler, 10
High Tech. L. J. at 109-10, 133-39 (cited in note 96) (citing authorities). The Commission
stressed the vulnerability of database publishers to market failure, but devoted little or no
published attention to the countervailing risk of technologically induced overprotection. The
Commission did nonetheless attempt to avert overprotection of database contents by a require-
ment that sole-source database providers license their data on fair and non-discriminatory
terms. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 8(1) (cited in note 72). But, this plan was
foiled by the Council of Ministers at the last moment. See notes 133, 187-88 and accompanying
text.
103. See E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25-27 (cited in note 7) (arts 3-6
(copyright), 7-11 (sui generis right)). For earlier versions, see First E.C. Proposal on Databases
(cited in note 72); Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, COM (93) 464 final-SYN 393 (1993) ('Amended
E.C. Proposal on Databases"); Common Position (E.C.) No. 20/95, adopted 10 July 1995, with a
view to adopting Directive 95/ /E.C. of the European Parliament and of the Council of the
European Union on the Legal Protection of Databases (95/C/288/02), 1995 O.J. (C 288) 14, 14-21
CE.C. Common Position").
104. See, for example, Gunnar Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in E.J. Dommering and
P.B. Hugenholtz, eds., Protecting Works of Fact 67-72 (KliAwer Law & Taxation, 1991)
(analyzing the history and scope of protections of the Nordic Catalogue Rule). Laws implement-
ing this regime "prohibit slavish reproduction, in whole or in part, of 'catalogues, tables, and
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Accordingly, in 1992, the Commission proposed an innovative
directive to protect such databases that was "loosely modelled on the
Nordic catalogue rule, [and] more directly and strongly protects elec-
tronic information tools."1°5 A greatly amended version of this pro-
posal was adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament in July 1995106 which, with only modest, technical
changes, took effect on March 11, 1996.107
In the following Sections, we track the evolution of the
European Database Directive ("E.C. Directive" or "Final E.C.
Directive") in considerable detail, for two principal reasons. First,
this legislative history illustrates how a modest, pro-competitive
initial proposal for sui generis protection has been transformed into a
virtually absolute monopoly by the backdoor lobbying efforts of pub-
lishers and by the coordinated efforts of U.S. and E.U. officials to
propogate a protectionist strategy for the global information infra-
structure. As will become apparent in Part IV, there was wisdom in
earlier drafts of the E.C. Directive upon which we think a better sui
generis law could be built. Second, this legislative history also reveals
how radically the world intellectual property policymaking arena has
similar compilations in which a large number of particulars have been summarized,' including
databases, for ten years after first publication.... [I]ndustrious effort and investment rather
than creativity are the prerequisites .... Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2492-93 (cited in
note 2) (quoting Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule in Dommering & Hugenholtz eds.,
Protecting Works of Fact at 67-72 and noting pre-digital ambiguities of this law).
105. Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2493 (cited in note 2). See also Jean Hughes and
Elizabeth Weightman, E.C. Database Protection: Fine Tuning the Comnmission's Proposal, 14
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 147, 148 (1992) (indicating that the Directive goes beyond the Nordic rule
and protects against re-use of the data compiled).
106. See generally E.C. Common Position, 1995 O.J. (C 288) at 14-29 (cited in note 103).
107. See E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) at 25 (cited in note 7). The Directive
as finally adopted may be subdivided into five parts: (1) a list of sixty "Recitals" or premises
that underlie this legislation; (2) a small group of definitional articles that apply across the
board (arts. 1-2); (3) a set of provisions regulating the treatment of databases under the
member states' domestic copyright laws (arts. 3-6); (4) a set of provisions requiring these same
states to provide the new, sui generis intellectual property right for noncopyrightable databases
(arts. 7-11); and (5) a final group of "common provisions" that apply to both copyright and the
sui generis laws (arts. 12-16). The copyright provisions in the E.C. Directive on Databases
reserve full copyright protection only for those databases in which "the selection or arrangement
of... contents... constitutes the author's own intellectual creation," and they forbid states to
apply other eligibility criteria, such as the "industrious effort" (or "sweat-of-the-brow") criterion
heretofore recognized by courts in the United Kingdom. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art
3(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7). The drafters also specify that copyright protection
extends only to the author's creative selection and arrangement, and not to the contents of the
database as such. Id. art. 3(2). These eligibility and scope of protection clauses thus restate
familiar doctrines recognized in most domestic copyright systems (except for that of the United
Kingdom, where broad copyright protection of electronic databases will be cut back) and pose
fewer new questions than the sui generis regime.
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changed in the last several years. In this climate, it is literally possi-
ble for an as yet unimplemented legislative initiative of one govern-
ment to become an international minimum standard for other gov-
ernments before most people affected by it, including the scientific
and educational communities, even know that proposals for new
intellectual property rights have been put on the table.
A. The European Union's Initial Project
Collections of data, including those relatively unstructured
collections of primary interest to science, have never fit comfortably
within the romantic notion of authorship that once dominated
European copyright law or even within the more pragmatic concep-
tions of "originality" that pervade modern copyright laws, such as that
of the United States. Behind this conceptual resistance there lies a
profound concern that facts and ideas constitute building blocks of
intellectual discourse that should not (and some contend cannot con-
stitutionally) be removed from the public domain.108 In this context,
the scientific community's own commitment to the free and unre-
stricted flow of data 09 represents an important subchapter in a larger
discourse that, in this country, at least, is rooted in the First
Amendment.110
With these constraints in mind, the Commission of the
European Communities pursued two objectives. One was to harmo-
nize the rules of the member states with regard to copyrightable da-
tabases. The other was to fill a perceived gap in existing intellectual
property regimes with regard to electronic compilations of data, which
appeared particularly vulnerable to market-destructive appropria-
tions.
1. The Copyright Provisions
The copyright provisions in the E.C. Directive are, at first
glance, less remarkable than the sui generis regime that it attempts
to introduce for the first time. The most obvious change was the
adoption of an "intellectual creation" standard for copyrightable data-
108. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 3 (cited in note 32) ("Data in science are like
bricks, and the theoretical concepts are the mortar that connects them to give the subject its
structure."). See also notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
109. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
110. See notes 50-55 and accompanying text. See also Ginsburg, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 338
(cited in note 44); Litman, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 607 (cited in note 71); Melvin B. Nimmer and
David Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright §§ 1.10[C][2] and 1.10 [D] (Matthew Bender, 1996).
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bases marketed anywhere within the European Union, and rejection
of the United Kingdom's "sweat of the brow" standard of eligibility for
future databases.', But the E.C. Directive's copyright component also
extended database authors' exclusive rights to encompass temporary
reproductions, online transmissions, and certain other uses, while
later drafts authorized member states to adopt some restrictions on
the scope of these exclusive rights.12  A closer look at this last
provision suggests that its real intent was to limit the power of
member states to apply, let alone extend, traditional copyright
exceptions, including exceptions for private or research uses,"3 on
which the scientific and educational communities have long relied.
114
111. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 3(1), 1996 O.J. (L77) at 25 (cited in note 7). See
note 48 above concerning the U.K. standard. In the final E.C. Directive on Databases, the
copyright owner's exclusive rights are broadened to include "temporary or permanent
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part" as well as "any communication,
display or performance to the public" either of the original database or of "the results
of... [any] translation, adaption, arrangement and any other alteration." See E.C. Directive on
Databases, art. 5(a), (b), (d), (e), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7).
112. For restrictions on the scope of protection, see id. art. 6(2).
113. The Directive, authorizes member states to exempt "reproduction for private purposes
of a non-electronic database." Id. art. 6(2)(a). This would seem to mean that this same exemp-
tion does not apply to electronic databases, even though academic institutions and research
organizations have long taken it for granted with respect to print media. To be sure, a "lawful
user of a database" (i.e., a subscriber, licensee or purchaser of a CD-ROM) will "not require the
authorization of the author" for acts inherently "necessary for the purposes of access to the
contents of the database and normal use of the contents." Id. art. 6(1). Moreover, private use
via networked transmissions constitutes the primary market for any electronic databases,
whether or not copyrightable. Yet, the absence of any "private use" exception for electronic
databases covered by copyright laws, however logical, makes other exceptions for teaching and
research activities correspondingly more important. The Directive expressly confines these to
"use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research ... to the extent
justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved." Id. art. 6(3). Lest there be any doubts
about the drafters' true intentions, the Directive expressly denies states the right to derogate
from this provision when implementing "other exceptions to copyright which are traditionally
authorized under national laws." Id. art. 6(2)(d). It then ups the ante by paraphrasing the
Berne Convention's own strictures against so-called public-interest exceptions that unreason-
ably prejudice the rightholder's legitimate interests or that conflict with a normal exploitation of
the database. Id. art. 6(3).
114. The advent of a number of new technologies, including photocopying machines,
computer programs, and optical scanners, have unsettled the public policy limitations on copy-
rights, such as the fair use doctrine, in recent years. See generally American Geophysical Union
v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that systematic photocopying of articles for
commercial research purposes infringed copyright); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. Intell.
Prop. L. 49 (1993). These technologies enable copies for private research uses to displace
commercial markets. See, for example, Goldstein, Celestial Jukebox at 129-30 (cited in note 89)
C[T]he risk has grown that 'private' copies will displace the retail sales and rentals of the
authorized originals from which publishers, record companies, and motion picture producers
earn their revenues."). The extent to which private photocopying of journals for research
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While the precise mesh of these provisions in administrative
and judicial practice remains to be seen, the drafter's protectionist
thrust is unmistakable. Prior to the E.C. Directive, the broad ex-
emptions and immunities afforded copies made for teaching and re-
search activities under most domestic copyright laws were engrafted
onto the Berne Convention's exclusive reproduction right and, within
limits, appeared to lie outside the normal range of exploitative activi-
ties reserved to authors.115 A separate provision in Article 10(2) of the
Berne Convention then authorized certain other uses of works "by
way of illustration for teaching," such as face-to-face teaching activi-
ties and educational broadcasts, which did not apply to "mere scien-
tific research."116 These uses were roughly analogous to "annotations,"
which are permitted by article 10(1) of the Berne Convention."1
In contrast, the copyright provisions of the E.C. Directive seem
to recognize "illustration for teaching or scientific research" as the
"sole purpose" for which the educational and scientific communities
may invoke "fair use." 8 In other words, the E.C. Directive expands
purposes without compensation remains a fair use, however, is controversial from a global
perspective. See, for example, Cornish, Copyright in Scientific Works, in Gesellschaft, ed.,
European Research Structures at 47-50 (cited in note 66) (stressing that academics "who are also
authors, find their interests.., and.., judgment.., pulled in two directions on these issues"
and no settled solution has emerged); Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproductions of Protected Works for
University Research or Teaching, 39 J. Copyright Soc'y 181, 188-89, 192-211 (1992) (discussing
legal license regimes and collection societies). But see L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg,
The Nature of Copyright: A Law of User's Rights 191-96 (U. Georgia, 1991) (arguing that
private use for nonprofit purposes is always allowed).
Digital technologies may make it possible to overcome most of the transaction cost problems
that have lately been used to justify application of the fair use exception in practice. See, for
example, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982); Goldstein, Celestial
Jukebox at 16 (cited in note 89) (evaluating public and private benefits test of fair use in terms
of transaction costs). See also id. at 223-24, 230 (while "celestial jukebox may reduce transac-
tion costs" and lessen "perceived need for a safety valve such as fair use," the enduring impor-
tance of "exemptions or compulsory licenses for educational and research uses" remains clear).
115. Under the relevant provisions of the Berne Convention, an author's exclusive repro-
duction right (as set out in Article 9(1)) is subordinated to domestic legislation "permit[ting] the
reproduction of such works in certain special cases" (by dint of Article 9(2)). The Article 9(2)
exceptions should not, in principle, conflict with "normal exploitation" or "unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author" (as also required by Article 9(2)). See Berne
Convention, arts. 9(1), (2) (cited in note 1). See also World Intellectual Property Organization
Guide to the Berne Convention 56-57 (1978) C'WIPO Guide") (suggesting a system of compulsory
licensing with equitable remuneration when "fair uses" unduly harm the copyright owner; and
stressing freedom of each country to provide for educational, cultural, social, and economic
needs.)
116. See Berne Convention, art. 10(2) (cited in note 1); WIPO Guide at 60 (cited in note
115).
117. See Berne Convention, art. 10(1) (cited in note 1).
118. See E.C. Directive on Databases, arts. 6(2)(b), (d), 6(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in
note 7). Article 6(2)(d) allows states to make "other exceptions to copyright which are tradi-
tionally authorized under national law.... without prejudice to points (a), (b), and (c)." Id.
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the limited exception for annotations and educational performances,
drawn from Article 10(2) of the Berne Convention, to scientific re-
search."9 It then avoids any general fair use provision, analogous to
Article 9(2), which applied to copies "for personal or scientific use,"'
20
and which, in the context of databases, should permit scientific use of
the content, without permission and on favorable terms.121 On the
contrary, the Directive also implies that any other claim of fair use by
these communities would inherently "prejudice. . . the rightholder's
legitimate interests or conflict with normal exploitation of the data-
base."1
22
The inescapable conclusion is that, in the drafters' minds,
these provisions should narrow the educational and scientific com-
munities' ability to invoke "fair use" with respect to copyrightable
databases under prior law. In this and other respects, the E.C.
Directive's copyright provisions are thus the first concrete measures
in a larger project for the recasting of copyright law as applied to
transmissions over networked systems of telecommunications 23 that
would greatly reduce the pre-existing public interest exceptions of
particular interest to the educational and scientific communities.
24
119. Berne Convention, art. 10(2) (cited in note 1) (permitting "quotations" and other uses
of literary and artistic works "by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or
visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice.")
120. WIPO Guide at 56 (cited in note 115).
121. The drafters of the Directive have thus singled out one of the numerous exceptions
recognized by the Berne Convention (whose language was narrowly drawn lest it overshadow
the others) and converted it into the sole exception allowed for science and education under the
Directive's copyright provisions. The same procedure will then be caried over to the sui generis
regime. See notes 170-179 and accompanying text.
122. See note 118.
123. In effect, these provisions implement, with respect to eligible databases, the
Commission's pending and highly protectionist approach to online transmissions of copyright-
able works in general, which are on the agenda for a diplomatic conference, hosted by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), scheduled for December 1996. See text
accompanying notes 209-14. With due regard for differences in legal technique, they also reflect
the goals expressed in the Information Infrastructure Task Force's White Paper on the National
Information Infrastructure and in the pending amendments to United States copyright law that
it has inspired. See note 64.
124. The appropriateness of the copyright law's traditional "economic and cultural bar-
gain," see notes 50-55 and accompanying text, for the digital environment has been called into
question, given that publishers in this medium can electronically monitor and track most uses
without high transaction costs. See, for example, U.S. White Paper at 82 (cited in note 64). See
also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the
availability of a licensing scheme affected the fair use determination). Trade-driven economic
policies have further weakened the consensus on which that cultural bargain previously de-
pended. See Jaszi, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. at 599 (cited in note 87) (criticizing replacements of
"cultural bargain" theory of copyright law with new, trade-driven goal, which seeks to
"enhance... the wealth and overall financial well-being of companies which invest in the
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2. The Sui Generis Provisions
Having resolved these copyright issues more or less to their
satisfaction, the Commission initially approached the database in-
dustry's demands for sui generis legal incentives with commendable
caution. It did not, for example, uncritically propose yet another
hybrid exclusive property right based on modified patent and copy-
right principles, like those that have increasingly challenged both
classical intellectual property theory and the competitive ethos from
which it arose. 125 Rather, the Commission affirmed its preference for
a regime based on modified liability principles-one that would deter
certain types of socially undesirable conduct without vesting exclusive
property rights in data as such.126  Unfortunately, even the
production of and distribution of copyrighted works"). See also David Nimmer, The End of
Copyright, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1385 (1995).
The U.S. Register of Copyright may be right in observing that "[1]icense or access fee
structures may be developed that will take into account the proportion of total uses that qualify
as fair use... [and] certain acts of decryption may be excused if the ultimate purpose is to make
fair use of the work." Marybeth Peters, The National Information Infrastructure: A Copyright
Office Perspective, 20 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 341, 354 (1996). But the impetus to enter
voluntary agreements that provide preferential treatment to certain users depends in part on
the legal constraints otherwise applicable as baseline rules. If these rules tend to create or
reinforce powerful monopolies, there is little reason to expect that "consumers will be charged
lower prices in exchange for giving up fair use, first sale, and other rights" or that the grant of
strong copyright protection for digital works will ensure that the scientific and educational
communities can access digital works at affordable rates. See, for example, Hamilton, 27 Vand.
J. Transnat'l. L. at 628-29 (cited in note 94) (stressing need to recreate cyberspace parallels to
fair use lest "the limited monopoly currently afforded copyright owners ... become an 'absolute
monopoly' over the distribution of and access to copyrighted information once such information
is routinely transmitted online") (quoting Association of Research Libraries, Intellectual
Property: An Association of Research Libraries Statement of Principles 1 (May 1994)); Pamela
Samuelson, Copyright Grab, Wired 4.01 at 134, 191 (Jan. 1996). See also Kurtz, 18 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rev. at 134 (cited in note 58). From this perspective, the single most troubling aspect of
the White Paper (and the legislative proposals it has spawned) is that so many qualified
observers reach the conclusion that it favors "reducing the application and scope of the fair use
doctrine in cyberspace." McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection (cited in note
99) (citing authorities).
125. See generally Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 512-17 (cited in note 3).
See also John H. Barton, Adapting the Intellectual Property System to New Technologies, in
Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee, and Robert A. Schoen, eds., The Global Dimensions
of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology 249 (National Academy Press, 1993)
(evaluating more positively the emergence of hybrid intellectual property rights).
126. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at arts. 1(1), 2(5) (cited in note 72); Commission
of the European Communities, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, COM (92) 24 final-SYN 393 21-22, 25, 35, 41
(1992); Amended E.C. Directive on Databases at arts. 2.2, 6 (cited in note 103) (all stressing the
goal of protecting the compiler's industrious effort and investment against parasitic
appropriation by competitors). A true liability regime aims primarily to restore and preserve
the bases for healthy competition by discouraging certain market-distorting forms of conduct
that prevent innovators from appropriating the fruits of their investment. See, for example,
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Commission's earliest proposals along these lines were flawed by
contradictory elements drawn from the exclusive rights model,
127
while overwhelming lobbying pressures converted the final version
into one of the least balanced and most potentially anti-competitive
intellectual property rights ever created.
The Commission's initial approach was premised on the ab-
sence of a harmonized system of unfair competition legislation to
safeguard "the investment of considerable human, technical and fi-
nancial resources" in the making of databases that "can be copied or
accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to design them independ-
ently."128 The logical solution was, therefore, to codify a new type of
unfair competition law. Such a law, loosely modelled on existing laws
that protected trade secrets or confidential information, would repress
conduct amounting to the "misappropriation" of an electronic data-
base producer's investment without imposing either legal barriers to
entry or the social costs of actual or legal secrecy. 129 To this end, the
Commission proposed simply to forbid the "unfair extraction" of data
from an electronic database for commercial purposes without the
second comer's having expended independent effort to collect and
verify similar information. The first proposed draft E.C. Directive
accordingly provided a ten-year period of lead time in which the
database maker could recoup his or her investment in a noncopyright-
able electronic database while preventing copiers from engaging in
for-profit extraction or reutilization of the factual contents, in whole
or in substantial part.1
30
Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2434-42, 2495-96, 2504-558 (cited in note 2); text accompanying
notes 431-50.
127. For example, the definition of "in substantial pare in early drafts of the E.C. Directive
on Databases was heavily reliant on the exclusive rights concepts of copyright law. See First
E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 1(3) (cited in note 72); Amended Proposal on Databases at
art. 11(8) (cited in note 103). See also note 130.
128. First E.C. Proposal on Databases (recitals 5-6) (cited in note 72).
129. Compare Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition at §§ 39-45 (cited in note 38)
(restating the norms of trade secrecy law); Gordon, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 221-24 (cited in note 44)
(proposing the tort of"malcompetitive copying").
130. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at arts. 1(1), 2(5), 9(3) (cited in note 72).
Technically, the right arose with the creation of the database and lapsed ten (now fifteen) years
from the date it was first lawfully made available to the public. The provision forbidding un-
authorized reuse of the compiler's factual contents closed a gap in the Nordic catalogue rules,
which case law had not yet resolved. See notes 104-105 and text accompanying. Already at this
first draft stage, however, the language chosen to implement the Commission's "unfair compe-
tition" approach was contradicted by other language describing the database maker's "exclusive
right to prevent unauthorized extraction and reutilization" of contents.
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The Commission's "unfair extraction" criterion seemed to in-
vite case-by-case judicial distinctions between pro-competitive activi-
ties, especially independent investment in the generation of a compet-
ing electronic database (which was roughly analogous to reverse engi-
neering by honest means), and market distorting forms of electronic
copying (which were roughly comparable to industrial espionage,
commercial bribery, and other types of "parasitical" or free-riding
behavior that unfair competition laws interdict). It may also have
opened the door to case-by-case judicial evaluation of unauthorized
extractions deemed "fair" because they advanced non-commercial
educational and scientific pursuits, although neither the draft E.C.
Directive nor the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum about it
specifically endorsed this proposition. In any event, the drafters
further diluted the database maker's new right against "unfair extrac-
tion" by engrafting some express user's rights upon it and by adopting
explicit measures to safeguard the public interest in free competition.
For example, the drafters apparently envisioned that lawful
users of an electronic database -could make a limited reuse of its con-
tents even for some commercial purposes, as might occur in value-
adding uses.131 There was also no clear means for database creators
to extend control over the initial compilation by making subsequent
changes to it, although the extent to which this omission resulted
from a drafting oversight remains unclear. 132 Above all, price compe-
tition was directly encouraged. Second comers could choose between
independently compiling their own databases from scratch or invok-
ing a statutory compulsory license against any sole-source provider of
data in electronic databases, with a view to competing against that
provider while paying reasonable royalties for the use of the extracted
data. 33
Of course, if multiple data providers serviced a given market
segment, the draft E.C. Directive's pro-competitive thrust was satis-
fied without recourse to a compulsory license. The opportunity to
choose among providers, however, seems rarely to occur in practice
because the bulk of all electronic compilations of data reportedly
emanates from sole-source providers, and this "niche" marketing
appears characteristic of both the private and public sectors." 4 In all
131. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. § 8(4) (cited in note 72).
132. For the possibility of perpetual protection introduced in later versions, see notes 147-
48 and accompanying text.
133. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 8(1), (2) (cited in note 72). See also
Amended E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 11(1), (2) (cited in note 103).
134. See notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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such cases, the compulsory license would lie, and originators, includ-
ing public bodies benefitting from a natural monopoly, would be
obliged to grant licenses for commercial reexploitation of the data in
question on fair and nondiscriminatory terms.135 The liability princi-
ples loosely embodied in the first draft of the E.C. Directive thus
created no legal barriers to entry. Arguably these principles may
even have lessened existing economic barriers to entry by empowering
would-be competitors to borrow data at reasonable rates when the
cost of independently regenerating them appeared too costly or
otherwise inefficient as a business strategy.13
6
Absent from this framework, however, were any explicit excep-
tions favoring educational and scientific users, assuming these were
not implicitly "fair" uses under the basic "unfair extraction" criterion
of the draft E.C. Directive, an omission that the European Parliament
singled out for criticism. Although the legislative history does not
explain why the drafters ultimately rejected this criticism,3 7 a rea-
sonable inference from all the evidence is that the Commission be-
lieved further exceptions and immunities would unduly weaken
database publishers' incentives to invest under a regime that already
implemented a pro-competitive strategy. If so, the Commission erred
in at least two respects.
First, the Commission seems to have assumed that a more
competitive market would intrinsically satisfy the needs of the
scientific and educational communities. A National Research Council
Report shows, however, that basic science has organizational and
operational needs that often differ from those a competitive market is
geared to meet.138  Experience demonstrates, indeed, that basic
science may not be able to pay the market rate for data even when it
is competitively determined. Important research projects may
consequently languish for lack of affordable data unless non-market
135. First E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 8(1), 8(2) (cited in note 72).
136. In this respect, the early draft seems to have anticipated some of the findings concern-
ing the pro-competitive characteristics of liability-based intellectual property regimes that legal
theory was investigating at about the same period of time. See, for example, Samuelson, Davis,
Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2308 (cited in note 11) (proposing a market-oriented
approach); Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2432 (cited in note 2) (discussing pro-competitive
characteristics of liability based regimes).
137. See Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, COM (93) 464 final-SYN 393 4 (1993) ("Second
Explanatory Memorandum") (declining to accept parliamentary request for special exemptions
in favor of education and research).
138. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
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mechanisms (such as subsidies) or legal constraints on publishers
(such as fair use exceptions) close the gap.13 9
Second, the drafters optimistically assumed that their concern
for the public interest in free competition was still a paramount legis-
lative value in developed market economies. They thus underesti-
mated the ability of powerful lobbies, working largely behind closed
doors, to convert their rudimentary liability framework into a potent
exclusive property right from which their preferred public interest
safeguards would be totally excised.
B. The European Union's Final Product
The European Commission's ingenious project had already
suffered considerable erosion by the time the Amended Proposals
were put forward in 1993.140 The project's conversion from a relatively
weak liability regime to a strong exclusive property right, however,
occurred during the closed proceedings of the European Council of
Ministers, which produced the Common Position of July 10, 1995.141
This version, with minor technical alterations, became the final E.C.
Directive on Databases, adopted on March 11, 1996, which the
European Union member states must promptly convert into domestic
intellectual property laws and regulations. 142
1. Abolishing the Public Domain
As finally enacted, the sui generis right conferred on qualifying
database makers is no longer couched in terms of "unfair" or even
"unauthorized" acts or uses.43 Rather, the database maker obtains an
exclusive "right to prevent extraction and/or reutilization of the whole
or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively,
139. Id. See notes 301-15 and accompanying text.
140. For example, the Amended Proposal seemed to grant the same exclusive rights to
makers of noncopyrightable databases as those granted to copyrightable databases. See
Amended E.C. Proposal on Databases (cited in note 103); Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2494-
98 (cited in note 2) (analyzing and criticizing these proposals).
141. See E.C. Common Position, 1995 O.J. (C 288) (cited in note 103). See also Kaye, 12
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. at 583 (cited in note 96) (approving this version); Hunsuker, European
Database Directive (cited in note 60) (approving this version).
142. See E.C. Directive on Databases, arts. 7(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7)
("Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database..."); id. art. 16(1), 1996
O.J. (L 77) at 27 (requiring Member States "to comply with this Directive before 1 January
1998").
143. See notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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of the contents of that database."'144 This two-pronged exclusive right,
which now applies to both electronic and nonelectronic databases,145
lasts for an initial period of at least fifteen years. Any compiler who
makes a database available to the public, however, may continually
renew that right for additional fifteen-year terms if the compiler has
made additional investments in the database.1
46
The Final E.C. Directive does not condition sui generis
protection on any showing of a creative achievement or of a novel
contribution to the prior art, the classical bases for justifying legal
derogation from free competition. Rather, it merely requires the
database maker to prove that "there has been qualitatively and/or
quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, veri-
fication or presentation of the contents" or in "any substantial change
resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or
alterations.' 47 Because the E.C. Directive itself provides no further
guidelines for evaluating the requisite level of investment in either
case, this threshold will remain uncertain, pending decisions by
European courts applying the still to be drafted domestic database
laws. Nevertheless, there are no limits to the number of quantitative
144. E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 7(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7). As
compared to earlier drafts, the Final E.C. Directive seems to strengthen publisher rights by
omitting two provisions that were present in earlier drafts: one that would have permitted brief
quotations from database contents, and another that would have allowed database makers to
include in their databases biographical references, abstracts, or brief quotations from another
database without permission. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 4(1), 7(1), 1996 O.J.
(L 77) at 25-26 (cited in note 72); Amended E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 4(2), 7(1) (cited in
note 103). Also seeming to strengthen publisher rights in databases is a recital in the Final E.C.
Directive indicating that users who obtain database contents by online transmission will not
have acquired a copy in which rights of the database owner would be exhausted. Final E.C.
Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 23 (cited in note 7) (Recital 43).
145. See E.C. Directive on Databases at art. 1(1), 1996 O.J. (L77) at 24 (cited in note 7)
('This Directive concerns the legal protection of databases in any form."). Both the First E.C.
Proposal on Databases, art. 1(1) (cited in note 72) and Amended E.C. Proposal on Databases at
art. 1(1) (cited in note 103) covered only electronic databases. The Common Position found this
distinction unworkable, and could not justify differing levels of protection on this basis. See, for
example, Hunsuker, European Database Directive (cited in note 60) (citing authorities and
adding that "today's high speed scanners and optical character recognition software make
electronic conversion of non-electronic databases almost as easy as electronic conversion of
electronic databases").
146. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 7(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7)
(providing initial fifteen-year term from date of completion), art. 7(2), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26
(extending protection for an additional fifteen years if the database "is made available to the
public in whatever manner" before expiration of the initial term), and art. 7(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77)
at 26 (allowing fifteen-year renewals for "[alny substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or
quantitatively, to the contents of a database.., from the accumulation of successive additions,
deletions or alterations, which.., result in... a substantial new investment").
147. See id. at art. 7.
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or qualitative changes that will qualify for such extensions, and any
publisher who continues to make a substantial investment in updat-
ing, improving, or expanding an existing database can look forward to
perpetual protection.14
Although the sui generis right depends on mere investment
rather than on some palpable creative contribution, the scope of pro-
tection that the Final E.C. Directive affords investors in noncopyright-
able databases now appears roughly equivalent to that afforded
authors of copyrightable compilations.149 This conclusion follows from
both the definitions of the exclusive rights set out in the E.C.
Directive itself and from the Council of Ministers' closed-door decision
to delete the initial proposal's compulsory license requirement for
sole-source providers from the Common Position formulated in
1995.150
As defined in Article 7(2) of the Final E.C. Directive, the inves-
tor's sui generis "extraction right" covers even temporary transfers to
on-line receivers, much like the author's broadened reproduction
rights in copyright law under Article 5(a).151 The investor's
"reutilization right" covers online use or transmissions of data, includ-
ing those in value-adding or derivative formats, much like the
author's broadened "communications" rights under article 5 (b), (d),
and (e). 152 In this and other respects, including the omission of any re-
148. The current quest for perpetual protection has an historical antecedent in the crown
privileges and guild monopolies of the medieval period. Prior to enactment of the first modern
copyright statute in the United Kingdom, members of the Stationers' Company recognized
copyrights in publishers, not in authors. These rights were said to be necessary to protect
publisher investments. See, for example, Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of
Copyright 12 (Harvard U., 1993). During this period, publishers also claimed perpetual
exclusive copyrights in works printed by them. Id. at 4. The E.C. Directive, like the Stationers'
copyright, recognizes rights in publishers, and its broadened renewal-of-term provisions in the
final version of the European Directive may have the effect of providing database owners with
virtually perpetual rights to the data in their databases. See also Clark, The Copyright
Environment for the Publisher in the Digital World at 5 (cited in note 10) (stressing importance
of a publishers' right as such).
149. See E.C. Directive on Databases, arts. 3 and 5, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7).
See also notes 118-24 and accompanying text (noting that such protection is greater than that
traditionally afforded to authors.)
150. See E.C. Common Position, arts. 8-9, 16(3), 1995 O.J. (C 288) at 20, 22 (cited in note
103).
151. Compare E.C. Directive on Databases at art. 7(2)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26 (cited in
note 7) (defining "extraction" to mean "the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a
substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form")
with id. art. 5(a) (discussed in note 111 and accompanying text).
152. Compare id. art. 7(2)(b) at 26 (defining "re-utilization" as "any form of making avail-
able to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of
copies, by renting, by online or other forms of transmission") with id. arts. 5(b), (d), (e) at 25
(discussed in notes 111-12 and accompanying text) (discussing author's right to alter or display
to the public a copyrightable database). A database embodied in a hard copy and sold as such
1997] DATABASE PROTECTION 87
quirement for compulsory licenses against sole source providers,153 the
drafters of the Final E.C. Directive have integrated its sui generis
regime into the broader regulatory framework for national and inter-
national information infrastructures that the E.U. and U.S. intellec-
tual property authorities are now jointly promoting.154
On closer inspection, indeed, the investor's scope of protection
under the hybrid extraction right appears paradoxically to exceed
even that afforded authors of traditional literary and artistic works
under the classical copyright paradigm of the Berne Convention s55 in
at least three important respects. First, it ignores the important
distinction that copyright law makes between "ideas" (a legal meta-
phor for the noncopyrightable components of protected works, includ-
ing among other things, the facts or data they contain) and the
author's "expression" (a legal metaphor for the protectable elements of
style in an otherwise eligible work).56 The TRIPS Agreement makes
this distinction universally applicable to all copyrightable works,
remains subject to the first-sale doctrine even under the sui generis right. This means that the
database maker cannot "control resale of that copy [by the vendee] within the Community" Id.,
art. 7(2)(b) at 26. Moreover, public lending of such a copy, say, by a library, "is not an act of
extraction or re-utilization." Id.
153. A two-pronged strategy by lobbyists opposed to the compulsory license provisions of
the first two drafts of the Directive may have succeeded in wooing the Commission away from
the automatic license provision. One prong relied on the European Court of Justice's recent
decision in Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the European Communities, 1 C.E.C. 400
(1995) (widely known as the Magill decision), which illustrated the use of competition law to
deal with the abuse of a dominant position when a sole source provider of information refused to
license a competitor. In Magill, the Court affirmed the Commission's finding of abuse because
the owner of a U.K. copyright in television program listings refused to license the listings to a
firm that wished to publish a weekly guide for television viewers. See, for example, Tritton,
Intellectual Property in Europe at 638-48 (cited in note 50) (stressing that refusal to permit
independent compilations by willing third parties transformed qualified monopoly of copyright
law to abusive, absolute monopoly). See also Sasha Haines, Copyright Takes a Dominant
Position, 16 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 401, 401 (1994) (noting that publishers who claimed that the
refusal to license in Magill was not abusive ironically used Magill to argue no compulsory
license was needed even in the case of sole-source providers). The other prong was to argue for
a several-year test period during which compulsory licenses would not be available so that the
Commission could gather evidence about licensing practices to determine if there were sufficient
abuses to warrant reintroducing compulsory license provisions. See E.C. Directive on
Databases, art. 16 (3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7).
154. See note 7 and accompanying text (citing 1996 WIPO documents favoring both an
international database regime similar to that proposed by the U.S. and international copyright
reforms concerning online transmissions similar to that proposed by the E.U.).
155. See, for example, Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 485-86, 492-96 (cited in
note 3) (summarizing the changes in copyright protection of literary and artistic works since the
19th century with an emphasis on the economic effects). See also Sam Ricketson, The Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886-1986 at 231-32 (Queen Mary
College, 1987).
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See also note 51 and accompanying text.
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including such borderline works as computer programs and factual
compilations. 157 Yet, the database law contains no such distinction.
This means that, in the universe of data generators, there is no evolv-
ing public domain substratum from which either research workers or
second comers are progressively entitled to withdraw previously
generated data 158 without seeking licenses that may or may not be
granted.
On the contrary, every independent generation of data, how-
ever mundane or commonplace, will obtain protection if it costs
money, and every regeneration or reutilization of the same data in
updates, additions, and extensions that cost money will extend that
protection without limit as to time. 59 As a consequence, third parties
can rarely avoid the expense of regenerating pre-existing data-in the
way that they could always use previously generated ideas, however
much it cost to develop them-unless the originator of the relevant
database has abandoned it or declined to exercise his or her proprie-
tary rights, much as occurs under trademark laws.160 To be sure, data
providers, including members of the scientific community, could de-
cide not to exercise proprietary rights in certain databases, for exam-
ple, those funded by government agencies. This would not, however,
change the legal situation with respect to scientifically important data
located in privately owned databases or in those funded by public
agencies, especially foreign agencies, that had opted to commercialize
their data.'16
157. See TRIPS Agreement, arts. 9(2), 10(1), in Results of the Uruguay Round at 370 (cited
in note 1); J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software Fared
Badly, and What Are the Solutions?, 17 Hastings Comm. & Enter. L. J. 763, 773-84 (1995)
(discussing the effects of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS agreement on the copyright
protection of computer software).
158. See Jaszi, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. at 596 (cited in note 87) (expressing concern about
lack of attention to the public domain in current copyright policy intiatives); Jessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 Emory L. J. 965, 967 (1990) (arguing that the public domain has been
undervalued in recent copyright case law); David L. Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44
Law & Contemp. Probs. 147, 171-73 (1981) (arguing that the public domain has been under-
valued in recent trademark and unfair competition case law).
159. See notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
160. See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1059 (1994 ed.) (setting forth
requirements for registration of trademarks and renewal of registration). However, there is an
infinite array of trademarks, and the use of marks to distinguish quality producers inherently
promotes competition without creating legal barriers to entry. See generally William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1987).
See also Paul J. Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 635 (1996) (focusing on the trademark
provisions of TRIPS).
161. OMB Implementing Memo at 95-22 (cited in note 73).
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The absence of any equivalent to the idea-expression doctrine
under the new sui generis regime means that investors, in effect,
obtain proprietary rights in data as such, a type of ownership that the
copyright paradigm expressly precludes. Proponents of the sui gene-
ris right downplay this finding by insisting that third parties always
remain free to generate their own databases. 162 But this opportunity
exists only for data that are legally available from public sources and
whose cost of independent regeneration is not prohibitively high in
relation to the gains expected from the exercise. As for proprietary
data not legally available for second comers to exploit, there is no
opportunity to avoid the originator's exclusive rights to prevent
extraction or re-use of existing data. Even the most avid apologists
for the E.C. Directive concede that in such cases the investor's
exclusive rights necessarily vest in the data as such.
63
A deeper point is that, regardless of whether it is theoretically
possible to regenerate the data from publicly available sources, inves-
tors in database production can always deny third parties the right to
use pre-existing data in value-adding applications, 64 even when the
latter are willing to pay royalty-bearing licenses; and there is no es-
caping such licenses unless the database publisher either declines to
exercise his or her rights or engages in an abusive exercise of market
power.165 In other words, except when the new proprietary rights are
abandoned or misused, the concept of incremental or "cumulative and
sequential innovation," which is central to the development of modern
technological paradigms, 166 has been banished from the universe of
162. See, for example, IIA Report at 29 (cited in note 67). See also Hunsuker, European
Database Directive (cited in note 60).
163. See, for example, IIA Report at 29 (cited in note 67) ("Admittedly, there may be situ-
ations in which it could be claimed that granting non-copyright protection to compilations
amounts to a monopoly on the facts contained therein."). See also Hunsucker, European
Database Directive (cited in note 60).
164. See notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
165. A refusal to license, however, coupled with a dominant position in the marketplace,
could trigger an antitrust violation or a related charge of abuse of intellectual property rights.
See, for example, E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 16(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7).
See also note 153 (discussing the Magill decision).
166. See, for example, Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change 255-62 (Harvard U., 1982) (discussing the cumulative nature of technological
advancements); Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative Systems
Technology, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2674, 2676 (1994) (discussing the central concerns surrounding
the copying of computer software). See also Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 881 (1990) (discussing how the
"scope doctrine can be used to approximate the 'tailoring' function proposed by economists.").
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database production, despite the economic waste and inefficiency
inherent in such policies.
2. Establishing Legal Barriers to Entry
A second, and closely related, way in which the database inves-
tor's scope of protection under the E.C. Directive exceeds that of
authors under the classical copyright paradigm is seen in the treat-
ment of derivative works. Under copyright laws, the scope of an
author's exclusive right to create a derivative work extends only to the
original, expressive matter added to the underlying work. One does
not infringe an author's derivative work right by copying ideas or
information that it (or the underlying work) contains or by appropri-
ating from the derivative work any pre-existing expressive matter
that has entered the public domain owing to the expiration of the
terms of protection. 167
The E.C. Directive recognizes no such legal distinctions. As
previously explained, it harbors no working conception of a public
domain whatsoever. Unless local European courts, applying the do-
mestic laws that implement the E.C. Directive, take pains to limit
this omission, the upshot will be that each new extension of the data-
base maker's exclusive rights by dint of his or her "substantial in-
vestment" in updates, additions, and revisions 168 will, in effect, re-
qualify that investor for protection of the database as a whole for
additional fifteen year periods. In other words, this extended protec-
tion is not limited to the revised or added matter-the "derivative
work"-as would occur under the copyright laws. This, in turn, rein-
forces the monopolistic effects inherent in the originator's ability to
deny third parties the right to build incrementally and sequentially
upon pre-existing scientific and technical knowledge, and it creates a
further barrier to entry.
A third way in which the scope of protection for investors in
database production exceeds that afforded authors of copyrightable
literary and artistic works results from the much narrower range of
applicable public interest exceptions.16s In effect, the sole important
exception available to all users of noncopyrightable electronic
databases under the E.C. Directive is the right to extract or reutilize
167. See, for example, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 106, 501 (setting forth the subject matter
requirements and scope of copyright protection for derivative works).
168. See notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
169. For the general range of public-interest exceptions under copyright laws, see notes 52-
53 and accompanying text.
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"insubstantial parts of the database."' 70 Reinforcing this privilege is a
provision nullifying any contractual override of it.171
Yet, given that courts must judge the substantiality of any
extraction or reuse in qualitative as well as quantitative terms, it re-
mains to be seen whether the formal right to take insubstantial parts
will actually benefit users. 72 For example, if the data extracted by
the user are the data responsive to his or her online query, one can
always argue that the extraction was qualitatively substantial. 
1
73
Because this exception applies only to "lawful users" of the database
(presumably subscribers to an online service or purchasers of a CD-
ROM), in most cases it may merely validate acts incidental to the uses
for which one has paid. Although the E.C. Directive's copyright
provisions spell out an elementary proposition of this sort, there is no
parallel to it in the sui generis provisions.' 74 The possibility therefore
exists that publishers may assert the right to control uses of noncopy-
rightable components of databases that would otherwise have been
subsumed within the general right to use the same database had it
qualified for copyright protection.
The final version of the E.C. Directive also provides that a
lawful user of a noncopyrightable database cannot extract or re-use
even insubstantial parts of its contents in "repeated and systematic!'
ways that "conflict with a normal exploitation of that database
or... unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
maker."'' 7r Arguably, this too could preclude most value-adding uses
of an insubstantial part of the database, regardless of their commer-
cial or noncommercial purpose.
Unlike previous versions of the E.C. Directive, the final version
also gives E.U. member states the option of allowing certain limita-
170. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 8(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26 (cited in note 7).
Member states, however, may allow "extraction for private purposes of the contents of a non-
electronic database." Id. art. 9(a) (emphasis added).
171. Id. art. 15 at 27.
172. Id. art. 8(1) at 26.
173. Another factor affecting a determination as to whether an appropriation is substantial
is whether it impedes normal exploitation of the database. Id. art. 8(2). If database owners are
prepared to charge for every unit that a user might want, is there any taking so insubstantial
that a database owner could not argue that it unreasonably interfered with its normal exploita-
tion of the market?
174. See id. art. 6(1) at 25 (incidental to lawful use provisions).
175. Id. art. 7(5). See also id. art. 8(2) at 26 (forbidding any acts by lawful users that
"conflict with normal exploitation" or "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests" of its
maker).
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tions on the sui generis right.17 In particular, member states may
authorize extraction of a substantial part of a noncopyrightable data-
base "for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific re-
search, as long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by
the non-commercial purpose to be achieved." 177  This exception is
available only to "lawful user[s]" and it only applies to "extraction[s]"
for such purposes, not to reutilizations. Thin as it is, this exemption
will become available only in those member states that opt to enact
it. 178
This limited exception, drawn from Article 10(2) of the Berne
Convention concerning "quotations" and "use of work[s] by way of
illustration for teaching,"179 yields a perverse effect in the realm of sui
generis database laws where data, facts, and other noncopyrightable
contents are the real objects of protection. As applied to traditional
scientific works covered by copyright law, such an exception made
sense because only the author's individual style was protected, and
not his or her data, findings, or ideas. Hence, teachers who made
176. Id., art. 9 at 26. The first two drafts of the E.C. Directive on Databases contained no
authorization for the granting of any public policy exceptions to the sui generis right. First E.C.
Proposal on Databases at art. 6 (cited in note 72); Amended E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 7
(cited in note 103). Although the European Commission's Explanatory Memorandum on the
Amended Directive indicates that the European Parliament had pressed for exemptions for
educational, scientific, and other nonprofit users, see Second Explanatory Memorandum (cited
in note 137), it was not until the Common Position that member states were authorized to enact
any limitations on the sui generis right. Even so, there is evidence of residual concern within
the Council about the potential negative impact of the sui generis right on information flows.
The Italian delegation, which decided to vote in favor of the Common Position version of the
Directive, drew attention to
the importance of the problems-which are already in existence and will probably in-
crease in [the] future as a result of technological developments-surrounding the issue
of compulsory licenses as the only mechanism able to contain the possibility of abuse of
dominant positions, not only between competitive undertakings, but also, in particular,
in respect of science, education and the freedom of information, which could be subjected
to undue restrictions.
Memorandum from the Council Secretariat to the Permanent Representatives
Committee/Council, Brussels, 16 June 1995, Annex 1.
There are two other features to be noted about the restriction of rights provision of the E.C.
Directive on Databases. One is that member states were given at least nominal authority to
apply some limited but traditional copyright exceptions to protected databases, see text
accompanying notes 118-24, yet they were not given any authority to extend traditional
exceptions of this sort to noncopyrightable databases. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art.
6(2)(d), 9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7). The other is that, although the Directive was
intended to harmonize the laws of member states concerning database protection, id. at 20
(Recitals (1) and (3)), it leaves to the discretion of member states whether to adopt one or more
of the three exceptions to the sui generis right, id. art. 9 at 26, thus seeming to promote
disharmony in national laws.
177. Id. art. 9(b).
178. See id. arts. 9, 9(b).
179. See notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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excessive use of the first author's stylistic features clearly infringed
because they could extract the data and other noncopyrightable com-
ponents at will. As applied to the contents of databases, in contrast,
the exception permits a limited use of "quotations" by both teachers
and scientific researchers for purposes of illustration.'80 But it ex-
cludes any broader "fair use" right to extract or reutilize the data or
facts for nonprofit scientific or educational pursuits, as would have
been possible in appropriate cases under Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention.'", In this respect, the Final E.C. Directive aligns both its
copyright and sui generis provisions in cutting back on the fair use
doctrine under prior law. 82
Even if a member state enacts this provision, a scientific or
educational user's exempted extraction must satisfy the non-commer-
cial purpose test, and it must not exceed the quantum necessary to
accomplish that purpose lest it violate the general obligation "not [to]
perform acts which conflict with normal exploitation or [that] unrea-
sonably prejudice [the maker's] legitimate interests."'813  Because
normal uses of educational or scientific databases in academic and
research institutions may not meet these tests, the optional exemp-
tion for scientific and educational purposes looks like a kind of fool's
gold that merely permits illustration of conclusions reached. On this
reading, the exemption would not extend to uses for other scientific or
educational purposes, such as browsing, extraction, or use of the data
for the purpose of reaching the conclusions that one may then freely
"illustrate." 184
Of course, local legislatures could manufacture loopholes
through which to widen this exception,'8 5 and database publishers
180. E.C. Directive on Databases art. 9. See also notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
181. E.C. Directive on Databases, arts. 8(2), 9(2); Berne Convention, art. 9(2). See note 114
and accompanying text.
182. See notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
183. See E.C. Directive on Databases at arts. 8(2), 9(b) (cited in note 7).
184. See, for example, McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection (cited in note
99) (stating that "[a]ny other substantial extraction from an electronic database [besides
illustration for teaching or scientific research] will be infringing, irrespective of whether the
extraction is for a commercial purpose, such as market research or private investment decisions,
or for a wholly non-commercial purpose, such as religious canvassing, political polling,
geneological research, or pursuit of any.., hobby or avocation."). Professor McManis contrasts
this provision unfavorably with "the exceptions and limitations that safeguard the public
interest in copyright law." Id.
185. See, for example, Hunsuker, European Database Directive (cited in note 60) (stressing
fact that article 9(b) speaks of extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific
research, whereas article 6, concerning copyrightable databases, speaks of "the sole purpose of
illustration for teaching or scientific research").
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might refrain from imposing harsh or oppressive terms and conditions
that unduly impinge upon scientific and educational uses. The fact
remains, however, that nothing in the E.C. Directive as finally en-
acted requires such accommodations. Its sui generis provisions con-
tain no real equivalents of the private use, fair use, and related ex-
ceptions that traditional copyright laws afford scientific and educa-
tional users of core literary and artistic works. This is despite the fact
that database publishers who acquire market power through
restricted online transmissions have reportedly imposed questionable
contractual conditions on libraries and academic subscribers in the
past.186
It follows that, under the E.C. Directive, the most borderline
and suspect of all the objects of protection ever to enter the universe
of intellectual property discourse-raw data, scientific or
otherwise-paradoxically obtains the strongest scope of protection
available from any intellectual property regime except, perhaps, for
the classical patent paradigm itself.8 7  Nor are the breadth of
protection, and the monopolistic power it tends to breed, likely to be
offset by greater competition in the market for electronic databases,
especially now that the E.C. Directive as finally adopted no longer
contains the compulsory license requirement that had initially been
devised for this purpose.
Formally, of course, third parties still remain free to compile a
database exactly like one already in commerce, because independent
generation of the relevant data at one's own time and expense is al-
ways permitted. In practice, this option ignores the economic realities
of the database industry. Startup costs are relatively high, the pros-
pects for market-sharing have seldom been realized, much valuable
data is unavailable from public sources, and the existence of one
complex database seems empirically to constitute a de facto barrier to
entry that is seldom overcome. This lack of effective competition,
with its inherent possibilities for discouraging add-on products and
for encouraging abuses of market power, was downplayed by the
Council of Ministers, even though it had been uppermost in the minds
of the European Commission's own drafters a short while earlier.
Article 16 of the Final E.C. Directive thus merely calls for three-year
reviews to determine whether existing antitrust laws prove
inadequate to deal with the "abuse of a dominant position or other
186. See note 90 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 488-89 (cited in note 3)
(discussing economic implications and contradictions of such paradoxes).
[Vol. 50:51
DATABASE PROTECTION
interference with free competition," in which case proposals for "non-
voluntary licensing" may once again be considered. 88
The fear of market failure and of chronic underprotection that
initially motivated the quest for a sui generis regime to protect elec-
tronic databases has thus given way to the creation of "mini-monopo-
lies over information."189 This fear has also given rise to a rent-seek-
ing logic impervious to the public interest in the full and unrestricted
flow of scientific data. The original goal of providing some incentives
to augment the publishers' investment in compiling electronic data-
bases has generated a set of norms that could render many scientific
and technological undertakings prohibitively expensive. As explained
below, the short-term social benefits of the E.C. Directive's "extraction
right" may thus conceal the long-term social costs of diminished
research and development capabilities at scientific and educational
institutions, including public and semi-public institutions that are
already indirectly subsidizing private research and development.190
C. The United States and International Models
When the European Commission began its deliberations con-
cerning database protection in the early 1990s, the climate in which
intellectual property policy discussions at both the national and in-
ternational levels took place differed from that prevailing today. The
fate of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and its
intellectual property component, the TRIPS Agreement, remained
uncertain. The U.S. intellectual property authorities had not yet
begun to survey the issues posed by widespread transmission of
digitized information over telecommunications networks.191 The
Supreme Court had just denied copyright protection to telephone
directories in Feist,92 and had recently invalidated state protection of
subpatentable industrial designs.193 These decisions proclaimed re-
188. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 16(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7).
189. Rosler, 10 High Tech. L. J. at 138, 140 (cited in note 96) (stressing tendencies of
"[m]onopolists typically [to] charge large premiums for their goods").
190. See, for example, id. at 141-43; Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2496-98 (cited in note
2).
191. The United States did not begin to study, in any systematic fashion, the impact of
digital technologies on copyright law until mid-1993 when the Clinton Administration formed
the National Information Infrastructure Task Force which established a Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights. The Working Group's report was not finalized until September,
1995. See U.S. White Paper at 1 (cited in note 64).
192. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 363.
193. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168.
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newed faith in a nineteenth century vision of the competitive ethos
without recognizing, let alone addressing, the unresolved problems of
appropriating returns from investments in subpatentable information
goods under twenty-first century conditions. 194 Indeed, only a few
years earlier, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property had set very high standards that would have to
be met before Congress would consider special interest pleas for
additional forms of sui generis intellectual property protection that
deviated from the classical patent and copyright paradigms. 95
Against this background, the European Commission's early
drafts of a Directive concerning the legal protection of databases
adopted a defensive posture with respect to foreign publishers whose
principle base of operations was outside the European Union. In lieu
of the national treatment clause that had become the international
standard prior to the 1980s,196 the Commission proposed a strict crite-
rion of material reciprocity.197 Member states of the European Union
would, accordingly, extend the sui generis right to databases owned by
foreign nationals only if the nations from which they hailed adopted
equivalent laws. Databases made in countries having no similar leg-
islation would remain vulnerable to wholesale copying within the
European Union itself.98 The decision to discriminate against foreign
nationals operating in non-harmonizing states was modelled on the
earlier and equally controversial decision by the United States to
impose a material reciprocity clause under the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984.199 Although both decisions rested on dubious
194. See, for example, Reichman, 25 Int'l Rev. Indus., Prop. & Copyright L. at 466-67, 472-
75 (cited in note 44) (suggesting that Feist raises legitimate fears that those who disseminate
information in hard copies may suffer from a chronic state of underprotection that discourages
investment).
195. See Robert W. Kastenmeier and Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 417, 438-42 (1985) (stating
that proponents of new intellectual property laws have the burden to "show... that a meritori-
ous public purpose is served by ... proposed congressional action," and setting forth a four-
pronged test of public interest that should be met in each case).
196. See, for example, Berne Convention at art. 5(1) (cited in note 1); Paris Convention at
art. 2(1) (cited in note 1).
197. See First E.C. Proposal on Databases at art. 11(1) (cited in note 72) (making protection
available to E.U. nationals and nationals of countries with equivalent laws); E.C. Directive on
Databases, art. 11, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26-27 (cited in note 7).
198. See Simon Chalton, The Amended Database Directive Proposal: A Commentary and
Synopsis, 16 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 94, 99 (1994) (stressing that national treatment would apply
to copyrightable databases, but not to the extraction right). U.S. commentators on the E.C.
Directive on Databases have almost uniformly condemned its reciprocity provision. See, for
example, IIA Report at 2, 25 (cited in note 67).
199. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a)(1)(A)-(C), 913, 914; Jay A. Erstling, The Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act and Its Impact on the International Protection of Chip Designs, 15 Rutgers Comp.
& Tech. L. J. 303, 310 (1989) (discussing section 902(a) of the Act which provides two means by
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legal grounds even before the TRIPS Agreement was adopted, and
even though the Agreement rejects this approach at least in spirit,2 0 a
version of the reciprocity provision nonetheless entered the Final E.C.
Directive.201
1. A Coordinated High-Protectionist Strategy
By 1995, however, when the European Union's Council of
Ministers met to adopt its Common Position on the pending E.C.
Directive, the climate surrounding worldwide intellectual property
policymaking had profoundly changed. Universal intellectual
property standards embodied in the TRIPS Agreement had become
enforceable within the framework of a World Trade Organization, 2
02
largely as the result of sustained pressures by a coalition of powerful
manufacturing associations in Europe, the United States, and
Japan.03 The success of this venture presages further alignments of
interests by U.S. and E.U. officials with a view to forging a common,
which a foreign nation may qualify for reciprocal treatment); Charles R. McManis, International
Protection for Semiconductor Chip Designs and the Standard of Judicial Review of Presidential
Proclamations Issued Pursuant to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 22 Geo. Wash.
J. Intel L. & Econ. 331, 347-52 (1988) (describing different interpretations of the Act's
requirement that a foreign nation provide non-discriminatory treatment for works of U.S.
citizens or domiciliaries).
200. See TRIPS Agreement, arts. 1(2), (3), 2(1), 3(1), 4, 9(1), 39, in Results of the Uruguay
Round at 367-70, 385 (cited in note 1); McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection
(cited in note 99); Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact
of TRIPS Dispute Settlement?, 29 Int'l. Law. 99, 109-10 (1995).
201. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 11, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26-27 (cited in note 7).
See also id. at 24 (Recital 56). At public meetings, officials of the European Commission have
stated that they retained the reciprocity provision so that it would prod other countries to adopt
equivalent laws. Statement of Jens Gaster, Knowright '95, Vienna, Austria (Aug. 26, 1996).
202. See, for example, Adrian Otten and Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The
Emerging World View, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 391, 393 (1996) ('As a result of the TRIPS
Agreement... the protection of intellectual property has become an integral part of the
multilateral trading system, as embodied in the World Trade Organization...."); J.H.
Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS
Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 Int'l Law. 345, 347-51 (1995) ('Beyond these equal-
treatment obligations, states must accord to the nationals of other member states those inter-
national minimum standards of intellectual property protection that are comprised within the
treatment provided for in this [TRIPS] agreement.").
203. See, for example, Intellectual Property Committee (USA), Keidanren (Japan), and
UNICE (Western Europe), Basic Framework on Intellectual Property: Statement of the Views of
the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities (1988). See also R. Michael
Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?, 22
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 223, 235-37 (1989) (discussing efforts to protect the intellectual property
rights of semiconductor producers).
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high-protectionist strategy for intellectual goods in the post-TRIPS
environment.
20 4
Besides coordinating their efforts in support of treaties that
would expand or supplement the 1971 Revision of the Berne
Convention, the United States and European Union both submitted
proposals for worldwide protection of the contents of databases under
sui generis intellectual property regimes akin to that embodied in the
E.C. Directive.20 5  They have also proposed treaty language206 to
conform international copyright law to the regulatory framework for a
global information infrastructure that was set forth in a controversial
White Paper recently prepared for the U.S. administration,20 7 and a
204. See, for example, Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade,
Adequate Competition Policy, in John 0. Haley and Hiroshi Iyori, eds., Antitrust." A New
International Trade Remedy? 153, 184-207 (Pacific Rim Law & Policy Assoc., 1995); Ralph
Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 J. Copyright Soc'y 18 (1994)
(approving this trend). See generally Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers (cited in
note 94) ("Competitive Role of the Developing Countries in an Integrated World Market").
205. See U.S. Proposal on Databases (cited in note 7); European Proposal on Databases
(cited in note 7). See also Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An
International Antidote to the Side-Effects of Feist (paper presented to the Fourth Annual
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Fordham University School of
Law, Apr. 11-12, 1996) ("Fourth Fordham Conference") (on file with the Authors). Powell notes
that the E.C. Directive will be incorporated into the laws of Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein
under existing trade agreements with the European Union; that "the Commission will
encourage Central and Eastern European countries to adopt similar legislation" in their
Association Agreements; that the E.U.-Turkey Customs Union Decision explicitly obliged
Turkey to align its legislation on databases with the Directive; and that its reciprocity clause
"will be used by the Commission as a bargaining chip" in dealing with third world countries.
See id. at 52-53.
206. See Proposals of the European Community and Its Member States to the Committee
of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Geneva, May 22-24, 1996, WIPO Doc.
BCP/CEVII/1-INRJCEIVI/1, May 20, 1996 ("E.U. Proposals for GIr'); Proposals of the United
States on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Geneva, May 22-24, 1996, WIPO Doc.
BCP/CEIVII/ - ("U.S. Proposal to WIPO").
207. In its White Paper on Intellectual Property and the NII, the Clinton Administration
sought a number of amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 that would strengthen the rights
of copyright owners. See U.S. White Paper, Appendix 1 (cited in note 64); National Information
Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
H.R. Rep. No. 2441, 10th Cong., 1st Sess (1995). These would grant to copyright owners a new
"exclusive right of transmission," see U.S. White Paper at 212 (cited in note 64); a provision to
prohibit the development of technologies or services useful for decoding encrypted transmissions
(or the tampering with other electronic safeguards) as a kind of copyright infringement; and a
provision outlawing any alterations to "copyright management information, including the terms
and conditions for access to online transmissions." See, for example, White Paper at 230-34.
Very similar provisions are part of the Administration's proposal for international treaty
language to WIPO. See U.S. Proposal to WIPO (cited in note 206).
Despite the innocuous appearance of these and related proposals, they are very broadly
drafted, perhaps with a view to indirectly overruling numerous judicial precedents, including
some that permit reverse-engineering of the noncopyrightable components of computer pro-
grams. See, for example, Samuelson, Wired 4.01 at 190 (cited in note 124); McManis,
International Intellectual Property Protection (cited in note 99).
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version of these proposals was embodied in a Draft Copyright
Treaty.20
8
A diplomatic conference hosted by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") convened to consider these proposals
in December 1996.209 The delegations to this conference were thus
asked to convert the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, prepared by a
Committee of Experts,210 into a norm of international intellectual
property law, even though the United States lacked any
corresponding domestic regime as of the time of writing;211 there has
been no empirical test of the controversial E.C. Directive in actual
practice; 212 and no preliminary reports or studies evaluating even the
Adoption of these proposals might also help to immunize copyright owners from claims of
misuse for imposing harsh or oppressive conditions on users in the form of non-negotiable
electronic contracts. See, for example, McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection
(cited in note 99) (stressing proposal to limit removal of electronic "shrink wrap licenses" as
component of White Paper's overall efforts "to reduce.., application and scope of fair use
doctrine"). For judicial and scholarly opposition to such licenses, see Charles R. McManis,
Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United
States and European Community, 8 High Tech. L. J. 25, 88-96 (1993) (concluding that contracts,
or at least shrink-wrap licenses, that prohibit reverse engineering are preempted by federal
intellectual property law); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic
Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091
(1995). But see Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter for the Drafting Committee on Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 2B (licenses)), U.C.C. Revision: Information A.S.E. in Contracts
(April 15, 1996) (arguing that proposed Art. 2B of U.C.C. should make such licenses presump-
tively valid); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (validating such licenses).
208. See WIPO, Basic Proposal on the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain
Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the
Diplomatic Conference, WIPO doc. CRNRIDC/4, August 30, 1996 ("WIPO Draft Copyright
Treaty").
209. See note 7. For a discussion of the proposals, underlying these draft treaties, see, for
example, Morton David Goldberg, The Digital Agenda in the U.S. and WIPO (paper presented to
the Fourth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Fordham
University School of Law, Apr. 11-12, 1996) ("Fourth Fordham Conference")) (on file with the
Authors); Paul Waterschoot (Director, DG XV/E, European Commission), Intellectual Property
and the Global Information Infrastructure-The E. U. Perspective, paper presented to the Fourth
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Fordham University
School of Law, Apr. 11-12, 1996) ("Fourth Fordham Conference"). See also Shira Perlmutter
(Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office), Developments in
WIPO: A Status Report on the New Instrument and Protocol, paper presented to the Fourth
Annual Conference on International Inellectual property Law & Policy, Fordham University
School of Law (Apr. 11-12, 1996) ("Fourth Fordham Conference").
210. See WIPO Draft Database Treaty (cited in note 7).
211. See notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
212. See, for example, Powell, Fourth Fordham Conference at 2-3 (cited in note 196)
(objecting that "it is questionable whether an international instrument should be founded on a
legal measure with no proven track record and which contains such novel legal con-
cepts... especially since... [n]either database makers nor users were satisfied with the
compromise reached in the Directive"). See also Samuelson, The N.I.I. Intellectual Property
Report, 37 Communications of the ACM at 17 (1994) (finding it "peculiar that the WIPO experts
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economic justification for such measures have been issued by WIPO or
any other reputable international institution.213 This same conference
considered the adoption of a supplementary agreement to the Berne
Convention that would convert the White Paper's vision of a global
information infrastructure into binding international minimum stan-
dards, even though these controversial proposals have yet to be
endorsed by the pertinent congressional committees. 214
Against this background, the changes to the E.C. Directive
wrought in the Council of Ministers' Common Position of 1995, includ-
ing deletion of the compulsory license provision (to which United
States publishers had objected) and other measures that strengthened
the exclusive rights apparatus, 215 evidence the coordinated strategies
that the Commission and the United States intellectual property
authorities are now jointly pursuing.2 6 If successful, these strategies
should even consider recommending a treaty on database protection when the idea for such a
law is so new and untested").
213. See, for example, Powell, Fourth Fordham Conference at 196 (cited in note 205)
(stating that the "economic case for the creation of a right to prevent extraction and/or re-
utilization of non-original contents by users has never been satisfactorily explained").
214. See notes 270-81 and accompanying text. However, the delegations to the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference in December, 1996, rejected or modified many of these proposals, and a
more socially balanced treaty was actually adopted. See Draft WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO
Doc. No. CRNR/DC/89, December 20, 1996, adopted by the Geneva Diplomatic'Conference on
the same date.
215. See, for example, Jens L. Gaster (Principal Administrator, DG XV-E-4, European
Commission), The New E.U. Directive Concerning the Legal Protection of Data Bases (paper
presented to the Fourth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law &
Policy, Fordham University School of Law, Apr. 11-12, 1996) ("Fourth Fordham Conference") (on
file with the Authors) (conceding that "the sui generis right was considerably strengthened
during the legislative process," and that attacks on the right to extract even insubstantial parts
of a protected database were barely repelled).
216. Besides proposing statutory amendments to copyright law, the U.S. White Paper seeks
to extend the rights of copyright owners by, among other things, interpreting the Copyright Act
of 1976 as favoring strong protectionist positions, particularly with regard to the right to control
unauthorized browsing of works in digital form (said to be temporary copying from a computer
memory), to the inapplicability of the "first sale" doctrine in the digital environment, and to
limitations on fair use in digital networked environments. See U.S. White Paper at 64-95 (cited
in note 64); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "copies"), 107 (codification of fair use in terms of
market interest), 109 (a) (first sale doctrine). Among the critics of the White Paper's interpreta-
tions of existing law are Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 40-41 (cited in note 89);
McManis, 8 High Tech. L. J. at 63-73 (cited in note 207); Samuelson, 37 Communications of the
A.C.M. at 23 (cited in note 212). The White Paper also takes the view that online providers are,
or should be, strictly liable for digital transmissions of copyrighted works, even if this obliges
providers to serve as "copyright police" without regard to their ability to perform such functions.
See, for example, U.S. White Paper at 114-24 (cited in note 64); Samuelson, Wired 4.01 at 136,
190-91 (cited in note 124); McManis, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 68-70 (criticizing the view
of the U.S. White Paper).
The important question for the future is not how to construe existing law so that it covers
"electronic browsing," "electronic lending," or the right to make "copies for private use," a
concept that is less established in U.S. copyright law than in some foreign laws. See, for exam-
ple, Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway:" Authors, Exploiters,
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would gradually extend international norms concerning the legal
protection of databases from the Berne Convention (or related in-
struments) to the TRIPS Agreement itself, which could give them
worldwide effect. 217 This is made expressly possible by Article 71(1) of
the Agreement, which empowers the Council for TRIPS to "undertake
reviews in the light of any relevant new developments which might
warrant modification or amendment of this Agreement."218 If and
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1466, 1477 nn. 44-45 (1995). It may be that one
cannot simply transfer these and other exceptions to the national information infrastructure
without unintended and possibly harmful effects on copyright owners, including those scientists
and academics whose own proprietary rights are at stake. See, for example, Peters, 20 Colum.-
VLA J. Law & Arts at 349-51 (cited in note 124). See also Ginsburg, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1468
(cited in this note) (stating that "the perspective of user rights... should remain secondary.
Without authors, there are no works to use"); Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An
Unorthodox Analysis, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 579, 584 (1996) (criticizing those who would
sacrifice the cause of author's rights to the generic category of "users," including "[I]nternet
users, developing nations, consumers, small competitors, and creators of derivative works").
Arguably, for example, "the entire concept of 'private copying' makes little sense in a world
where the work is predominantly marketed directly to the end users[,] ... [and] the market for,
or 'normal exploitation of,' the work will by and large be the private copying market." Ginsburg,
95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1477-78 (cited in this note).
The important question is how to recreate a "fair use" zone in cyberspace that protects the
strong public interest in ensuring that certain uses and certain users, notably the scientific and
educational communities, are not priced out of the market or forced to cut back upon the kind of
basic research that has heretofore played a crucial rule in U.S. economic and technological
growth. See, for example, Goldstein, Celestial Jukebox at 230 (cited in note 89) (stressing need
for exemptions and compulsory licenses favoring "research and educational uses" as transcen-
dent claim rooted in cumulative progress of knowledge); Hamilton, 27 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. at
628-29 (cited in note 94).
217. In the meantime, the WIPO Draft Database Treaty proposes to implement, in one
form or another, "the enforcement provisions of Part III, Articles 41-61, of the TRIPS
Agreement." See WIPO Draft Database Treaty at 20-21 (cited in note 7) ('Notes on Article 13");
id. at 21-28 ("Annei' reproducing TRIPS Agreement rules).
218. TRIPS Agreement, art. 71, in Results of the Uruguay Round at 402 (cited in note 1).
See also id. arts. 68-69 at 400 (stating that the Council for TRIPS shall "afford Members the
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights" and that "Im]embers agree to cooperate with each other with a view to eliminating
international trade in goods infringing intellectual property rights"). While parties to the Berne
Convention remain free to adopt higher copyright standards among themselves, see Berne
Convention at art. 20 (cited in note 1) ('The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve
the right to enter into special arrangements among themselves, in so far as such agreements
grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or certain other
provisions not contrary to this Convention."), these arrangements would not become binding on
other Berne Convention members in the absence of a unanimous decision. See id. at art. 27(3).
Unless such standards were incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, parties to a special
arrangement under, or related to, the Berne Convention would run some risk of having to
extend the higher standards to nonsignatory members of the WTO, under the most-favored-
nation clause of the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, art. 4, in Results of the Uruguay
Round at 369 (cited in note 1). While applications of Article 4 remain inherently uncertain, and
this outcome would depend on the interpretation of various provisions in both the TRIPS
Agreement and prior international agreements, see note 1 and accompanying text, the goal is
clearly to develop "a model in the search for a global solution regarding the protection of
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when the Council decided that the proposals embodied in the WIPO
Draft Database Treaty (if finally adopted)219 had become norms of
international intellectual property law, it would legitimize pressures
on other WTO member states to recognize similar measures in their
domestic laws and lead eventually to their formal incorporation into
the TRIPS Agreement.220 This, in turn, would obviate the long-term
effects of the reciprocity clause in the E.C. Directive by replacing it
with a set of harmonized norms binding on all WTO member states,
like those already adopted for semiconductor chip designs in articles
35-38 of the TRIPS Agreement.221
2. The Pending United States Bill
The United States delegation submitted its proposed treaty
language concerning sui generis protection of database contents to a
duly constituted WIPO Committee of Experts before any legislation to
create such a right had been placed before Congress.22 By the time
the WIPO experts met to consider the U.S. proposal, this embarrass-
ing omission had been rectified.223 The congressional bill ("H.R. 3531"
or "the Bill") proposing a domestic regime for noncopyrightable
databases articulates a far more protectionist strategy than that of
the E.C. Directive, however. This protectionist bias then influenced
the Draft Database Treaty that the WIPO Experts recommended for
consideration at the Diplomatic Conference held December 1996.224
databases which is presently discussed at WIPO." Gaster, Fourth Fordham Conference (cited in
note 215).
219. See note 7.
220. See TRIPS Agreement, art. 71(1) (cited in note 1).
221. See id. arts. 1(3), 2(2), 3(1), 35-38, in Results of the Uruguay Round at 367-68, 384-85
(cited in note 1); Reichman, 29 Int'l Law. at 374-75 (cited in note 202). See also WIPO Draft
Copyright Treaty at 1-2 (cited in note 208) (indicating that the Committee of Experts
considering the various draft treaties anticipates such a result).
222 U.S. database legislation was introduced on May 23, 1996, see note 7, long after the
U.S. had submitted its proposed treaty language for consideration at the WIPO Committee of
Experts meeting, scheduled for May 22-24, 1997. The head of this delegation also headed the
NII Working Group, whose U.S. White Paper on Intellectual Property and the NII had antici-
pated the need for legislation to protect the contents of databases. See U.S. White Paper at 153
(cited in note 64). Was it merely a coincidence that the Eutropean Commission submitted draft
treaty language for the proposed Berne Protocol mirroring the White Paper's recommendations
on contentious digital copyright issues at the same time that the U.S. submitted draft treaty
language on protecting the contents of databases? See U.S. Proposal on Databases (cited in note
7); Proposals of the the European Community and its Member States to the Committee of
Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Seventh Sess., May 22-24, 1996, WIPO
Doc. BCP/CE/1-INR/CE/VI/1 (May 20, 1996) at 3-5 ("E.C. Protocol to the Berne Convention").
223. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 1 (cited in note 7).
224. WIPO Draft Database Treaty (cited in note 7). However, the Conference postponed
action on this Draft Treaty to a later date. See note 7.
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a. Towards Broader and Stronger Exclusive Rights
Under the Bill, as under the Final E.C. Directive, a compiler
would qualify for exclusive rights to prevent extractions and reuses of
the whole or substantial parts of a database by dint of his or her hav-
ing made substantial investments in the collection, assembly, verifica-
tion, organization, or presentation of its contents.2 5 These exclusive
rights would attach automatically upon the expenditure of resources,
and if the owner continued to invest in updating or otherwise main-
taining the database in question, its twenty-five year initial term of
protection could be continually renewed without limit.226 These provi-,
sions thus ignore the constitutional Enabling Clause, which requires
intellectual property rights to be limited in time.227
When scrutinizing the details of the pending U.S. proposal,
moreover, one first finds that its definition of "database" is much
broader than that of the E.C. Directive.228 It contemplates, for
example, that noncopyrightable components of computer programs
could qualify for protection as databases,29 and it provides no appar-
ent criteria for excluding even facts or data compiled for scientific and
historical works.230 Furthermore, H.R. 3531, like the U.S. proposal to
WIPO, would grant database makers a twenty-five year initial term,
which reflects the dissatisfaction of U.S. industry groups with the
shorter duration of the E.C. Directive.31
The U.S. legislation also recognizes an exclusive right to con-
trol the uses of database contents, not just extractions and reuses of
225. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 2, 3(a) (cited in note 7); U.S. Proposal on Databases at 1.3,
3.1 (cited in note 7).
226. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 2, 3(a), (b), 6 (cited in note 7).
227. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
228. Compare, for example, H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 2 (cited in note 7) (defining "database" as
"a collection, assembly, or compilation, in any form or medium now or later known or developed,
of works, data or other materials, arranged in a systematic or methodical way") with E.C.
Directive on Databases, art. 1(2), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 24 (cited in note 7).
229. Both the European Directive and H.R. Rep. No. 3531 appear to exclude computer
programs from database rights. See E.C. Directive, art. 1(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 24 (cited in
note 7); H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 3(d) (cited in note 7). But the U.S. legislation indicates that
insofar as the contents of a program include material that satisfies the definition of database,
those contents can be protected by the database law. See notes 370-85 and accompanying text
for further discussion of this issue.
230. But see E.C. Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 23 (cited in note 7)
(indicating, in Recital 45, that the sui generis right should not protect "mere facts or data"). For
further discussion of the implications of the U.S. legislation for scientific and historical works,
see notes 386-94 and accompanying text.
231. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 6(a) (cited in note 7); U.S. Proposal on Databases at art. 6.1 (cited
in note 7). See IIA Report at 23 (cited in note 67).
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them.2 32  In addition, it reinforces all these exclusive rights by
allowing database makers further to control any use that "adversely
affects the actual or potential market for that database" in addition to
uses that otherwise "conflict with the database owner's normal
exploitation.."233 This specification, which is not found in the E.C.
Directive, has the potential for impeding virtually any judge-made
exceptions analogous to "fair use" under copyright laws, because any
such exception would almost certainly affect the "potential market"
for any given database. 234 At the same time, the database owner's
potentially perpetual derivative work right flowing from continuous
updates, which is subject to no public domain exceptions whatsoever,
becomes even easier to obtain than under the E.C. Directive. This is
because H.R. 3531 would condition the renewal right merely upon
"any change of commercial significance" to the database contents and
not solely on additional "substantial investments."235
The pending bill subtly and powerfully expands the database
owner's scope of protection well beyond that of the E.C. Directive's sui
generis regime by introducing an array of measures that, when read
together, produce formidable anticompetitive effects. For example,
the E.C. Directive's principal concession to users-the exception for
extractions of insubstantial parts 236-is ostensibly broadened in H.R.
3531 to permit uses or reuses of insubstantial parts, 237 but it is then
drastically narrowed in at least two ways. First, there is a new
provision that not only forbids "repeated or systematic use or reuse of
insubstantial parts" (like the comparable provision of the E.C.
Directive),238 but also expressly forbids extraction or uses even of
insubstantial parts "that cumulatively conflict... with... normal ex-
ploitation... or adversely affect... the actual or potential market."239
This latter clause acquires further teeth by means of still other
provisions that seem to outlaw extraction or reuse of even in-
232. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 4(a)(i) (cited in note 7); U.S. Proposal on Databases, art. 3.1,
(cited in note 7).
233. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 4(b) (cited in note 7).
234. This provision is thus consonant with several other key provisions that greatly
strengthen the scope of protection in general. See notes 236-253 and accompanying text.
235. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531, § 6(b) (cited in note 7); note 147 and accompanying text.
236. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 8(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26 (cited in note 7).
Gaster, Fourth Fordham Conference (cited in note 215) (indicating that protection of the right to
extract-but not to reuse-an insubstantial component was an integral part of the compromise
that led to otherwise strengthened protection).
237. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 4(a)(ii) (cited in note 7).
238. Id.; E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 7(g), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25-26 (cited in note 7).
See note 175 and accompanying text.
239. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 4(a)(i), (ii), 5(a) (cited in note 7).
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substantial parts of a protected database in any product or service
that directly or indirectly competes with the database from which it
was extracted in any market, however distant.240 Also forbidden are
extraction, use, or reuse of even insubstantial parts "by or for multiple
persons within an organization or entity in lieu of... authorized
additional use or reuse... by license, purchase, or otherwise. 24'
Given such restrictions, one is hard pressed to imagine un-
authorized uses of an insubstantial component that the drafters of the
United States model would deem legitimate. To forestall even this
remote possibility, H.R. 3531 allows publishers contractually to
override even the formal right of lawful users to extract or use
insubstantial parts in contrast with the express nullification of
similar contractual provisions in the E.C. Directive.242  One
knowledgeable source reports that United States database publishers,
angered by the presence of this constraint in the E.C. Directive, have
every intention of exercising permissible contractual overrides in
practice.243 A similar intention seems manifest in the clause allowing
publishers to impose separate licenses for networked use of a
database within organizations, including nonprofit academic and
scientific institutions, which can be construed as covering the
extraction, use, or reuse even of insubstantial parts.
244
Taken together, these and other provisions of H.R. 3531
reinforce the single most disturbing aspect of the E.C. Directive,
namely, that it precludes formation of an evolving public domain from
which third parties can freely draw. 245 To this end, the bill expressly
confines permissible acts of "independent creation" to data or
materials not found in a database subject to the proposed sui generis
240. See id. §§ 4(a)(ii), 4(b). This restriction covers markets in which the database owner
has a demonstrable interest or expectation in licensing or otherwise reusing the database, as
well as markets in which owners might reasonably expect to find customers for the database.
Id.
241. Id. § 4(b)(iv).
242. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 15, 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7)
(expressly voiding contractual provisions to this effect). See also IIA Report at 19-20 (cited in
note 67) (criticizing this provision from the U.S. perspective).
243. See Powell, Fourth Fordham Conference (cited in note 205). See also U.S. Proposal on
Databases at art. 7(2) (cited in note 7) ("No Contracting Party shall impair the ability to vary by
contract the rights and exceptions to rights set forth herein.").
244. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 4(a)(ii) (cited in note 7) (requiring authorization for
repeated or systemmatic extraction, use, or reuse of insubstantial parts of a database in a way
that conflicts with the owner's normal exploitation), 4(b)(iv) (prohibiting multiple persons within
an organization from using a database in a way that conflicts with the owner's normal
exploitation without authorization through liscense or otherwise).
245. See notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
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regime.246  This restriction applies regardless of whether the
unauthorized extraction or use is made for purposes of noncommercial
scientific endeavor or for commercially important value-adding
products that build incrementally on existing compilations of data.
Every unauthorized use or reuse of existing data thus potentially
violates the database owner's unbounded derivative work right.
Furthermore, the existence of this potential violation is determined
without regard to the substantiality of the second comer's own
expenditure of effort or resources, to the similarity or differences of




b. Perfecting an Absolute Monopoly
The absolute monopoly conferred on database owners under
the pending U.S. legislation is then perfected by recognizing no public
interest exceptions whatsoever. Even the weak exception for extrac-
tion (but not reuse) of database contents "for the purposes of
illustration for teaching or scientific research" that the E.C. Directive
allows E.U. member states to enact 248 is omitted from both H.R. 3531
and from the U.S. submission to WIPe.
249
The sole sop to science and education in H.R. 3531 is a provi-
sion not found in the E.C. Directive that expressly denies coverage to
"a database made by a government entity. '" 250 Because most databases
246. See, for example, H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 5(b) (cited in note 7) ("Nothing in this Act shall
in any way restrict any person from independently collecting, assembling or compiling works,
data or materials from sources other than a database subject to this Act.").
247. Id. §§ 4 (outlining the prohibitions of the Act), 5 (carving out two exceptions without
regard to the user's purpose, effort, or resulting product), and 6.
248. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 9(b), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26 (cited in note 7). See
also id. at arts. 9(a) (allowing extraction for private purposes from non-electronic databases),
9(c) (allowing extraction and reuse for purposes of "public security or an administrative or
judicial procedure").
249. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 5 (cited in note 7) (providing exceptions only for lawful users
to extract, use, or reuse insubstantial parts of public or commercially-used databases and for use
of data from sources not subject to the Act); U.S. Proposal on Databases at art. 5 (cited in note
7). The U.S. Proposal to WIPO appears less watertight, because it does permit contracting
parties, "in their domestic legislation, [to] provide for exceptions to or limitations on the rights,"
so long as such exceptions or limitations "do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation ... and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder."
U.S. Proposal to WIPO at art. 5.3 (cited in note 206). Because the U.S. Proposal links this
exception to the notion of a "substantial" taking for purposes of infringement and also to the
express notion that use of pre-existing protected matter is not an independent creation, see id.
at arts. 3.1, 3.2, the drafters clearly aim to forbid any exceptions that permit extraction or use of
a substantial part of the database for any purpose.
250. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 3(c) (cited in note 7) ("Except for a database made by a
governmental entity, any database otherwise subject to this Act, is not excluded herefrom
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of primary importance to science are funded by government agencies,
this provision appears to recognize that such databases merit
different treatment from those normally covered by the proposed sui
generis regime. The message is rendered ambiguous, however, by
language in the same provision to the effect that "any database
otherwise subject to this Act ... is not excluded herefrom because its
contents have been obtained from a governmental entity.251 This
provision seems to clarify that private firms that invest in data
appropriated from government sources will still qualify for protection.
It can also be read, however, as implicitly inviting governmental agen-
cies to derogate from the traditional U.S. position, reiterated in a
recent Office of Management and Budget Directive, which limits such
agencies to the recovery of dissemination costs from commercial
applications of government-funded data by the private sector.252  If
government entities moved beyond cost-recovery principles, the con-
tinued ability of scientists to access such data on favorable terms,
which current policy seeks to guarantee, could then be called into
question.25
3
Disregarding the status of databases made by governmental
entities, H.R. 3531 would render virtually any act of "collecting, as-
sembling, or compiling... data... from ... a database subject to this
Act" a prohibited or infringing act. The perpetrator can never justify
such acts as incidental to other acts of independent creation, or as
incidental to recognized public interest exceptions, or even as legiti-
mate means of building on preexisting data sets.254 Nor does H.R.
3531 express any concern that application of its exclusive rights might
lead to abuse of a dominant position or to other anticompetitive acts
that might require "nonvoluntary licensing" at some point in the fu-
because its contents have been obtained from a governmental entity."). This provision has no
counterpart in the E.C. Directive on Databases because E.U. governments expect to
commercialize their databases. See note 78 above. See also WIPO Draft Database Treaty at
art. 5(2) (cited in note 7) (allowing national legislation to determine the level of protection for
databases made by government entities).
251. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 3(c) (cited in note 7).
252. See OMB Implementing Memo (cited in note 73) (cautioning agencies that use the
services of private contractors not to impose, or permit the intermediary to impose, restrictions
that interfere with the agencies' own dissemination responsibilities; and reiterating "the basic
standard that agencies shall not charge use fees for government information which exceed the
cost of dissemination").
253. See notes 293-94, 302-10 and accompanying text.
254. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 4, 5(a)(b) (cited in note 7). See notes 237-44 and
accompanying text (stressing built-in restrictions on claiming use of an insubstantial part in
practice).
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ture.2 55 On the contrary, the bill expressly empowers publishers con-
tractually to override even the nominal right of subscribers to use or
reuse insubstantial parts of the database and to require "multiple
persons within an organization or entity"-presumably including
scientific and educational entities-to acquire additional licenses or





Ancillary provisions of H.R. 3531 also embody some of the
present administration's most controversial proposals concerning the
regulation of national and global information infrastructures.257 For
example, it includes a provision akin to that found in the White Paper
that would outlaw making or distributing any technical device (or
performing any technical service) the primary purpose or effect of
which was to circumvent self-help technological security measures
that publishers may rely on to protect the contents of their data-
bases. 258 Another provision inspired by the White Paper would forbid
tampering with database management information attached to digital
copies of the database contents or otherwise distributing contents in a
form that bears false information about ownership or other aspects of
managing the relevant proprietary rights.259
Self-help measures, such as encryption for networked trans-
missions, often serve valid commercial purposes, and they may be-
come indispensable for the protection of privacy.2 60 Such measures
may also, however, unduly reinforce the publisher's power to impose
harsh contractual terms in two-party deals,28' a prospect that H.R.
255. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 16(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7)
(requiring E.C. Commission to report, at three-year intervals, concerning these issues and the
need to establish "non-voluntary licensing arrangements").
256. See notes 242-44 and accompanying text. See also H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 4(b)(iv) (cited
in note 7).
257. See note 207 and accompanying text.
258. See, for example, H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 10 (cited in note 7) ("Circumvention of
Database Protection Systems"); U.S. Proposal on Databases at art. 8 (cited in note 7)
(Prohibition of Protection-Defeating Devices). See also U.S. White Paper, Appendix 1 at 5
(cited in note 64); Pamela Samuelson, Technological Protection for Copyrighted Works, paper
presented to the Thrower Symposium, Emory Law School (Feb. 22, 1996) (on file with the
Authors) (stating that, although digital technology "poses a serious challenge for copyright
owners because works in digital form are vulnerable to uncontrolled replication and dissemina-
tion in networked environments," it is "not just part of the problem; it may also be part of the
solution").
259. See, for example, H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 11 (cited in note 7) ("Integrity of Database
Management Information"). See also U.S. White Paper, Appendix 2 at 5 (cited in note 64).
260. See, for example, Branscomb, Who Owns Information? at 175-77 (cited in note 35).
261. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text. A solid body of scholarly opinion holds that "a
combination of technological restrictions (such as encryption), contractual arrangements and
criminal sanctions (for unauthorized decryption)" raises a far greater risk of overprotection than
that of underprotection. McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection (cited in note
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3531 completely ignores. There is also reason to fear that publishers
will use these measures to fend off legitimate public interest
challenges to the scope of protection obtained under the proposed sui
generis regime. If, for example, decrypting a coded transmission is
necessary to extract part of a database for noncommercial scientific
purposes, and the act of decryption itself constitutes a tort,
262
researchers are unlikely to explore the possible availability of judge-
made public interest exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by
the new regime.
263
In sum, by providing a longer period of protection, more power-
ful exclusive rights, no public interest exceptions or privileges, harsh
criminal penalties (as well as treble damages for willful infringe-
ments),264 and ancillary rules reinforcing self-help policing of online
transmissions, the proposed U.S. law would grant database owners a
more absolute monopoly than that emanating from the E.C. Directive.
In so doing, the drafters of H.R. 3531 take no notice of the role that
affordable, unrestricted flows of data have traditionally played in U.S.
science policy or in other domains. The proposed regime thus risks
triggering a chain of unintended consequences that could ultimately
compromise both the foundations of basic science and the technologi-
cal superiority of the national innovation system.
265
3. The "Digital Agenda" at the World Intellectual Property
Organization
Although WIPO's Draft Database Treaty left the Diplomatic
Conference a choice between the fifteen and twenty-five year terms
for database rights proposed by the European Union and the U.S.,
99); Kurtz, 18 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. at 120, 121, 124 (cited in note 58) (stressing risk that a
chronic state of overprotection could "choke off opportunities for academic research and
educational uses of intellectual property").
262. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 10 (cited in note 7) (prohibiting circumvention of database
protections without the database owner's authorization), 12 (presecribing remedies, including
damage awards, for violation of § 10).
263. See notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
264. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 7(1), 8 (cited in note 7) (prescribing fines of up to $250,000
and up to five years imprisonment for certain first offense willful violations of the prohibited
acts under § 4; id. §§ 12, 13 (prescribing fine of up to $500,000 and up to five years
imprisonment for violations of § 11 with intent to defraud).
265. David and Foray, 16 Sci. Tech. & Ind. Rev. at 38-59 (cited in note 62) (national sys-
tems of innovation studies).
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respectively,266 in most respects it adhered more closely to the United
States model than to the European model. For example, the treaty,
like the proposed U.S. legislation, would regulate uses (not just
reuses) of database contents; 267 provide no public policy exceptions or
privileges; 268 and limit avoidance of circumvention technologies.
269
Even so, there is probably enough of the European Union model in the
Draft Treaty to satisfy eventually the European Union, even if they
cavil on some details during the treaty negotiation process. By their
coordinated efforts, the U.S. and E.U. delegations have thus largely
succeeded in focusing attention on the details of their proposals
rather than on whether there is really a need for such a regime in the
first place or whether a melded United States-European Union model
law is the best solution to whatever problem might exist.
From the international perspective, the WIPO Draft Database
Treaty is best understood as an integral part of the larger "digital
agenda" put forward in the White Paper and other policy statements.
Taking these proposals directly to the international level, as reorgan-
ized by the TRIPS Agreement, may accelerate the process of imple-
mentation and, at the same time, circumvent the task of reconciling
private and public interests in the domestic legislative processes. 270 In
other words, by pursuing its "digital agenda," and including the sui
generis protection scheme, 271 at the international level with the
cooperation of European colleagues, U.S. officials are on their way to
converting the White Paper's controversial "reform proposals" into
international standards of intellectual property protection that would
eventually become binding on all signatories to the Berne Conven-
266. WIPO Draft Database Treaty, art. 8 (cited in note 7). Another issue of contention
between the United States and the European Union on which the draft treaty takes no position
concerns the entitlement of governments to claim database rights. Id. at art. 5(2).
267. Id. at art. 3(1). The WIPO Draft Database Treaty does not even contain a provision
that would give lawful users the right to take insubstantial parts of database contents.
268. The draft WIPO Draft Database Treaty would, however, permit nations to enact
exceptions or limitations on rights "in certain special cases that do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rightsholder." Id. at art. 5(1). At the time of this writing, some U.S. authorities advocated
adding a new paragraph 3 to Article 5, as follows: "Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1)
above, contracting parties shall provide appropriate exceptions to or limitations of the rights
provided in this treaty for uses of databases for non-commercial scientific or educational
purposes." Such language is a response to concerns expressed by the National Research
Council. See Memorandum of Keith Kopferschmid to Mike Nelson of Nov. 9, 1996 (on file with
the Authors).
269. WIPO Draft Database Treaty, art. 10 (cited in note 7).
270. See notes 215-21 and accompanying text (discussing potential impact of the TRIPS
agreement).
271. See notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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tion.272 This "whiplash effect," coupled with the E.C. Directive's reci-
procity clause, 273 would then oblige the United States to implement
these same standards in its domestic laws even if Congress had not
already adopted similar legislation in the interim.
274
While the advent of new technologies has always created a
degree of legal uncertainty in intellectual property law, the tendency
in the past was to allow the law slowly to catch up, despite the risk of
some short-term obsolescence. 275 This applied with particular force to
international intellectual property law, which evolved slowly from a
bottom-up consensus among states that experimented with different
solutions to new problems in their domestic laws.276 In contrast, pow-
erful interests contend that the opposite course of action is needed
with respect to digitally conveyed knowledge and information goods,
and the major reforms set out in the White Paper further this view.
277
272. See notes 196-201 and accompanying text. Although the White Paper legislation is
more restrictive in some ways than the WIPO Draft Database Treaty (for example, in the draft
treaty's insertion of a scienter requirement in the anti-circumvention provision, WIPO Draft
Database Treaty at art. 10(1) (cited in note 7), this would not clash significantly with the treaty.
See Berne Convention at art. 20 (cited in note 1) (authorizing member states "to enter into
special agreements among themselves... [that] grant to authors more extensive rights than
those granted by the Convention").
273. See notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
274. See notes 99, 200, 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing obligation of all WTO
members to adopt both the universal minimum standards of the Berne Convention, whether or
not they adhere to that Convention, and the additional standards concerning computer
programs, compilations, and related subject matter set out in the TRIPS Agreement itself,
including modifications that take account of new developments). See also Reichman, 29 Int'l
Law. at 347-51, 365-73 (cited in note 202). The formal ability of developing countries to opt out
of such proposed international norms has so far been limited by their need for market access in,
and economic assistance from, the developed countries.
275. If one believes that the federal courts can apply existing copyright law to the new
technologies with relatively little friction, then one has implicitly opted for a wait-and-see
approach or at least for a minimalist approach, based on case-by-case judicial decisions and a
minimum amount of tinkering with the statute as it stands. For a detailed and cogent
exposition of this view, see generally Joseph V. Myers III, Note, Speaking Frankly About
Copyright Infringement on Computer Bulletin Boards: Lessons to be Learned from Frank Music,
Netcom, and the White Paper, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 439 (1996). This approach leaves the traditional
exemptions for scientific and educational users intact, but subject to case-by-case evaluation. If,
in contrast, one believes that gaps in the law leave online publishers too much at risk, then
proposals for statutory reform easily escalate into a campaign to rid the emerging information
infrastructure of allegedly anachronistic vestiges of the cultural bargain that had heretofore
protected users and second comers of works in print and other media. See, for example,
McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection (cited in note 99).
276. See, for example, Stephen Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights: National
and International Protection 59-94 (Harvard U., 1975).
277. See, for example, U.S. White Paper at 17 (cited in note 64) (characterizing its proposed
amendments as "the fine tuning that technological advances necessitate, in order to maintain
the balance of the law in the face of onrushing technology"). But see, for example, Kurtz, 18
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. at 120 (cited in note 58) (criticizing White Paper's biased review of
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Yet, the level of disagreement about even the most rudimentary
components of the proposed reforms is very great; and an impartial
evaluation of them is further complicated by the larger (but often
unstated) policy implications of even the most seemingly innocuous
technical proposals.278 Under these circumstances, the unseemly
haste with which both the U.S.279 and E.U. authorities28O have moved
existing law as a partisan brief that adopts the position of publishers on almost every contro-
versial issue, without acknowledging contrary arguments or authority).
278. See, for example, Samuelson, Wired 4.01 at 135 (cited in note 124) (characterizing
proposed White Paper amendments as a "copyright grab" that will profoundly change the
historic balance of copyright law by maximizing the protection of digital works with no
corresponding consideration of the need for public access to and use of such works).
279. The Administration's main argument for moving so far and so fast rests largely on the
supposed difficulties of enforcing territorially grounded intellectual property rights in cyber-
space, see, for example, McManis, International Intellectual Property Protection (cited in note
99), and on the "detach[ment of] information from the physical plane, where property law of all
sorts has always found definition." John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for
Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know About Intellectual
Property is Wrong), Wired 2.03 at 84 (March 1994). From a legal perspective, these
developments raise daunting problems of conflicts of law, a field that has never found it easy to
accommodate intangible property. See, for example, I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime
for "Cyberspace," 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 993 (1994); Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial
Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J.
Copyright Soc'y 318 (1995); Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Law in Cyberspace: Rethinking
International Copyright in a Digitally Networked World, 20 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 571 (1996).
The Administration's haste in pushing these initiatives without domestic debate, including
inputs from the scientific and educational communities, reinforces the impression that the real
goal of the campaign is to rid cyberspace of the pre-existing cultural bargain, including manifold
applications of the fair use doctrine on which those communities depended in the past. See
Jaszi, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. at 599 (cited in note 87); Samuelson, Wired 4.01 at 135 (cited in
note 124).
280. See, for example, Waterschoot, Fourth Fordham Conference (cited in note 209).
European officials seem eager to adopt digital agenda policy proposals at the international level
without much time for public hearings or for consultations with national science groups and
other interested parties. See, for example, Dirk J. G. Visser, Copyright in Cyberspace-National
Dutch Report (paper presented to the International Association for Literary and Artistic
Property (ALAI) Study Days, Amsterdam, June 4-8, 1996) ("Copyright in Cyberspace"). This
paper quoted the Dutch Federation of Organizations in the Library, Information and
Documentation Fields' (FOBID) recent complaint to the Minister of Justice:
To its unpleasant surprise FOBID has found that in the [E.C.] Green Paper little or no
attention is paid to the statutory limitations on copyright, such as library privileges and
rules on educational, scientific and private use. Many existing limitations are
technology dependent. It has to be examined whether and to what extent these
limitations should be maintained or adapted in the digital environment.
Id.
To this and similar complaints, Professor Visser's report makes the following reply:
[Iv]any limitations are the result of successful "lobbying." Intermediaries and users
applying for specific limitations must realize that right owners, who will oppose any
limitation as a matter of principle, are generally very well represented at the (national
and international) legislative level. Thus, the extent to which copyright limitations will
be preserved or extended in the digital environment will eventually be determined by
the ability of intermediaries and users to have their voice heard on the political level.
Id. at 13 (quoting P. B. Hugenholtz and D. J. G. Visser, Copyright Problems of Electronic
Document Delivery: A Comparative Analysis, Report to the Commission of the European
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to implement these measures at the international level raises
troubling and still unanswered questions about the extent to which
the public interest has been sacrificed to the private interests of "right
owners, who.., are generally very well-represented at the (national
and international) legislative level.."
281
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A SUI GENERIS DATABASE REGIME
The use of either raw or elaborated data sets in scientific and
technological pursuits is so prevalent that, under the best of circum-
stances, the adoption of any new proprietary rights in databases was
bound to have broad repercussions on numerous and apparently unre-
lated fields. As matters stand, the E.C. Directive and its counterpart
proposals were deliberately drawn as broadly as possible, which mag-
nifies the social costs (or benefits) likely to derive from them. The
foregoing analysis reflects our pessimistic view of that cost/benefit
analysis. In the sections that follow, we spell out the probable impli-
cations for science, for value-adding information providers, and for
other important user groups. Given the possibilities for mischief this
survey reveals, we then reconsider the database project as a whole
with a view to identifying alternative solutions likely to provide real
social benefits at a more acceptable social cost.
A. Putting Basic Science at Risk
Enactment of a U.S. version of the E.U.'s sui generis regime to
protect noncopyrightable databases will significantly affect the
scientific and educational communities in this country, if only because
it would introduce the factors of prospective privatization and
Communities (DG XIII), Brussels/Luxembourg 62 (1995)). See also Robert J. Hart, Intellectual
Property and the Global Information Infrastructure-The Perspective in Japan, Australia, and
Canada (paper presented to the Fourth Annual Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law & Policy, Fordham University School of Law, Apr. 11-12, 1996) ("Fourth Fordham
Conference") (stressing that only Australia's proposals concerning regulation of national infor-
mation infrastructures have so far reflected concerns for "fair use" and related exceptions).
281. Visser, Copyright in Cyberspace at 12 (cited in note 280). Professor Samuelson has put
it more bluntly:
[N]ot since the King of England in the 16th century gave a group of printers exclusive
rights to print books in exchange for the printer's agreement not to print heretical or
seditious material has a government copyright policy been so skewed in favor of
publisher interests and so detrimental to the public interest.
Samuelson, 37 Communications of ACM at 22 (1994) (cited in note 212).
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commercialization into a universe of discourse whose supplies of both
raw and elaborated data have largely been funded by the government
and shared by all interested investigators.182 If, in the future, the
acquisition of scientific data depended on the payment of prices set by
the market and became subject to licensing and other legal con-
straints, it could represent a wrenching change from current practices
and procedures.
1. Hypothetical Benefits to Science from the Commodification of Data
The proponents of database protection have commissioned no
studies concerning the implications of their sui generis intellectual
property regimes for science and education, and nothing in the litera-
ture suggests that this topic has received serious consideration at the
legislative level. On the contrary, the domestic and international
institutions that normally represent the interests of the scientific
community were not consulted on the draft proposals, and until a
Commission of the National Research Council ("NRC") began to look
into the matter last year,283 most scientists and educators were un-
aware of the pending legislative agenda. For this and other reasons,
the presidents of the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS"), the
National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine
petitioned the Administration to postpone action on the WIPO Draft
Database Treaty in order to allow time for the scientific and
educational communities to express their concerns in the appropriate
domestic legislative fora.284
As an abstract proposition, nonetheless, one may construct a
seemingly plausible scenario according to which the scientific com-
munity might suffer no harm from the pending legislative initiatives
and could even benefit significantly from them. While such a theory
282. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32); OMB Implementing Memo
(cited in note 73).
283. See Bits of Power at ch. 1 and Executive Summary (cited in note 32).
284. Letter to the Secretary of Commerce from the Presidents of the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine (Oct. 9, 1996) (on
file with the Authors) ("Academy Presidents' Letter"). The Academy Presidents deplore
proposed changes to intellectual property law that "could seriously undermine the ability of
researchers and educators to access and use scientific data, and ... have a deleterious long-term
impact on our nation's research capabilities... [and be] broadly antithetical to the principles of
full and open exchange of scientific data." The Academies' Presidents find it "especially
disconcerting ... that.., radical legal changes have been proposed.., for ... negotiation at the
WIPO Diplomatic Conference this December, without any debate or analysis of the law's
potentially harmful implications for our Nation's scientific and technological development."
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must be tested against the countervailing evidence discussed below, it
would rest on the following (often questionable) premises.
First, the scientific community might arguably suffer no harm
if its members continued to operate in a noncommercial universe that
enjoyed strong government support. Indeed, governments that lacked
funds for basic scientific research might look to revenues from the
generation and distribution of databases to augment, rather than
reduce, prior levels of funding. Within their noncommercialized
space, meanwhile, the continued adherence of the scientific commu-
nity to deeply entrenched norms that favor the sharing of data285
would further immunize it from the private sector in which commer-
cial providers, fortified by new proprietary rights, were operating.
Alternatively, those scientists who so desired could look to data
collections as a source of revenue if, as seems likely, government
support declined, and new markets for specific collections arose. Self-
help commodification would, of course, intensify a breakdown of the
sharing ethos, as individual scientists increasingly felt the need to
protect their data, either out of a sense of unfairness or simply to
have something to trade. Even so, scientists might devise new ways
of shifting part of the costs of acquiring data under changed
conditions to private and public funding.286 Moreover, economists
would argue that these costs-including the transaction costs of adap-
tation-might be offset by corresponding gains in efficiency that
would occur if database production and distribution took place under
competitive, free-market conditions.287
On this view, if competitive markets formed in the database
sector as a whole, an intellectual property right that prevented free-
riding appropriation of an investor's returns would provide a catalyst
to the further growth and development of such markets.288  To the
extent that markets arose even for scientific databases or for applica-
tions derived from them,28 9 the existence of a new intellectual property
285. See Bits of Power at chs. 3-4 (cited in note 32).
286. Id. at ch. 4.
287. See id. See also Merges, 13 Social Philo. and Pol. Found. at 147, 157-58 (cited in note
36).
288. See generally Hunsuker, European Database Directive (cited in note 60).
289. The evidence gathered for the Bits of Power study showed very few examples of
commercial databases of interest to science. The main examples pertained to databases in
materials science and chemistry, such as those whose access is maintained by STN
International. Some of these (accessed by STN) were actually developed by U.S. government
sources, for example, databases compiled by the National Institute for Standards Technology
(NIST). See, for example, Letter from Dr. Jolie A. Cizewski to the Committee on Issues in the
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right could, in principle, lead to more and better products utilizing
and applying the relevant data, to lower prices for the use of such
data, or both. Scientists might also find novel ways to internalize
costs in a more competitive environment or to recuperate them from
applications to industry, while data suppliers would have more incen-
tives to favor academic users through product differentiation and
price discrimination.290 There is, of course, always a concomitant risk
that, even under competitive conditions, providers might price their
data beyond the capacity of basic science to pay, which would lead to
under-funding and other consequences discussed below.29' But
healthy competition might itself spawn corrective measures to over-
come this risk.292
The problem, of course, is that competition remains a chimeri-
cal concept insofar as the generation of most databases under real
world conditions is concerned. This applies with even greater force to
the bulk of scientific databases. As noted above, the high start-up
costs and limited economies of scale available to most database mak-
ers have in the past combined to produce mostly niche markets domi-
nated by a single source.293 As regards the important databases on
which basic science relies, they are usually cooperative in nature,
government controlled, and geared to a relatively small and selected
band of users who benefit from the principle of free and open access to
data.
294
Only a small fraction of all the data generated around the
world is directly compiled for basic scientific pursuits. Much of the
Transborder Flow of Scientific data (Apr. 30, 1996) ("Letter from Dr. Cizewskf') (on file with the
Authors). Another example is that of a database run by the International Union of
Crystallography, which profits from information about crystal structures that is of interest to
the research community and pharmaceutical companies. See, for example, Letter from Dr.
William E. Gordon to the Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data (Jun.
13, 1996) (on file with the Authors). Most other scientific databases are generated and
maintained by groups or government agencies that have not heretofore engaged in for-profit
activities. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
290. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
291. Other non-economic factors could adversely affect scientific activities in a more
competitive environment, and these must be taken into account. There is, for example, the
problem of evaluating which among several offerings, are the "best value" files. NIST has
reportedly earned income by establishing standards or "best values" that scientists respect, and
this trust, in turn, creates something of a barrier to entry for would-be competitors, even if such
a competitor has repackaged the NIST numbers. See, for example, Letter from Dr. Cizewski
(cited in note 289). While second products may afford new and cheaper tools, the second comer
who uses a file he or she does not fully understand may introduce errors when downloading it.
For an example, see Bits of Power at ch. 3 (cited in note 32).
292. See, for example, National Research Council, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
See also Hunsucker, European Database Directive (cited in note 60).
293. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
294. See, for example, Bits of Power at chs. 2-4 and Executive Summary (cited in note 32).
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data that fuels some scientific disciplines is collected by governments
to foster public safety (for example, providing timely warnings of
potential disasters, such as floods, tornadoes and the like).295 The
study of this data often leads to advances that improve public safety
mechanisms. The public good aspects of science thus overlap With the
larger public good aspects inherent in the generation of raw data.
It is true that government agencies have sometimes relied on
private intermediaries for downstream delivery of publicly funded
data,2 9G and this practice could become more common in the presence
of stronger legal protection. Even so, the sole-source structure that
characterizes the generation of many databases, including scientific
databases, appears unlikely to change, at least as long as entry fees
remain disproportionately high in relation to the small size of the user
market segments. Indeed, under these conditions, the existence of
even one database-generating unit may constitute a singular social
achievement.
It follows, therefore, that in most cases the proposed sui gene-
ris regimes will simply engraft a strong legal monopoly onto the pre-
existing natural monopolies that are typical of the database industry.
It is the social costs of these double-barreled monopolies to the public
at large that must actually be taken into account,297 along with their
overall impact on a scientific community whose leading role in world
technological production is linked in still unexplored ways to the
traditional funding of scientific data by government.
2. Retarding the Progress of Science
Some segments of the United States scientific community
might at first feel little or no impact if the pending legislative initia-
tives become law. So long as the government continues to fund the
acquisition and dissemination of relevant data, those branches of
science that remain willing and able to carry on as before may simply
opt out of the commercialization process. H.R. 3531 expressly
recognizes this option,298 unlike the E.C. Directive, which emanates in
295. See, for example, id.
296. See, for example, OMB Implementing Memo (cited in note 73)
297. See Bits of Power at Executive Summary (cited in note 32) ("A fundamental principle
must be that where privatization is likely to lead to monopoly supply, it is not good public policy,
and especially not good for science.") See generally id. at ch. 4 ('Privatization: When Does it
Make Sense").
298. See note 250.
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part from a political drive to protect and commercialize publicly
funded databases.
299
In practice, however, the possibilities for opting out of a com-
mercialized universe of discourse would probably shrink over time,
even if the United States government retained its present policies.300
Under section 3 of H.R. 3531, for example, a private firm could assert
rights in a database funded by the government after making an in-
vestment in, say, converting the data to a different format, if the in-
vestor "intends to use or reuse the database in commerce."30' While
the investment would need to be "substantial," the statute provides no
standard other than that substantiality is to be evaluated in qualita-
tive as well as quantitative terms. 3 2 It might not, for example, ex-
clude simply merging two or more government databases into a single
whole.303
Over time the problem of integrated data sets derived from
different sources could become acute if some were protected under the
database laws and others were provided by scientific groups or
government entities that had opted out of the statute.304 Unless coun-
tervailing legal measures were made available at both the domestic
and international levels, the trend towards commercialization in other
countries, especially within the European Union, coupled with the
new intellectual property rights, could thus become a serious im-
299. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
300. See, for example, Merges, 13 Social Philo. and Pol. Found. at 157-58 (cited in note 36)
(discussing game-theory reasons for this result).
301. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 3(a)(i) (cited in note 7).
302. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 speaks of "a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial investment
of human, technical, financial or other resources in the.., assembly... or presentation
of... contents." Id. This "substantial investment!' test is more elastic than the E.C. Directive's
test. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 10(3), 1996 O.J. (L77) at 26 (cited in note 7).
303. See, for example, Letter from Professor Shelton Alexander to the Committee on Issues
in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data (Jun. 15, 1996) (on file with the Authors). This result
would become especially likely if the broad criterion for extending protection for derivative
works---'any change of potential commercial value"-were judicially imported into the substan-
tial investment test. See H.R. Rep. No. 3531 §§ 3(a), 6(b) (cited in note 7).
304. See Letter from Professor Shelton Alexander (cited in note 303). Professor Alexander
asks:
Would these providers or users be subject to penalties/jail/unexpected costs if protected
data were improperly included in the integrated database? (Apparently no action could
be taken against the Federal government, if they were the provider, but what about non-
government users?) In fields like Global Change where many different types of global
data are relevant and where a scientist might not know the legacy of a lot of the data,
avoiding a breach of the Act could be very difficult.
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pediment to the study of global observations (nearly all of the earth
science disciplines).30 5
Furthermore, funding for the acquisition of scientific data is
likely to become scarcer, in keeping with overall trends, while pres-
sures for privatizing the distribution of data seem certain to in-
crease.30 6 Indeed, a recent OMB circular suggests that pressures to
privatize the distribution of government-funded data were already a
problem before the advent of the proposed database law in the United
States. The circular also indicates that OMB was finding it hard to
hold the line on its cost-recovery pricing policy. 07
Because the sui generis database laws are meant to stimulate
investment in the generation and distribution of for-profit data, there
is even greater reason to doubt the ability or willingness of govern-
ments, including that of the United States, to maintain a cost-recov-
ery formula over time. As pointed out above, H.R. 3531 may even
invite this change of course by insisting that "any database otherwise
subject to this Act... is not excluded herefrom because its contents
have been obtained from a government entity."30 8 If, as is logical to
suppose, a cost-recovery formula were gradually replaced with profit-
based prices, then the many reuses of data in basic science (and in its
applications) would become increasingly contingent upon the scientific
community's ability to pay those prices, absent some more favorable
305. See generally Bits of Power at chs. 3-4 and Executive Summary (cited in note 32).
There is some evidence that the creation of "mini-monopolies" under the Directive on Databases
was viewed as a desirable strategic response to the rivalry between states in the global market
for information products. See, for example, Rosler, 10 High Tech. L. J. at 138-39, 141-43 (cited
in note 96) (discussing perceived advantages, as well as possible disadvantages, of the E.C.
Directive on Databases). In this connection, a unilateral decision not to profit from the
acquisition, distribution, or use of data taken by a segment of the U.S. scientific community
would not bind foreign segments of the same community. These communities might decline to
supply data needed for local research without payments under the rate schedule applicable
abroad. In such cases, the willingness of the U.S. government to defray the costs of acquiring
and distributing foreign data without passing these costs on to local researchers would actually
determine the extent to which a given scientific sector could carry on as before.
306. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
307. See 0MB Implementing Memo (cited in note 73). See generally Bits of Power at ch. 4
(cited in note 32).
308. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 3(c) (cited in note 7). See also id. § 3(a)(i) (stating that an oth-
erwise qualifying database remains subject to the Act if "the database owner intends to use or
reuse the database in commerce"). This could permit any scientific database to fall under the
Act whenever the putative owner declared an intention to use it at some unspecified time in the
future. "Presumably, this could include data collected at government expense via grants and
contracts to the private sector [or to] ... universities." Letter from Professor Shelton Alexander
(cited in note 303).
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legal disposition, such as a "fair use" exception, or favorable price
discrimination. 0 9
The moment one begins seriously to ponder the implications of
detaching the scientific community from the cost-recovery formula on
which it has thrived, the more disquieting become the monopolistic
effects built into both the E.C. Directive and H.R. 3531. If natural
monopolies are to become converted into self-perpetuating legal mo-
nopolies, with little likelihood of direct or indirect competition (even
by means of value-adding products), with no evolving public domain,
and with no serious public-interest exceptions favoring science and
education, then the publishers' capacity to maximize profits at the
expense of overall social benefits is limited only by what the market
will bear.3
10
Unfortunately, a calculus of net social benefits was never a
factor of any importance to either the European Union's Council of
Ministers or to the drafters of H.R. 3531. The former, at least, ac-
knowledge the prospects of real-world anticompetitive consequences,
which they ultimately relegated to the clumsy embrace of competition
law. 311 In the United States, however, the role of competition (or anti-
trust) law in minimizing abusive exercises of intellectual property
rights is quite limited as compared with even that of the European
Community. For example, both monopoly pricing and the refusal of a
sole-source provider to license add-on products could violate the
European Union's competition law, but such practices would almost
never constitute antitrust violations under U.S. law.312 In general, the
high costs and cumbersome procedures of proving an abuse of market
power under the "rule of reason" approach to United States antitrust
309. Scientists seeking to study weather patterns in order to develop early warning sys-
tems reuse data collected for more immediate forecasting purposes. Commodifying this data
without offsetting measures to support scientific research could slow or shut down this activity.
See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
310. Id.
311. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 16(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7)
(leaving open the door to the imposition of compulsory licensing if triennial reviews show that
"application of this right has led to abuse of a dominant position or other interference with free
competition" that would justify such actions). See also note 153 (discussing the Magill decision).
312. See, for example, Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual
Property-TRIPS and Its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 481, 494 (1996)
(discussing the effect of the TRIPS Agreement on national antitrust law). See also Spencer
Weber Waller and Noel J. Byrne, Changing Views of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
in the European Community and the United States of America, 20 Brooklyn J. Int'l. L 1, 2-9, 9-
21 (1993) (comparing the interaction between intellectual property law and laws protecting com-
petitors in both the United States and the European Community). The recent Magill decision in
the E.U., see note 153, was held out as proof that competition law sufficed to protect the public
interest in sole-source databases without need for involuntary licenses. This case might,
however, have come out differently under U.S. antitrust law.
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violations,3 3 make it an ineffective constraint on the ability of the
sole-source provider to charge whatever the market will bear.
An overly protective, socially unbalanced database law thus
aggravates the problems that science would face, even under more
competitive conditions. Basic science needs abundant, unrestricted
flows of both raw and elaborated data at prices it can afford. Indeed,
the evidence suggests that "efficient" use of data is a concept anti-
thetical to the norms and practice of basic science. 314 On the contrary,
by absorbing cheap data in ways that encourage serendipity and
playful exploration, basic science arrives at precisely those
breakthroughs that lend themselves to more efficiently organized
technical applications later on.315 When, instead, data become too
expensive, scientific research suffers irremediable harm.
For example, when data from the Landsat series of remote
sensing satellites were privatized in the 1980s, the prices charged to
most users, including academic and federal government users
increased from $400 to $4,400 per image.3 16 When the research
community pressed to use Landsat data for global exchange research
in the early 1990s, complaints about high prices persuaded Congress
to return the Landsat system to the public sector. Consequently,
there was a negotiated price reduction to $425 per image for U.S.
government and affiliated users only.3'1 This result nonetheless left
non-government researchers, including the academic community, to
pay $4,400 per image, a ten to one price differential that severely
limits the use of Landsat data by most non-government U.S.
scientists, who cannot afford to pay these prices from their limited
research budgets.38 While one cannot know which scientific advances
were delayed or prevented by this practice, evidence gathered by the
313. Current U.S. antitrust enforcement policies seldom treat intellectual property licens-
ing or other practices as "per se" violations. Normally, such licensing practices are viewed as
prima facie pro-competitive. To overcome this, a challenger must show market power, coupled
with a sufficient anticompetitive effect as to constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade under
the rule of reason. Fox, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. at 459 (cited in note 312).
314. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
315. See id. This playfulness is an important component of the "progress of science," which
intellectual property law supposedly promotes via the constitutional Enabling Clause. See U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
316. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4, Box 4.1 and 4.2 (cited in note 32) ('The Failed
Privatization of Landsat" and 'The Impact of Landsat Privatization on Research," respectively).
317. Id. The compromise that favored "U.S. Government and Affiliated Users" (USGAU)
had thus deviated from the policy of providing data for the "cost of fulfilling a user request"
(COFUR), which normally applies to all users. See, for example, OMB Implementing
Memorandum (cited in note 73) (discussing government information dissemination practices).
318. See note 316.
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National Research Council presents a sobering picture of the social
costs of this lost potential.3 '
The experience with Landsat is also indicative of transnational
problems likely to arise when states adopting different policies may
invoke exclusive property rights to buttress their respective positions.
For example, the international ground stations that receive Landsat
data reportedly object to the traditional U.S. policy of making data
available at the cost of fulfilling a request.320 The likely result is that
this cost-recovery formula will not be extended to ground station
agreements, which would leave academics and other non-governmen-
tal users to pay exorbitant prices. 321 This, in turn, tends severely to
limit scientific use by non-governmental U.S. scientists32 2 and, given
the weak dollar, may place the U.S. scientific community at a disad-
vantage with respect to scientists in other technologically advanced
countries.
In these cases, the adverse effects on the scientific community
were easy to document, although the value of lost research opportuni-
ties remains hard to quantify in terms of objective social costs. In
other cases, however, it will prove harder to show the negative effects
on science. This will be especially true if the commercialized database
has many downstream users who are better able to afford the rates,
and there is no powerful upstream user community-akin to the fed-
eral users of Landsat data--capable of voicing its distress in terms
that cannot be ignored. In such cases, the high cost of data may sim-
ply inhibit project formulation when there is no realistic possibility of
funding that cost. Because academic scientists are relatively few in
number and not typically a presence in day-to-day decisionmaking at
the policy level, their lost research opportunities may simply go unre-
ported and unrecorded.323
319. Bits of Power at ch. 4, Box 4.2 "The Impact of Landsat Privatization on Research"
(cited in note 32) (showing that efforts to "map and monitor" terrestrial ecosystems and to
develop models to assess land quality, soil productivity, and degradation, and erosion hazards"
came to a "complete halt," while other major areas of research were set back for years).
320. 'They want to continue to charge whatever the market will bear and they are bringing
pressure for the U.S. to change" its policy and laws, with effect from Landsat 7. Letter from
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz to the Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific
Data (June 25, 1996) ("Letter from Professor Gabrynowicz") (on file with the Authors).
321. See notes 317-19.
322. See note 319.
323. See Academy Presidents' Letter (cited in note 284). See also Kurtz, 18 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rev. at 121 (cited in note 58) (stating that overprotective legal monopolies "can... be as
stifling to creation as underprotection... [and they] can choke off opportunites for academic
research and educational uses of intellectual property"). Even though the sole-source provider
may not wish to price itself out of the market, this will be cold comfort to "those who cannot
afford to pay, and [could thus] lead to a society of information haves and have nots"). Id.
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Of course, the law of diminishing returns also applies, and
commercial providers may find that no one will access their files if
they charge too much. Before this point is reached, however, the more
likely result-as suggested by the Landsat example-is that the
provider may charge just enough for the better funded scientists to
afford access. This would ignore the problems of general access for
those unable to pay, including both students and scholars with limited
grant funds, not to mention scientists in poorer communities. 324
If the commercialization of data under hybrid intellectual prop-
erty rights did diminish the research capabilities of basic science, the
long-term social costs could be very high indeed. It might even back-
fire on the U.S. database industry itself, which currently dominates
the world market for databases despite the lack of any sui generis
intellectual property protection. This follows because some observers
link the success of the U.S. database industry to applications of basic
scientific databases that are almost always government funded. If, in
the wake of database legislation, there were a reduction of funding or
a diminished capacity to generate scientific data, it could lessen the
competitive edge that the U.S. database industry now enjoys.
32 5
More generally, the drive to commercialize data has ignored
the contribution of basic science to the ability of U.S. firms to
predominate in markets for technology and information goods.
Despite a consensus on the need for sustained levels of investment in
research and development,326 the proposed database laws could
change the status quo-without anyone's intending it to happen-by
elevating the price of the one raw material that U.S. science has
always had ready access to. The extent to which government funding
of data as a public good freely available to the scientific community
compensates for the lack of other, more interventionist industrial
policies might then become painfully clear. If less scientific
knowledge translated to fewer applications of economic importance,
the end result would be a loss of American technological competitive-
ness in an integrated world market. 327
324. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
325. See Academy Presidents' Letter (cited in note 284). In this connection, it is worth pon-
dering that the E.C. Commission believed that its sui generis database regime would increase
the market share of E.U. providers compared to that of both U.S. and U.K. providers. See, for
example, First E.C. Proposal on Databases (cited in note 72).
326. See, for example, U.S. R and D Spending Continues Fairly Brisk, Wall St. J. Al (Aug.
19, 1996) (discussing need for and benefits of research and development spending in the United
States).
327. See Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers (cited in note 94).
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Clearly, United States policymakers should not incur such
risks without evaluating in advance the possible repercussions of sui
generis database laws on the scientific community, and without tak-
ing measures to alleviate them before embarking on such an un-
charted course. By the same token, the scientific community has a
vital stake in the formulation of new database laws. 328 This commu-
nity should take steps to ensure that legal incentives to stimulate
investment in the production and distribution of data do not end by
impeding the full and unrestricted flow of that same data to basic
science. 329
B. Impeding Competition in the Market for Value-Adding
Products and Services
In assessing the implications of current proposals to protect
the contents of databases for the information industry, one should
recall that this industry consists not only of firms that sell informa-
tion they have compiled, but also of many firms that add value to
existing information products.30 Though some value-adding enter-
prises license the right to extract and reuse data from the initial
compilers,3 1 others do not.33 2  Value-adding providers sometimes
compete with the initial compiler in one or more segments of the
market for value-added products, and often the former perceive a
market opportunity for value-added products and services that the
latter either overlooked or did not wish to provide.3 33 Needless to say,
consumers benefit from the existence of competitive markets for
products and services that add value to existing data or information.
The market for products that add value to digital data may
become more lucrative and competitive than the market for value-
328. See Academy Presidents' Letter (cited in note 284).
329. Id. See notes 451-88 and accompanying text.
330. Indexing services are an example of value-adding information providers. When West
Publishing Company adds key numbers and case synopses to court decisions it reports on-line, it
becomes a value-added provider. Shepard's Citations are also value-added services to existing
information.
331. After losing the first round of copyright litigation regarding its insertion of page
numbers from West reporters, see West Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th
Cir. 1986), Mead licensed pagination rights from West. See L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce,
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory
Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 722 (1989) (discussing the West Publishing litigation).
332. For example, Feist Publications did not license the right to extract white-page listings
from Rurars telephone directory. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 363-64 (rejecting copyright
claim in the white pages of a telephone directory).
333. For example, Feist's area-wide directory was an example of a new information product
not offered by existing information providers. See note 341 and accompanying text.
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adding print products, for two reasons. One is that digital
technologies facilitate the disaggregation of value-adding functions
that, because of technological and economic constraints, were once the
exclusive perogative of publishers of print compilations.134  As
Professor Perritt has pointed out, "[n]ew information technologies
permit separation of information and its value-added features from
physical formats, making it possible for multiple suppliers to add
different types of value to what ultimately becomes a single
information product.
335
Second, digital technologies foster new functions, such as re-
formatting, filtering, and hot-linking,33 6 which have no counterparts in
print media. These new value-adding functions can also be disag-
gregated and provided by different vendors. 337 So long as it remains
possible to interoperate different layers of digital documents,33 8
consumers may mix and match different combinations of value-adding
products and services in a manner that optimizes the usefulness of
digital data for their particular purposes. Any legal or policy initia-
tives that could weaken the ability of second comers to enter and
compete effectively in markets for products that add value to existing
data should, therefore, be carefully scrutinized, lest they impede com-
petition without offsetting benefits to the public.
Under existing law, second comers can usually extract and
reuse published data from another firm's compilation, especially when
the second comers add substantial value to the data and use it to
334. Professor Perritt identifies ten kinds of value that have traditionally been associated
with information products:
1. authorship
2. chunking and tagging (delineating sections, paragraphs, other boundaries)
3. internal pointers (tables of contents and indices)
4. external pointers (bibliographies, footnotes)
5. presentation of information
6. duplication of information product
7. distribution of information product
8. promotion of product
9. billing for products
10. integrity assurance
Publishers usually performed most of these value-adding functions once a work of
authorship was created. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, The First Amendment, and
Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 65, 68-69 (1992) (discussing the role
of the "modern print publisher").
335. Id. at 65.
336. See, for example, Samuelson, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. at 104-16 (cited in note 114)
(discussing the technology enabling such functions).
337. Perritt, 5 Harv. J. L. & Tech. at 65-66 (cited in note 334).
338. Interoperability issues are discussed at notes 374-83 and accompanying text.
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develop a product different in kind from the first firm's product.339 To
defend this pro-competitive bias, the United States Supreme Court
took the appeal and ultimately reversed the lower court's holding of
copyright infringement in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.340 Feist had made a substantial investment in the devel-
opment of a new area-wide directory of white-page listings that con-
sumers could previously obtain only by looking at eleven separate
directories published by telephone companies servicing different parts
of northwest Kansas.
341
One can better discern the threat that the current database
protection schemes pose to value-adding enterprises by considering
how these proposals might have applied to the facts of Feist. Having
appropriated almost two-thirds of the white-page listings from Rural's
directory, 342 Feist could hardly persuade a court that it had taken a
quantitatively insubstantial part of Rural's database.
Under the proposed database protection laws, moreover, quan-
tity alone is not determinative.3 43 Market impact is also a supposed
factor in determining if a taking was substantial or insubstantial.
Of course, Feist might argue that its area-wide directory had
no adverse effect on the market for Rural's white-page directory be-
cause Rural distributed copies of its product without charge as a
condition of operating a monopoly franchise for telephone service in
that area.3" But Rural might respond by pointing out that the license
fees Feist paid to other telephone companies demonstrated the exis-
339. See, for example, New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
217, 226-27 (D.N.J. 1977) (holding it to be fair use to produce an index to New York Times
indices because the defendant's derivative product was the result of considerable independent
effort and did not displace sales of the Times's indices); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981) (determining that motion picture did not infringe copyright
in book depicting facts that screenwriters extracted and reused from this book). Most of the
factual compilation cases in which courts imposed copyright liability involved copying of the
whole or a substantial part of the data and its reuse in competing products without substantial
independent investment. See, for example, Shroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th
Cir. 1977) (copying names and addresses of gardening supplies without independent effort).
340. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
341. Id. at 343 (discussing the facts of the case). Also favoring Feist was evidence that it
had tried to license the white-page data from the eleven telephone companies that published
them. All but Rural agreed to license Feist to use their data. Id.
342. The Feist directory contained about 1300 listings that were identical to the listings in
Rural's directory and approximately 3600 other listings that overlapped with Rural's listings.
The listings appropriated by Feist constituted almost two-thirds of the white-page listings in the
Rural directory. Feist omitted the remaining listings because they were not within the area
Feist's directory covered. Id. at 343-44.
343. See notes 147-48, 239-41 and accompanying text.
344. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.
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tence of a commercial market for white-page listings345 even if this
was a market that Rural had not yet exploited.
The proposed U.S. database law makes explicit what may be
implicit in the E.C. Directive, namely, that courts should consider the
effects of an unauthorized appropriation not only on markets in which
a data compiler actually operates, but also on potential markets for
that data.3 46 Feist's use of listings from Rural's directory would ad-
versely affect Rural's potential market for license fees. It would also
affect other potential markets. Rural, for example, might have
planned to recoup a considerable investment in compiling and main-
taining its database of listings by charging substantial fees to adverti-
sers in the contiguous market for value-added yellow-page directo-
ries.347 If so, Rural would consider Feist's use of its listings as an
interference with its ability to recoup its investments in this market.
Because it could make plausible arguments about the potential mar-
ket impact of Feist's appropriation, current database protection
schemes might enable Rural to persuade a court that Feist had
impermissibly extracted and reused a substantial part of Rural's
database.3
48
Viewed from an economic perspective, the facts in Feist do not
support the case for granting exclusive property rights to the first
compiler. Where the costs of the initial gathering of the data and of
copying it are roughly the same, there is less chance that copying will
produce market failure, and a grant of proprietary rights may not be
needed to stimulate investment.3 49 Feist was not a free-rider who
345. Id.
346. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 4(b) (cited in note 7).
347. The Supreme Court's opinion in Feist indicates that Rural denied Feist's request for a
license because it did not want a competitor in the market for yellow-page directories. Feist
Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 343.
348. Under an earlier draft of the E.C. Directive on Databases, Rural might have been
subject to a compulsory licensing provision to be imposed on "firms or entities enjoying a
monopoly status by virtue of an exclusive concession by a public body." Amended E.C. Proposal
on Databases at art. 11(2)(b) (cited in note 103). Under this provision, Rural might have been
required to license the data to Feist on fair and nondiscriminatory terms. Rural might have
challenged the application of this provision on the ground that the governmental body from
which Rural held its franchise had granted it a monopoly for providing telephone service, not for
operating a database business. Courts might have construed Article 11(2) as applicable only to
those entities having a monopoly franchise for engaging in the database business from a
governmental body. Rural might also have challenged the application of the "sole source"
compulsory license provisions of the Amended E.C. Proposal because it was economically
feasibile (however undesirable) for Feist to canvass Rural's customers to obtain the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers it needed. See id. at art. 11(1).
349. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemna in Intellectual
Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853, 867 (1992).
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threatened the viability of Rural's database business because Feist
incurred substantial costs in preparing its new product,3 0 and prob-
ably spent far more than the license fee it paid to other providers for
comparable quantities of data.
Giving Rural fifteen or twenty-five years of exclusive rights in
white-page listings, as the database regimes propose to do,351 would
deprive the public of access to an ingenious area-wide directory con-
ceived by Feist even though Feist was willing to incur a considerable
amount of expense. It would also deprive those who buy advertising
for yellow-page directories of the benefits of competition in this
market. Indeed, protecting this market was Rural's reason for deny-
ing Feist's request for a license.352
Besides these anticompetitive policy implications for value-
adding providers who extract and reuse the content of other firms'
databases, an important category of value-adding software producers
may also be affected if Congress adopts H.R. 3531 in its current form.
The U.S. legislation would forbid not only unauthorized extractions
and reuses of substantial parts of protected databases, but also
unauthorized uses of such parts. 353 Add-on software products often
interact with and use parts of existing databases or the database
components of other programs, such as look-up tables. 354 If makers of
the underlying database or software product wish to control the mar-
ket for such add-on products,3 5-. they may seize upon the database
legislation's exclusive "right to use" provision to block unauthorized
350. Feist had to select which of the white-page listings in the Rural directory fell within
the territory Feist had carved out, hire people to verify the information in the listings, and re-
key the data into its own database before producing its area-wide directory. Feist also incurred
extra costs because it chose to provide additional information about some listings. Feist, 499
U.S. at 343-44.
351. See note 266 and accompanying text.
352. The trial court had found that Rural's refusal to license its listings to Feist "was moti-
vated by an unlawful purpose 'to extend its monopoly in telephone service to a monopoly in
yellow pages advertising.'" Feist, 499 U.S. at 343.
353. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 4(a) (cited in note 7).
354. See, for example, Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2404-
05 (cited in note 11) (giving examples and discussing competitive significance).
355. Nintendo, for example, tried to stop the unlicensed distribution of add-on software
that enabled purchasers to change the play of Nintendo videogames. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992). The court decided that distribution
of this add-on software did not infringe Nintendo's copyrights. Id. at 972. Though some
commentators concur with this ruling, see, for example, Samuelson, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. at 74-78
(cited in note 114), others challenge it, see, for example, Ginsburg, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1484-85
(cited in note 216). See also Christian H. Nadan, Comment, A Proposal to Recognize Component




entry to the market for add-on products. 356  The database protection
laws may thus undermine competition in the market for software
products that interact with data from other digital information
products.
These competition policy concerns are not the only troubling
aspects of the overly broad derivative work rights that current propos-
als would seem to grant to database owners. In Feist, the Supreme
Court recognized that extraction and reuse of data serves important
social functions:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a compiler's labor may be used by
others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed,
however, this is not 'some unforseen byproduct of [the] statutory scheme [of
copyright].' It is, rather, the essence of copyright,' and a constitutional re-
quirement .... This result [that facts may be copied at will from another's
work] is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright
advances the progress of science and art.
35 7
The Court points out that extraction, use, and reuse of infor-
mation from pre-existing works is essential to achieving the constitu-
tional goal of copyright law. Scientists and historians, of course, are
not the only groups that need to reuse data in order to advance this
purpose. Nor are they the only groups that contribute to the ad-
vancement of knowledge. Those who add value to existing informa-
tion products may do so as well.35 8 In any event, permitting the ap-
propriation of information for such uses also promotes first amend-
ment values, while the prospects for legal constraints on these values
356. Not only do many add-on products use selected data from the program with which
they interact, but they must also incorporate at least some interface information from the first
program in order to interact with it at all. See, for example, Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and
Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2404-05 (cited in note 11) (discussing add-on software and the
necessity of interoperation with the original programs). For the implications of the Database
Directive for interface components of programs, see notes 370-85 and accompanying text.
357. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (citations omitted). See also von Simson, 20 Brooklyn J. Int'l L.
at 758-59 (cited in note 79) (arguing that the market for information products will be more
competitive if information is free for use by subsequent compilers). But see text accompanying
notes 430-50 (arguing that the "unfairness" is in fact a form of inefficiency to be overcome by a
modified liability regime that obligates second comers who make value-adding uses to con-
tribute to the original compiler's production costs for a reasonable period).
358. Suppose, for example, that West Publishing Co. sold CD-ROMs containing all federal
copyright decisions to lawyers. If a law professor constructed an add-on product that, when
used in conjunction with those CD-ROMs, provided users with a path through the CD-ROM, as
a surrogate casebook, the add-on would contribute to knowledge, even if it involved use of a
substantial part of the contents of the CD-ROM product.
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outside the copyright matrix have so far received little attention from
experts in constitutional analysis. 359
The Supreme Court in Feist was not so sentimental about con-
stitutional values favoring reuses of information as to ignore legiti-
mate concerns about the need to preserve appropriate incentives to
invest in database development. The Court recognized that unbridled
appropriations of data that were costly to compile are sometimes
potentially market-destructive and warrant liability on unfair
competition grounds.360 It just did not regard Feist as such a case.36'
A well-crafted law to protect the contents of databases would
provide a means for mediating the tensions between the competing
goals of advancing knowledge and protecting investments in database
development.32 Such a law would also address the need to promote
competition in the market for value-adding products and services in a
manner consistent with the Supreme Court's directions in Feist.363
Current database protection proposals altogether ignore this sort of
balancing exercise.
C. Other Implications
Many other groups, besides scientists and value-adding
providers, rely on existing legal norms that favor extraction, use, and
reuse of the data, facts, and information found in publicly available
359. Compare National Basketball Association v. Motorola, 17c., 931 F. Supp. 1124
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). After a successful lawsuit to prevent Motorola from appropriating basketball
game scores for dissemination via Motorola's pager device, the NBA next sued America Online
for appropriating the same information. These cases have clear first amendment implications
for publishers of hot news. See, for example, Editorial, The N.B.A. Foils Free Speech, N.Y.
Times A26 (Oct. 22, 1996).
360. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354. The classic case of such unfair competition is the INS case
discussed in notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
361. Indeed, had Kansas .adopted a database protection law modeled on the E.C. Directive
on Databases after the Supreme Court's decision in Feist, and had Rural sued Feist for
appropriations from its listings under this law, the Supreme Court might well have struck it
down for interfering with the copyright policy of promoting public access to knowledge. See, for
example, Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141 (1989) (pre-empting state unfair competition law prohib-
iting plug mold method of duplicating boat parts because it interfered with federal patent
policy). See also Samuelson, 42 Am. J. Comparative L. at 398-99 (cited in note 49) (making a
similar argument).
362. Focusing a law solely on the protection of investment may inadvertently encourage
either inflated estimates of the value of such investments or socially wasteful expenditures,
such as investments made principally for the purpose of extending intellectual property rights.
Any sui generis intellectual property right that would protect the contents of databases should
be geared to market forces and actual business strategies. See notes 430-50 and accompanying
text.
363. See notes 410-50 and accompanying text (discussing unfair competition and modified
liability approaches).
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compilations. Current database protection proposals will almost
certainly affect the work of educators,3 4 researchers outside the field
of science,3 65 public interest organizations,3 66 and even governments.
367
While it would be fruitful to explore the consequences of current
database proposals for these other groups, the consequences they face
are similar enough in kind and scope to be inferable from the earlier
discussion of the implications of database protection for science and
for value-adding providers. By the same token, even the most ardent
American supporters of database protection admit that these
proposals have first amendment implications that one cannot lightly
dismiss, particularly when the facts in a compilation cannot be
independently collected by someone willing to recompile them.368
These and other implications have largely escaped notice in
the rush to adopt trade-driven intellectual property rights in the post-
TRIPS environment.36 9 The one-dimensional focus of current propos-
als on the effects of an unathorized appropriation on actual or poten-
tial markets for database contents further obfuscates such analysis
364. The European Union recognized this to some degree and would permit extraction,
although apparently not reuse, of substantial parts of databases "for the purposes of illustration
for teaching... as long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-
commercial purpose to be achieved." E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 9(b), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at
26 (cited in note 7).
365. The E.C. Directive on Databases extends the privilege to teachers and scientific
researchers, but not to other researchers. Yet many other reseach workers, including
historians, may also need to extract and reuse the contents of databases to carry out their work.
The threat of litigation under poorly conceived database laws could chill some of these research
activities.
366. Certain public interest organizations analyze data published by corporations or by
other public interest organizations in the course of making policy recommendations or
challenging industry practices. Public interest organizations have also been known to feud
about unauthorized extractions and reuses of another's data or information. See, for example,
National Rifle Association of America v. Handgun Control Federation of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 559
(6th Cir. 1994) (finding against infringement on fair use grounds); Consumers Union of the U.S.,
Inc. v. New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (challenging extraction of Consumer
Union recommendation and reuse in advertisement as a copyright infringement).
367. The E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 9(c), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26 (cited in note 7)
authorizes member states to adopt an exception to extract and reuse data "for purposes of public
security or an administrative or judicial procedure." This suggests that, unless they adopt such
a limitation on database owner rights, governments may be constrained in acquiring data or
information from the private sector when a plausible argument can be made that the extraction
of this data would harm actual or potential markets for the data.
368. See, for example, HA Report at 29 (cited in note 67). See also Ginsburg, 92 Colum. L.
Rev. at 384-87 (cited in note 44) (discussing generally the first amendment ramifications of
patent or copyright protection for compiled information). IIA likes to think that these concerns
are generally satisfied by the ability of second comers to compile the same data independently
and by the general notion that the incentives built into a database law would advance first
amendment interests by inducing more compilations of data. IIA Report at 29 (cited in note 67).
369. See notes 270-81 and accompanying text.
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and favors database owners' interests far beyond the kind of meas-
ures needed to overcome market failure. Once one seriously begins to
contemplate the potential ramifications of current proposals for com-
petition in sectors other than those pertaining to databases as such,
one also perceives the extent to which database protection schemes
could gradually undermine the integrity of the worldwide intellectual
property system. Some of these less obvious consequences are briefly
explored in the remainder of this section.
The pending U.S. legislation broadly defines "database" as "a
collection, assembly or compilation of works, data, information or
other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way. 370 Like
the E.C. Directive, the U.S. legislation excludes computer programs
from the scope of protection.3 71 Yet, it makes explicit what may be
implicit in the E.C. Directive: that insofar as computer programs
incorporate any identifiable database components, the database law
would independently protect those components.
3 72
This qualification may provide those who have long favored
overly strong legal protection of computer programs with an oppor-
tunity to relitigate many issues that courts, especially the U.S. federal
appellate courts, had resolved against them in the copyright milieu.
This observation follows because it is fair to characterize many of the
most commercially valuable components of computer programs as
"industrial compilations of applied know-how." 373 Program interfaces,
for example, can usefully be characterized this way.
374
The protracted debate about the proper level of protection for
interfaces has generally focused on the question of whether copyright
law does, or should, cover the compilation of information that consti-
tutes the internal interface of a computer program.3 75 The issue has
370. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 2 (cited in note 7); U.S. Proposal to WIPO at art. 2.1 (cited in
note 206). See also E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 1(2), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 24 (cited in note
7); WIPO Draft Database Treaty at art. 2(1) (cited in note 7).
371. H.R. Rep. No. 3531, § 3(d) (cited in note 7).
372. Id. Compare E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 1(3), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 24 (cited in
note 7); U.S. Proposal to WIPO, art. 1(4) (cited in note 206); WIPO Draft Database Treaty, art.
1(4) (cited in note 7).
373. Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2326 (cited in note 11).
374. Id. at 2401-44.
375. Compare William T. Lake, John H. Harwood II, and Thomas P. Olson, Tampering
with Fundamentals: A Critique of Proposed Changes in E.C. Software Protection, 6 Comp. Law.
1 (Dec. 1989) (arguing for copyright protection of interfaces) and Arthur Miller, Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything
Neu) Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1013-34 (1993) (arguing in favor of copyright
protection for interfaces) with McManis, 8 High Tech. L. J. at 25 (cited in note 207); Cohen, 68




considerable competitive significance because reuse of this informa-
tion is necessary in order for a second programmer to develop a pro-
gram that can successfully interoperate with another firm's pro-
gram. 376 While some software developers license interface information
from the developer of the first program,3 77 other firms appropriate
such information without a license when developing interoperable
programs of their own, and the federal appellate courts have gener-
ally upheld the legitimacy of this practice under copyright law.378 The
courts reasoned that interface information was an external factor
constraining the design choices of subsequent programmers, and that
it lacked sufficient expressive content to qualify for copyright protec-
tion.379
If the pending U.S. database legislation passes, the developer
of a computer program who wants to control unlicensed
appropriations of its interface information might well argue that such
information constitutes a database component of the program falling
within the purview of that law. On this view, the interface
constitutes "a collection ... of... information ... arranged in a
systematic or methodical way. 380 As long as the software producer
can demonstrate a substantial investment in developing the interface,
proprietary rights would arguably arise automatically by operation of
law. An unlicensed appropriator of this interface information could
hardly argue that he or she had extracted and reused only an insub-
stantial part of that database component. Moreover, there is nothing
in H.R. 3531 that would limit the scope of database rights for
components that had become standards in the trade or that otherwise
constrained subsequent design choices. 38' The avowed goal is, after
all, to protect investments in compiling data.
376. Cohen, 68 Cal. L. Rev. at 1104-35 (cited in note 207).
377. See, for example, Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2403
(cited in note 11).
378. See, for example, Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that the intermediate copying of computer program code to gain
understanding of factual elements was fair use); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the use of certain elements of computer program
necessary to achieve compatability was not copyright infringement).
379. See, for example, Altai, 982 F.2d at 693.
380. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 2 (cited in note 7) (definition of "database").
381. Litigation over interface information under the database law is less likely to occur in
the European Union because the European Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, Council Directive 91/250, arts. 1, 6, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, explicitly permits reuse of
information necessary to achieve interoperability. See also McManis, 8 High Tech. L. J. at 49-
50 (cited in note 207). Nevertheless, some may press the issue because rights under the E.C.
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Many other aspects of user interfaces can also be characterized
as independently protectable database components. For example, for
the purposes of copyright law, the First Circuit Court of Appeals may
have decided that the command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 was an
unprotectable method of directing a computer to perform spreadsheet
functions.38 2 This ruling would not, however, preclude Lotus or other
developers of user interfaces from claiming that command hierarchies
are also separately identifiable database components of computer
programs. A command hierarchy is, after all, "a collec-
tion.., of... information... arranged in a systematic or methodical
way. 383 From this perspective, the extraction and reuse of a com-
mand hierarchy readily becomes an illicit appropriation of a sub-
stantial part of a protected database, rather than a legal act of reverse
engineering.
, Those who invest in developing both computer programs and
databases arguably do need a new form of intellectual property pro-
tection that would protect the industrial compilations of applied
know-how embodied in these products against market-destructive
appropriations that existing legal regimes are ill-suited to remedy.
384
It would be imprudent, however, to apply current database protection
schemes to aspects of computer programs that copyright law cannot
protect.385 If anything, the database protection schemes would over-
protect software developers as much as they would overprotect
database developers, with the same baleful consequences for competi-
tion in the market for follow-on products and services. In both the
software and database markets, second comers inevitably borrow
from and build upon previously available information. To require
every software developer or every value-adding information provider
to develop every product from scratch would lessen the growth rate of
both industries and burden consumers with unwarranted social costs.
If, moreover, interface specifications and command hierarchies
were actually considered database components of computer programs,
these precedents could justify applying the database law to other
Directive on Databases are meant to be cumulative. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 13,
1996 O.J. (L 77) at 27 (cited in note 7).
382. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 804,
133 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1996); Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. ARCE Engineering Co., Inc, 89 F.3d 1548 (1lth
Cir. 1996) (following the First Circuit's holding in Lotus).
383. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 2 (cited in note 7).
384. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2434-448 (cited in note 2);
Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2314-315 (cited in note 11).
385. In principle, it conflicts with H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 3(d) (cited in note 7), which oth-
erwise purports to exclude computer programs from the scope of the database law.
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products that existing legal regimes decline to protect. It might, for
example, portend the concurrent application of the database legisla-
tion to other classes of copyrightable works, such as the facts and
theories set out in historical works.386 If a subsequent historian ex-
tracts and reuses these component parts in a later work, he or she
might incur liability under the database law notwithstanding the
immunity that copyright law currently affords.387 While the reuse of
facts and theories has long been thought to promote the principal
purpose of copyright laws-to advance knowledge 38 -the purpose of a
database law is to protect investments. 389 One wonders which should
prevail when the two purposes conflict and the pending database
legislation does not envision the possibility of such a conflict.30
Conceivably, unpatented machines and genetically engineered
life forms could also fall within the broad definition of database in
that they are "assembl[ies] ... of... materials arranged in a me-
thodical or systematic way."391 Even if this language were tightened
to exclude machines, that would not prevent application of the data-
base law to biogenetically engineered products because they are legiti-
mately characterized as functionally determined compilations of ge-
netic information.392 So long as investments in the development
process were quantitatively or qualitatively substantial,393 the data-
base law could arguably apply to such products and render the un-
authorized use or reuse of the whole or substantial parts of the perti-
nent information illegal for a twenty-five year period.394 Extending
database protection to software components could even provide
386. See, for example, Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A
Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y 647 (1982) (discussing precedents that reject copyright
protection for research, but asserting that "historical theories and narrations satisfy the
threshold copyright requirement[s]").
387. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46.
388. See, for example, id. at 349. See also Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d
972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that historical works "may make significant use of prior work").
389. See note 102 and accompanying text.
390. For the view that both the First Amendment and Enabling Clause of the U.S.
Consitution would and should limit the applicability of a database protection act, see notes 54-
55, 227 and accompanying text.
391. H.R. Rep. No. 3531 § 2 (cited in note 7).
392. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2465-72 (cited in note 2).
393. See note 225 and accompanying text.
394. The Bonito Boats Company might, for instance, find such a law a useful weapon with
which to attack Thunder Craft's continued use of plug-molds to make competing boat hulls,
since the federal character of the database legislation would ensure the law would not be
preempted. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168 (striking down a Florida law prohibiting the use of
plug molds to make competing boat parts because of a conflict with federal objectives).
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precedents enabling the database law to become a functional equiva-
lent of the industrial design law that Congress never got around to
passing.3
95
Although this parade of horribles is consistent with the generic
goal of "protecting incentives to invest," it conflicts with a long line of
Supreme Court decisions that defend a second comer's right to exploit
publicly accessible unpatented innovations. As the Court's Bonito
Boats decision recently explained,96 making it easy to get a lengthy
period of exclusive rights in products not qualifying for patent protec-
tion would upset the balance between competition and innovation that
Congress struck when devising the patent system.397 "The attractive-
ness [of the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative
effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost en-
tirely on a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpat-
ented designs and innovations."398 An expansive interpretation of the
database law in the manner outlined above would thus undermine the
integrity of the classical intellectual property system and contradict
core principles that induce courts to treat unpatentable, non-
copyrightable applications of know-how to publicly distributed indus-
trial products as public domain matter.39
9
One may concede that protecting the database industry from
market-destructive appropriations constitutes a socially desirable
goal. It is equally important, however, to achieve that goal in a man-
ner that preserves the balancing principles inherent in existing intel-
lectual property regimes, which promote both competition and in-
vestments in new products and services.
395. See, for example, id. at 167 (noting that Congress has not passed an industrial design
protection law despite repeated proposals for one); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in
Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of
1976, 1983 Duke L. J. 1143, 1145-70 (discussing the American industrial design proposals).
396. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 177.
397. Id:
398. Id.
399. Some might argue that allowing the database law to apply to unpatented machines
and the like would not undermine incentives to use the patent system because many would use
that system to protect against independent invention of the same thing. See 35 U.S.C. § 171
(1994 ed.) (patents confer exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the invention). Like copyright
and trade secrecy law, the database law' would protect only against appropriations from the
protected information product. See notes 246-47 and accompanying text. As the Bonito Boats
opinion makes clear, however, this underestimates the negative economic purpose of the federal
patent law, which opens sub-patentable innovation to competition.
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V. RECALCULATING THE BALANCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
The core idea underlying current sui generis proposals to pro-
tect database contents is sound, even if the mechanisms proposed to
address the problem are flawed. Firms that make the contents of
databases accessible to the public often become vulnerable to market-
destructive appropriations that existing laws do not adequately rem-
edy.40 Trade secret laws cannot protect database developers who
make the contents of their databases accessible to the public.
40 1
Copyright laws do not protect disparate facts, data, or information as
such, even when assembled in large quantities. Nor do they protect
unoriginal and functionally constrained selections and arrange-
ments. 402 Patents are seldom available for database contents on sub-
ject matter grounds and also, because of the largely incremental
character of database development, database contents would typically
fail the requirement of nonobviousness. 40 3 Even contract law has
significant limitations when mass-marketed information products are
sold to persons not in privity with the makers.404
While the need for some legal regime to avert market failure
seems relatively clear, current database proposals seek to cure the
database developers' appropriability problem in ways that distort or
disrupt the innovation and competition policies underlying existing
intellectual property regimes. By focusing too much on private bene-
fits and not enough on social costs, these proposals would substitute a
chronic state of overprotection for a potential state of underprotection.
They do not provide adequate mechanisms for balancing public and
private interests; they do not favor minimum incentives (consistent
with the public-good nature of data) to provide the needed investment
and services; and they largely ignore the over-arching public interest
400. Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2443-44, 2480-88, 2490-98 (cited in note 2). See also
Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2342-64 (cited in note 11)
(discussing same vulnerabilities of software).
401. See notes 38-44 and accompanying text. See also Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at
2512-18 (cited in note 2).
402. See notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
403. See notes 88-92 and accompanying text; Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2451-52, 2512
(cited in note 2).
404. See notes 86-94 and accompanying text; Reichman, 25 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. &
Copyright L. at 450 (cited in note 44) (discussing limits of two-party deal in period between




in the free flow of information as a factor in the progress of "science
and the useful arts."
40
5
A plan of action is needed to resolve the database maker's
appropriability problem in a manner that yields net social benefits
over time without irreparably damaging basic science and other im-
portant user community interests. As an interim measure,
policymakers should recognize the shortcomings of existing sui gene-
ris proposals, hold off on national and international initiatives mod-
eled on them, and begin work on a more balanced approach to the
legal protection of database contents.406
In the rest of this Article, we examine two ways of achieving
this goal. One approach draws upon principles of unfair competition
law to determine when users impermissibly free-ride on the contents
of noncopyrightable databases. While we ordinarily dislike an unfair
competition approach because of its inherent unpredictability, we
nonetheless view judicial application of unfair competition principles
on a case-by-case basis as a means of providing interim relief at an
acceptable social cost. This approach would cause far less harm to
competition in follow-on markets, as well as to science, education, and
other socially important pursuits, than will the exclusive rights
regimes embodied in current proposals. Given the monopolistic
character of so many database markets, moreover, the very
uncertainty it engenders concerning the scope of a database owner s
rights might favor negotiated terms that approximate those of a more
competitive market.
A second, and in our view preferable, approach entails con-
structing a new legal regime for databases premised on liability prin-
ciples more refined than those set out in the first draft of the E.C.
Directive. That draft protected investors against "unfair extractions"
and required sole-source providers and government agencies to license
extractions and reuses of their database contents on fair and nondis-
criminatory terms.40 7 The goal of refining these principles is to ensure
that database compilers can recoup the costs of producing and main-
405. See notes 18, 314-315 and accompanying text; von Simson, 20 Brooklyn J. Intl. L. at
758-59 (cited in note 79) (arguing that the market for electronic information will grow more
quickly and be more competitive "if the underlying data is free to subsequent compilers").
Compare Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2450-55, 2497-98 (cited in note 2) (indicating the need
for balanced protection of know-how in general); Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94
Colum. L. Rev. at 2366-68 (cited in note 11) (stating the need for balanced protection of know-
how embodied in computer programs).
406. See, for example, Bits of Power at Executive Summary (cited in note 32); Academy
Presidents' Letter at 102 (cited in note 284).
407. See notes 126-30, 133 and accompanying text.
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taining their databases without impeding the development of follow-
on products and services and without harming science and education.
Such a regime could overcome the investor's fear of market failure
without suffocating either science or competition, and it could even
help to break down the barriers to entry that currently inhibit compe-
tition on most market segments.
Regardless of which approach is taken, the scientific and edu-
cational communities, which have a critical stake in the outcome,
must actively participate in the process of formulating a workable
database protection scheme. Policymakers responsible for formulat-
ing the current proposals have neglected to consult with these
groups. 408 Yet, science and education are not just major consumers of
databases and other information products, but integral components of
the social and economic fabric upon which high levels of innovation
and technological progress ultimately depend. Under the United
States Constitution, indeed, the very purpose of intellectual property
law is "to promote the progress of Science and [the] useful Arts," a
stricture with which any viable database protection regime-like the
patent and copyright laws themselves-must ultimately comply.
40 9
A. The Unfair Competition Approach
Both foreign and domestic courts have invoked unfair competi-
tion law to protect gatherers of information against free-riing appro-
priations that produce market-destructive effects. 410  The classic
American case in this tradition is International News Service, Inc. v.
Associated Press ("INS').
411
In this case, the Associated Press ("AP") successfully chal-
lenged the practice of International News Service ("INS") agents who
bought early editions of newspapers affiliated with AP and read the
war news these papers contained via telephones to INS agents in
California. The latter then published this news in competition with
AP-affiliated newspapers. 412 Although there was no established cause
408. See Academy Presidents' Letter at 1-2 (cited in note 284).
409. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
410. See note 102 and accompanying text. See also Jean-Marc Mousseron, La protection
du sauoir-faire, in M. Goudreau, et al., eds., Exporting Our Technology: International Protection
and Transfers of Industrial Innovations 259, 270-73 (1995) (explaining and approving spread of
"parasitic copying" as new common law cause of action in European unfair competition laws)
411. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
412. Id. at 231. The AP did not, and could not, claim copyright infringement because INS
had mainly appropriated news that, as history of the day, was outside the scope of protection
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of action to deal with such practices, 413 the Supreme Court invoked
unfair competition principles to enjoin INS from appropriating AP's
news until it had lost its value as fresh news.414 The Court perceived
that AP could not recoup its substantial investment in news gathering
and distribution if other firms instantly appropriated that news with-
out compensation or permission and sold it in competition with AP
and its affiliated papers. A grant of injunctive relief thus forestalled a
market-failure resulting from the inability of the compiler to appro-
priate the fruits of its own investment.
Despite widespread skepticism about extending this
"misappropriation" doctrine too far afield,415 many American com-
mentators regard INS as presenting a persuasive case for a legal rem-
edy in appropriate circumstances.46 Especially helpful is the analysis
of Professor Wendy Gordon, who thinks INS satisfied the criteria
courts should use to decide whether the facts in any given case justify
available to written works under copyright law. Id. at 235. A second, and more serious, prob-
lem with a copyright claim in the case was that neither AP nor its affiliated newspapers had
complied with the formalities necessary to qualify for copyright protection at the time the case
arose. Id. at 234. Hence, even when INS papers had published the AP stories word for word, no
copyright claim could be asserted.
413. Justice Brandeis, in dissent, analyzed at length the limitations of existing legal cate-
gories as applied to the facts of the INS case, and found that any legal remedy to plug this gap
should come from Congress, not the courts. Id. at 250-61. "The rule for which the plaintiff
contends would effect an important extension of property rights and a corresponding curtail-
ment of the free use of knowledge and information." Id. at 264. Justice Brandeis recognized that
Congress might decide "it was impossible to put an end to the obvious injustice involved in such
appropriation of news, without opening the door to other evils, greater than that sought to be
remedied." Id. at 265. Or Congress might decide that INS should pay AP for appropriation of
its news instead of being enjoined from the appropriation. Id. at 266.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Holmes thought that the only legally remediable wrong in
the case arose from the implied misrepresentation that the news derived from INS when in fact
it had been gathered by AP. He would have enjoined INS from appropriating the news unless it
gave proper attribution to AP as the source. Id. at 247-49. Justice Pitney, writing for the ma-
jority, agreed that there was an implied misrepresentation in the case, but did not regard this
as the essence of the wrong in the case. Nor did he think attribution was a sufficient remedy for
this wrong. Id. at 243.
414. Id. at 246. The trial court had declined to enjoin INS's appropriation of AP news from
early publications on the ground that the case involved an issue of first impression that should
await resolution on appeal. The Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of an injunction to stop
INS personnel from "any bodily taking of the words or substance of complainant's news until its
commercial value as news had passed away." Id. at 233.
415. See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 38 (cited in note 38);
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341 (1987); Raskind, 75
Minn. L. Rev. at 881-82 (cited in note 44).
416. See, for example, Gordon, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 266-73 (cited in note 44); L. Ray Patterson,
Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair
Competition, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 385 (1992). See also C. Owen Paepke, An Economic
Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in
Innovation, 2 High Tech. L. J. 55 (1987); Andrew Terry, Unfair Competition and the
Misappropriation of a Competitor's Trade Values, 51 Modern L. Rev. 296 (1988).
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some legal protection of the producer's investment in information
goods. She argues that courts should defend the incentive to invest
when: (1) the costs of developing an information product are high; (2)
the costs of copying are low; (3) copying yields a substantially identi-
cal product; (4) which a copyist can price cheaply, not having subst-
antial research and development costs to recoup; and (5) when con-
sumers, believing the two products are substantially identical, decide
to purchase the cheaper one, thereby inducing market failure because
the first comer is unable to recoup its expenses; and when (6) such a
market failure could have been averted by a period of protection that
would allow the first comer to recoup its expenses and justify its
investment in developing the information product.
4 7
Despite its inherent lack of clear boundaries, Professor Gordon
and others want to refine this doctrine of "misappropriation" so that
courts can use it more predictably to protect investors against the
kinds of market-destructive appropriations to which today's most
commercially valuable information products are susceptible. 4' 8 Like
other torts sounding in unfair competition law, including trademark
infringement, this approach to judging the fairness of extractions and
reuses of database contents would inevitably depend on a multiplicity
of factors. The uncertainty inherent in these variables is, however,
properly bounded by an appropriate conception of the minimalist,
market-preserving goal of the exercise. From this perspective, data-
base makers need a market-preserving period of lead time during
which unfair competition law may protect them against "cloning" or
"partial cloning," that is, against the wholesale reproduction of all or a
substantial component of database contents.
419
Under this framework, INS would remain liable for appropri-
ating AP's news because it produced a partial clone of the AP prod-
uct-a substantially identical subcompilation of a substantial portion
of AP's data-which it sold in direct and nearly simultaneous competi-
tion with AP-affiliated products. Moreover, INS engaged in no inde-
417. See Gordon, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 863-65 (cited in note 416). As Professor
Reichman has elsewhere pointed out, the grant of a proprietary right to overcome market
failure need not be accomplished through the grant of exclusive property rights. A right to
compensation may cure the market failure just as well or better. See Reichman, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. at 2548 (cited in note 2).
418. See, for example, Gordon, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 221-24 (cited in note 44).
419. For an elaboration of a similar approach to the legal protection of computer programs
as industrial compilations of applied know-how, see Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman,
94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2399-401 (cited in note 11).
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pendent development efforts of its own, and took the AP news when
its commercial value was at its peak.4 0
Even if AP had no affiliated news distributors in the territories
serviced by INS newspapers, so that INS could be said to operate in
an adjacent rather than a directly competing market, it should not
relieve INS of liability on the particular facts of this case. Because
INS's product was a partial clone of the AP product that reflected no
independent creation, it would substantially interfere with AP's abil-
ity to extend into the adjacent market through a licensing arrange-
ment with an existing or newly created independent newspaper. In
this sense, the appropriation retained its market-destroying potential,
without any redeeming contribution to transform free-riding into fair
following.
The unfair competition criteria set out above thus suggest that
the Supreme Court properly blocked INS from appropriating AP's
news until it had less commercial value as fresh news. AP obtained
the relief it needed from the Supreme Court: enough artificial lead-
time to enable it to recoup its investment.421 AP would not, however,
need fifteen, let alone twenty-five, years of exclusive rights to control
extraction and reuse of this information as an incentive to compile
and publish news about World War I.422 Indeed, AP actually compiled
such news without any legal incentives at all.
To a similar end, courts invoking unfair competition law in
cases concerning the contents of noncopyrightable databases could use
market-oriented criteria for determining when a second comer had
engaged in an "unfair extraction." Useful factors to consider are: (1)
420. See notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
421. See Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2539-544 (cited in note 2) ('The Fair Followers
Menu of Pro-Competitive Legal Options"); Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers (cited
in note 94) (outlining strategy for the acquisition of technical knowledge that would convert
developing countries under TRIPS Agreement from free riders to fair followers).
422. See, for example, Litman, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 613-14 (cited in note 71) (skeptically
viewing claims that database producers need additional legal protection for data, and stressing
that facts have long been regarded as basic building blocks of knowledge); Reichman, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. at 2496 (cited in note 2) (criticizing the Database Directive for failing to "create ana-
logues to the many exceptions and limitations that otherwise safeguard the public interest
under copyright laws"). But see Ginsburg, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y at 647 (cited in note 386)
(arguing that copyright protection should be available for detailed research).
Protecting data, facts, and information too long gives rise to socially harmful temptations
that publishers may find hard to resist. For example, under the broadly drawn subject matter
clause of the U.S. database protection bill, see notes 386-89, an historian might be barred from
writing a history of the war depicted in the AP stories, or about AP's coverage of the war, if
preparing this work required an extraction or reuse of what AP would regard as a qualitatively
substantial part of the data or information it had compiled. Furthermore, a scientist who
wanted to verify the accuracy of another scientist's data could be barred from doing so for
fifteen, or twenty-five years under the current initiatives.
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the quantum of data appropriated by the user; (2) the nature of the
data appropriated; (3) the purpose for which the user appropriated
them; (4) the degree of investment initially required to bring that data
into being; (5) the degree of dependence or independence of the user's
own development effort and the substantiality of the user's own in-
vestments in these efforts; (6) the degree of similarity between the
contents of the database and a product developed by the user (even if
only privately consumed); (7) the proximity or remoteness of the
markets in which the database owner and the user are operating; and
(8) how quickly the user was able to come into the market with his or
her product as compared with the time required to develop the origi-
nal database.
423
By the same token, these criteria would dissuade courts from
holding an historian who studies the manner in which AP covered the
war liable for appropriating AP's news.424 The historian would not
produce a partial clone of AP's product, but rather a new information
good representing a substantial additional investment of time and
energy. Her product would appear after the war news had lost its
423. A resort to these factors would reveal the ways in which database suppliers are some-
times less vulnerable to free-riding injury than appears from superficial claims for relief. See
notes 85-94 and accompanying text. For example, a second comer who downloaded a
substantial portion of the contents of a previously updated database would not always be able to
compete effectively with the firm that initially developed the database because much of the
value in the database would likely reside in its currency. The second comer might not attract
any significant quantum of customers of the database from which it made the appropriation if
these customers placed a high value on obtaining constant updates, which the free-riding
appropriator might not provide. "Stealing" last month's news may not, in fact, be market-
destructive, if the market is focused on the sale of today's news and all the "thief' has is what
the news gatherer published last month. By the same token, there may be good economic
reasons why the second comer should compensate the original compiler for such uses even if
they are not market-destroying. While these considerations exceed the blunt capabilities of the
unfair competition approach, they fit neatly into the modified liability approach discussed below.
See notes 430-50 and accompanying text.
424. It requires only a small twist on the facts of these examples to illustrate the disturbing
potential for private censorship inherent in all the database protection proposals. If, for exam-
ple, AP suspected that the historian would be critical of its coverage of the war (or if a scientist
wanted to verify her chief rival's results), the data compiler might be tempted to use the data
protection law to block extraction and reuse of data needed to prepare these works. See note
387. In this connection, Feist exemplifies the situation in which a database maker had a
financial reason not to license white-page listings to the defendant. Feist Publishing Company's
control over white-page listings gave Rural a monopoly on yellow-page listings as well. See
Feist Publishing Co., 499 U.S. at 342-43. See also National Rifle Ass'n v. Handgun Control
Federation, 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994) (NRA lost action against HCF for copyright infringement
arising from the latter's use of a three page list of Ohio legislators from NRA newsletter;
appropriation held fair use); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective ch. 6
(Vanderbilt U., 1968) (providing historical examples of publishers using copyright as a form of
private censorship).
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commercial value as hot news. It would also be distributed in a mar-
ket segment remote from that in which AP operated so that no social
benefit would accrue from blocking publication of her product, even if
it appeared shortly after the AP stories from which she extracted her
information. Allowing the historian to publish this book would also
foster first amendment values and fulfill the goal of the constitutional
Enabling Clause, which favors free exchanges of information that are
not market-destructive.
The unfair competition approach is also consistent with the
Supreme Court's narrow ruling in Feist. In that decision, indeed, the
Court recognized that free-riding appropriations of data may some-
times warrant liability on unfair competition grounds. The Court,
however, expressly did not perceive Feist to be such a case.425 On the
contrary, had the state of Kansas adopted an exclusive-rights regime
to protect databases after the Supreme Court's decision, and had
Rural sued Feist for new appropriations from its white-page listings
under that law, the Supreme Court would probably have struck the
state law down for interfering with the federal copyright policy of
promoting public access to knowledge.
426
.Feist recognized that the public's right to appropriate data and
information from copyrighted works implemented an important con-
stitutional principle. 427  Under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, one might nonetheless reconcile this principle with a
minimalist approach to regulating data appropriations that sounded
in unfair competition law. In contrast, an exclusive intellectual prop-
erty right in data that interfered with the underlying purposes of both
copyright law and the First Amendment appears to violate the
Constitution on its face. 428 This tension with the purpose and subject
matter limitations of the constitutional Enabling Clause is then
magnified by the prospects for perpetual protection of databases
425. Feist Publishing Co., 499 U.S. at 354.
426. See, for example, Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156. See also Samuelson, 42 Am. J. Comp.
L. at 399 (cited in note 49) (making a similar argument to that set forth in the text).
In contrast, a more refined market-oriented approach to database protection than unfair
competition law could reach more interesting results. For example, had Feist (without attempt-
ing to buy a license) simply made a digital version of Rural's listings by scanning Rural's print
directory or downloading the listings from a CD-ROM of the directory (without verifying the
listings, or adding any new information, or making his own new selection of data from Rural's
compilation), and had Feist thereafter produced a clone or partial clone of Rural's directory,
Rural might invoke a properly crafted database protection law built on modified liability princi-
ples to slow down Feist's entry into the market and to require Feist to pay Rural for the
eventually permissible use of its listings. See text accompanying notes 430-50.
427. See Feist Publishing Co., 499 U.S. at 349.
428. See notes 20-21, 55 and accompanying text.
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under all the current protection schemes, which violate the "limited
times" provision of that same clause.
4
11
B. A Modified Liability Approach
An alternative approach that would protect the contents of
databases on modified liability principles draws upon studies that
perceive an affinity between the needs of the database industry and
those of other producers of commercially important information
products. The common denominator facing all these industries is that
the fruits of their investment usually consist of aggregates of valuable
information that are embodied on or near the face of products sold in
the open market.430 Because trade secret law does not normally cover
such products, third parties who rapidly duplicate the embodied
information they contain deprive innovators of the lead time needed
to recoup their investments, without contributing, directly or
indirectly, to the overall costs of research and development. Investors
in information goods thus may lack any functional equivalent of the
lead-time protection that trade secrecy laws historically conferred on
compilations of applied know-how in the manufacturing era.
431
A legal regime devised to fill this gap would emulate the eco-
nomic functions of the liability principles that underlie classical trade
secret law, and would not grant exclusive property rights in data. It
would instead provide
those who invest in industrial applications of advanced technical know-how
with artifical lead-time to overcome market failure, with a menu of users' fees
that sensibly allocates contributions to the costs of research and development
among members of the relevant technical community, and with a common set
of pro-competitive ground rules that also make it possible for the relevant
technical communities to take collective action to enforce and adjust the liabil-
ity framework eventually adopted.
432
Applying these principles to the domain of data generation and
distribution would combine two basic mechanisms for providing a
market-preserving form of relief. The first consists of a "blocking
period" made available to the database providers from the first com-
429. See note 19 and accompanying text.
430. Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2512-18 (cited in note 2).
431. Id. at2506-11.
432. Id. at 2545. See also id. at 2505; Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. at 2369-71 (cited in note 11).
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mercial distribution of their products or from each relevant subst-
antial update. During this period, no second comer could appropriate
the contents of the database as a whole or of any component sub-
stantial enough to represent a threat of market failure. The database
provider, meanwhile, would freely determine the rates charged for
other uses during this same period, subject to public interest limita-
tions favoring science and education that would likely become manda-
tory in this environment.43  Further investigation, however, might
persuade policymakers not to award an initial blocking period to
certain databases of great public interest at all. They might also de-
cide to confine it to those databases that were distributed in markets
that are, or would readily become, competitive.
The second mechanism consists of an automatic license built
into the modified liability right itself.434 In the database milieu, one
can plausibly implement this device in different ways. For example,
the European Commission initially proposed putting sole-source
database producers under an obligation to license their data to second
comers on fair and nondiscriminatory terms.435 This solution included
provisions calling for arbitration to resolve disputes in the event that
the parties to the nonvoluntary license could not agree on terms.
436
433. See notes 466-88 and accompanying text.
434 See Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2539-44, 2548-51 (cited in note 2); Ginsburg, 92
Colum. L. Rev. at 386-87 (cited in note 44) (also suggesting that liability principles might be
used to regulate appropriations of data in a manner that avoids unduly disrupting the principle
of freedom of information).
435. Under an automatic licensing provision, such as that proposed in early drafts of the
E.C. Directive on Databases for entities holding a monopoly franchise from a public body, see
note 133, Feist might have been more successful in persuading Rural to license the listings on
fair and reasonable terms. Or if the parties could not agree on price or other terms (perhaps in
part because Rural wanted to maintain its monopoly on its yellow-page directory), Feist could
have sought arbitration to resolve their dispute. An arbitrator might have looked to the terms of
the licenses Feist had obtained from other telephone companies for guidance about what price
and other terms were appropriate for such a license. The automatic license might have
produced a similar outcome on facts like those in the Magill case. See note 153.
However, there should not be any prohibition on discriminatory prices as such, because
publishers should discriminate in favor of scientific and educational bodies. See, for example,
National Research Council, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32) (discussing price discrimina-
tion and product differentiation). The better solution is to require licenses to be made on "fair
and reasonable terms and conditions," and to treat discriminatory pricing as unreasonably anti-
competitive in some circumstances.
436. The draft Directive's linkage of an automatic license, a duty to negotiate terms, and a
resort to arbitration in case the parties fail to agree has parallels in U.S. law. See, for example,
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1988 ed.)
(providing a right of reasonable compensation when a second comer uses a first comer's data
concerning the safety of a pesticide). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
this provision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984). See also Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (suggesting that courts employ liability rules
and withhold injunctive relief in close fair use cases); Eisenberg, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1077
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Alternatively, the automatic license could become universally avail-
able at the end of the initial blocking period, in which case it would
last for a second period to be determined.
437
Policymakers would thus need to choose between reinstating
the initial European proposal or instituting a wider-ranging auto-
matic license. In any event, this mechanism would entitle users and
second comers to extract or use the data after the initial blocking
period for any purpose, including direct competition with the database
compiler, in return for payment of reasonable compensation according
to a menu of user options vetted by the industry with user and gov-
ernment inputs.
438
Because the goal of a modified liability regime is to provide
artificial lead time while precluding opportunities for rent-seeking, it
is preferable to adopt short rather than long blocking periods in most
technological sectors. The database environment presents a more
complex set of variables than some other industries, however, because
entry costs often appear formidable and the sole-source market struc-
ture is deeply ingrained.439 An initial blocking period must, therefore,
not be so short as further to discourage existing entrants. At the
same time, assuming that the existence of multiple providers is oth-
erwise feasible, both the existing entrant and would-be or potential
competitors know that an automatic license will ultimately facilitate
direct competition on the same market segment, subject to the second
comer's payment of reasonable royalties for the second period.
Assessing the optimum length of these periods requires further em-
pirical and theoretical analysis, although they would probably be
n.230 (cited in note 31) (citing examples where relief was denied because infringement furthered
the public interest).
437. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2448-49 (cited in note 2).
438. See id. at 2536-37, 2539-44, 2548-51 (cited in note 2) (discussing the operation of a
menu of user's options and fees); Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at
2414-18 (cited in note 11).
439. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32); notes 83-94 and accompanying text. The
database industry is also atypical because of the interrelations between the entities that fund
the collection of data (often governments), users (often scientists, as well as governmental and
affiliated users), and firms that apply the data to other industrial uses. This industry is not like
the community of innovators and borrowers in, say, the realm of computer programs or
industrial designs, where firms are likely to be both innovators and borrowers, which would
tend to curb rent-seeking in any collective body's establishment of licenses for appropriating
protected material. See Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2548-49 (cited in note 2). But it is also
true that, on balance, these respective communities or constituent groups are more
interdependent than in other industries, if only because of the overlapping public good aspects
that characterize the generation of raw and elaborated data.
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shorter than under existing proposals, and there would be no oppor-
tunity to perpetuate protection of pre-existing data.
While experience with compulsory licenses that undermine
strong exclusive rights regimes, notably patents, elicits mixed re-
views, 440 a built-in automatic license is ideally suited to weak regimes
seeking no more than a minimalist, pro-competitive cure for chroni-
cally insufficient lead time. Experience demonstrates, moreover, that
innovators and borrowers within a given sector will bargain around
liability rules, if the law itself clearly establishes a baseline obliga-
tion. For example, section 115 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976
supplies a compulsory license for the use of musical works on phono-
records after their first recordings. 441 Under this section, the Harry
Fox Agency, a private entity that operates as a de facto collection
society, administers some 200,000 voluntary licenses for the recording
of musical works. This contrasts with the twenty or so involuntary
licenses invoked under the statute. 2 Of course, the statutory base-
line under section 115 is crystal clear,443 but it should not escape no-
tice that the baseline was itself the product of industry negotiations. 444
In the realm of data protection schemes, baseline prices may
be determined by recourse to at least two known criteria. The first is
the cost-recovery principle long used by scientific agencies, 445 which
would focus attention on the reasonableness of any given profit mar-
gins put forward within the framework of an apposite collection soci-
ety. The second criterion focuses attention on the value added to the
free rider's product as a measure of liability for any taking permitted
by the automatic license. The quantum of equitable compensation
would then vary with the substantiality of the borrowed component,
with the amount of the borrower's own investment in research and
440. See, for example, Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property Law, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655 (1994).
441. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
442. M. William Krasilovsky and Sidney Shemel, This Business of Music 237-38 (Billboard
Books, 7th ed. 1995).
443. "When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the
public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owners, any other person may,
by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and
distribute phonorecords of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 115(a).
444. A clear statutory imposition of liability for unfair extraction or use, see notes 433-39
and accompanying text, coupled with an automatic license that kicks in after a specified period,
should suffice to induce negotiations between the interested parties. Nevertheless, the atypical
market structure could skew these negotiations in still unexplored ways, and it makes
leveraged public interest exceptions akin to fair use essential, as explained below. See notes
474-88 and accompanying text.
445. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 2); OMB Implementing Memo
(cited in note 73) (discussing government information dissemination practices).
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development, and with other factors identified above. Italian courts
and arbitrators have successfully used this second criterion under the
modified liability regime that country enacted in the 1930s to protect
novel engineering project designs that are ineligible for copyright
protection." 6 A moment's thought should convince even the most
skeptical reader that prices derived from bargaining around either
criteria would prove inherently less arbitrary and socially harmful
than those devised by sole-source providers who also enjoyed an abso-
lute legal monopoly.
The task, therefore, is to bring the different constituent groups
to an ongoing bargaining session within the framework of a collection
society set up to implement the baseline rules of the modified liability
regime. In the absence of a real market, something like reasonable
prices should emerge from within this framework, with due regard for
the needs of different categories of users. Over time, moreover, the
institution of a minimalist, pro-competitive liability regime may in-
duce more parties to enter the market, either by way of direct compe-
tition or by virtue of value-adding uses. In that event, the need to
bargain around the baseline rules-or to have a court decide the rea-
sonable royalty that the parties neglected to negotiate-should pro-
duce the same kind of voluntary transactions that now occur under
section 115 of the copyright law. 447
Within the ongoing relationship that a collection society makes
possible, moreover, the parties can voluntarily agree to a more
nuanced schedule of royalties---"a menu of liability options"448-than a
statute could or should attempt to institute. The statute need only
establish the clear baseline rules mentioned above, remove any
antitrust barrier that stands in the way of forming a collection
society, and carve out a role for government representation in the
workings of the society. Within this framework, however, one would
expect the rates set under the menu of user options to be pro-
portionately higher for certain uses. For example, the rates for di-
rectly competing uses by means of a comparable compilation or
subcompilation of data would logically exceed those for add-on uses in
446. See Italian Copyright Law, Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941, as amended through July
29, 1989, art. 99 (sui generis right protecting technical drawings and engineering projects under
provisions related to copyright law); Mario Fabiani, Italy, in Paul Edward Geller, ed., 2
International Copyright Law and Practice §§ 2(4)(f)(ii), 3(2)(g), 8(d)(vi) (1995); Reichman, 94
Colum. L. Rev. at 2477-78 (cited in note 2).
447. See notes 441-44 and accompanying text.
448. Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2429-60 (cited in note 2).
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a different market segment, not to mention the need for preferential
rates for pure scientific research in an academic laboratory.
The likelihood that these rates will bear a realistic correlation
with actual conditions is secured by the obligation of providers, users,
and second comers to bargain out their respective needs. This bar-
gaining process necessarily transpires with the knowledge that
providers cannot prevent borrowers from using the data after the
initial blocking period (because no exclusive right is conferred) and
borrowers cannot use the data without contributing a reasonable
royalty to the provider's costs of compilation and dissemination based
on the intended use. All sides also know that arbitration under the
aegis of the industry's collection agency becomes inevitable if they fail
to agree, and judicial determination of reasonable royalties remains a
last resort.
The framework outlined above also lends itself to the socially
important goal of stimulating value-adding uses of protected data
without depriving compilers of a fair return on their investment. The
basic set of default rules can be refined, indeed, to provide more fa-
vorable treatment to second comers who enter the market with value-
adding uses of protected compilations than would be available for
other competing uses. For example, the scheme can allow such users
to enter the market earlier, in derogation of the blocking period that
initially restricts direct competitors. Nevertheless, these value-add-
ing users must pay reasonable royalties for their reuse of any bor-
rowed subcompilations of data under the standard, automatic licens-
ing provisions for the full term of protection.
A more detailed discussion of these modified liability principles
exceeds the scope of this Article, although we pause to reaffirm our
belief that this extended framework has sufficient generality to serve
as the basis for a new paradigm of intellectual property law. 449 For
present purposes, we emphasize that a resort to liability rules stimu-
lates competition and avoids the top-down market distortions charac-
teristic of other sui generis intellectual property rights because it
allows single firms to choose from a menu of inherently pro-competi-
tive options in the light of their own business needs and strategies. 40
449. See generally Symposium, Towards a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2307-2667 (1994).
450. See, for example, Reichman, 17 Hastings Comm. & Enter. J. at 791-94 (cited in note
157) (explaining the workings of a market-oriented liability regime for computer programs);
Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2409-12 (cited in note 11)
(discussing how a market-oriented legal regime would allow innovators and borrowers to
maximize their individual interests). See generally Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2534-39,
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This pro-competitive function could grow more important over
time, precisely because the database industry itself might find more
room for value-adding competitors under a liability regime. In con-
trast, the adoption of overly strong exclusive property rights could
further ossify existing structural rigidities. If the industry did be-
come more competitive, then another advantage of a liability regime
is that it leaves investors free to decide when they should defray the
costs of borrowing from existing databases and when they should
independently generate their own. This could elevate the level of
investment in compilations of data as an industrial activity while
further fostering the kind of competition that liberates the price
structure from the grip of legal or natural monopolists. At the same
time, the introduction of market forces into the realm of data collec-
tion must be carefully monitored, with a view to ensuring that the
special needs of science, education and other socially important uses
are not inadvertently trampled under foot.
C. Putting Science and Education into the Picture
To date, neither the scientific nor the educational communities
have played any part in the relevant deliberations concerning the
legal protection of databases. Nor have these communities been
consulted on any official basis.451 Without such inputs from these
communities, Congress might enact the proposed sui generis database
regime, despite the risk that "it would allow a limited group of
database creators to control the dissemination of information" and
that the "resulting restrictions on the transfer of knowledge would be
detrimental to society, as information lies at the core of social ad-
vancement."452
The scientific community, in particular, can ill afford to ignore
database protection schemes if only because its whole nodus operandi
has been based on the principle of full and unrestricted exchanges of
data.453 This principle is indirectly undermined by the pending pro-
posals concerning legal regulation of national and global information
2548-51 (cited in note 2) (advocating the insitution of a market-oriented liability regime as the
most efficient for technological communities that develop subpatentable innovations).
451. See Academy Presidents' Letter (cited in note 284); Rosler, 10 High Tech, L. J. at 136-
37 (cited in note 96).
452. Rosler, 10 High Tech. L. J. at 136-37 (cited in note 96).
453. See, for example, National Research Council, Bits of Power at 1 (cited in note 32).
While scientists could, in theory, continue to operate on non-proprietary principles, the ethos of
sharing data will in fact come under severe strain. See notes 299-306 and accompanying text.
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infrastructures 454 and directly threatened by the drive to institute sui
generis intellectual property rights in the contents of electronic and
other databases. As regards the latter set of issues, the foregoing
analysis suggests that science has two paramount concerns that need
to be considered in the course of future legislative deliberations. One
is that sui generis laws to protect databases should, on the whole,
reflect a proper balance between public and private interests, includ-
ing the public interest in free competition. The other is that such
laws should contain measures specifically designed to preserve and
promote the scientific enterprise.
1. Reconciling the Needs of Science with a Competitive Market
While, at first glance, the scientific community's stake in a
more pro-competitive legal framework might seem marginal under
present conditions, this community should look beyond the static
dimension of the problem in order to head off the most troubling im-
plications of the current proposals for the legal protection of data-
bases. The advent of new proprietary rights where none previously
existed will influence the collection and distribution policies of all
data providers, including government-funded providers and other
sources that currently follow non-profit pricing policies. As funding
sources shrink and foreign governments operating under the E.C.
Directive shift to profit-oriented policies, more and more data of
interest to science will be covered by proprietary rights and less of it
will be made available to science on a cost-recovery basis. The ten-
sions already reflected in the recent OMB Circular and in the Landsat
examples, which were discussed above,'45 will become more general-
ized, even though different disciplines will experience different
degrees of hardship.
These prospects do not necessarily mean that the interests of
science and education are best served by the absence of legal protec-
tion for the contents of databases. A socially balanced, pro-competi-
tive database protection regime might indirectly help science to con-
tain costs by bringing market forces to bear on some of the pressure
points. It would provide a greater stimulus to third-party investors
who might compete with sole-source data generators or distributors
(when the market segment can feasibly support multiple sources) or
who might adapt sole-source data sets to applications of particular
454. See notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
455. See notes 73, 315-32 and accompanying text.
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interest to science. While this stimulus might not change the overall
market structure or significantly reduce the formation of natural
monopolies, it could help to trigger countervailing tendencies and
thus, at least in the short term, lead to lower prices and fewer restric-
tions on access, particularly if novel, value-adding products became of
greater importance to science over time.
456
Conversely, if a socially imbalanced, overly protective database
law converts existing impediments into insuperable legal barriers to
entry, the adverse effects on science-absent offsetting legal safe-
guards-would soon manifest themselves. The database owner's
absolute monopoly could disincline him or her to allow scientists
access to certain files, especially if the owner feared that the uses in
question could lead to value-adding products that diminished his or
her market power.457 Providers and distributors would also be likely
to charge higher prices for all uses, to demand payment for certain
uses that were previously free, and to resist pressures for price dis-
crimination favoring scientific users.
As matters stand, the electronic publisher's growing capacity
to charge for each and every use of online data (or at least for every
"hit" that accesses such data), and to track and monitor every user
potentially liable for these charges, means that it becomes increas-
ingly capable of serving "as its own collection society, subject to no
consent decrees, no membership controls and no external regula-
tion. 458 In this milieu, even blanket licenses can be priced unrealisti-
cally high for large-scale nonprofit users, such as libraries, universi-
ties, and research institutions, and the net impact of the licensing fees
will further depend on other contractual conditions that accompany
the licenses. Even when a blanket license fee is relatively low, for
example, if the institution is obliged to purchase many licenses for
different researchers or groups of researchers, the total cost may still
become prohibitive. The existing tendencies of publishers to ap-
proach academic and scientific users one by one, and to impose harsh
or oppressive terms, 459 could only be strengthened by the enactment of
456. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
457. See notes 328-44 and accompanying text. Here one would expect further tensions
stemming from the scientific community's own efforts to internalize electronic publication of
research results at the expense of both commercial publishers and professional societies. See
also Ginsparg, UNESCO Paper (cited in note 62).
458. Reichman, 25 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. at 464 (cited in note 44).
459. See OTA Report at 8 (cited in note 66) (discussing problems facing academic institu-
tions under intellectual property systems); Reichman, 25 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L.
at 464 (cited in note 44) (noting that licensing agreements "may consequently require libraries
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a new and powerful intellectual property right covering the contents
of electronic databases as such.
In this context, the scientific and educational communi-
ties-like value-adding users and second comers in general 46 0-would
arguably fare better either under a simple unfair competition law that
prohibited gross copying or under a sui generis regime built on more
refined liability principles than under the regimes based on exclusive
property rights.461 A liability model would create no legal barriers to
entry in its own right, nor need it significantly strengthen the sole-
source data provider's market power. On the contrary, a properly
crafted liability regime stimulates competition both through lead-time
incentives to invest and through an automatic license, which serves to
break down existing economic impediments to entry and favors in-
vestment in value-adding products that may be more efficient than
those of the primary provider.462
A liability regime can also eliminate the "refusal to dear' prob-
lem by addressing the serious concerns of those who fear the power of
sole-source data providers to restrict access to data on a variety of
grounds. When an automatic license is built into a modern liability
regime, it tends inherently to solve the problem of abuse without re-
course to antitrust law.43 At the same time, the use of appositely
formed collection societies would provide a forum in which publishers,
academics, and government agencies could negotiate fair and reason-
able licenses and resolve potential disputes. 464 For all these reasons,
the European Commission's initial preference for a liability regime,
rather than an exclusive property right,465 merits careful considera-
tion by the United States scientific community as a possible response
to waive privileges" under new or existing laws, including copyright law, "and to limit users'
access to... [the protected] matter beyond what their own understanding of the... [laws]
would require. Aggressive licensing of electronic information tools could thus distort the public
service mission of libraries by making them involuntary collection agents for publishers").
Compare American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that oil company's unauthorized copying of articles from its own library's technical
journals for archival use by its own research scientists was not fair use under copyright statute
where blanket licensing schemes were available); Patterson and Lindberg, The Nature of
Copyright at 159, 181-90 (cited in note 114).
460. See notes 328-44 and accompanying text.
461. See notes 292-327 and accompanying text.
462. See Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2548 (cited in note 2).
463. See notes 187-88, 310-11 and accompanying text.
464. See notes 468-79 and accompanying text (applying liability model to database
projects). See also Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2533-58 (cited in note 2) (proposing general-
purpose innovation law to implement new intellectual property paradigm based on modified
liability principles).
465. See notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
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to the overall challenge posed by the drive for sui generis database
laws.
2. Promoting the Public Good
With or without the more pro-competitive conceptual frame-
work of a liability model, a socially balanced database law should
preserve and promote the public-good aspects of science and educa-
tion. This goal requires careful crafting of its technical legal machin-
ery, as well as the inclusion of safeguards that address the specific
needs of the scientific and educational communities.
For example, exclusive control over data, like exclusive control
over ideas, raises serious concerns, including first amendment issues,
that are particularly germane to open scientific inquiry.4 6 While
meeting these concerns does not necessarily imply that data should
become available without charge or proprietary interests, it does
mean that the law itself should define the parameters of an evolving
public domain from which investigators can freely extract and use
data for certain purposes. The law must also guarantee scientific and
educational users access to that domain. To this end, the definition of
a protectible database should be narrowed so as to exclude ideas and
contents of scientific theories, and database owners should never
possess the right to preclude access to otherwise publicly accessible
data when sought for purposes of basic scientific research. The terms
of access would then depend in part on the size and scope of any free
use and fair use zones built into a proper sui generis law for the
benefit of scientific and educational users.467
Publishers will oppose such exceptions because they represent
a de facto subsidy to educational and scientific users, which in an
online environment can no longer be hidden behind the ancillary need
to overcome transaction costs. 468 Nevertheless, the case for maintain-
ing such exceptions seems even stronger in the database milieu than
466. See, for example, Ginsburg, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 384-87 (cited in note 44) (considering
proprietary interests and possible incursions on speech interests in information).
467. The ambivalence of the Final E.C. Directive on this score is explained in part by the
fact that no serious fair use provisions had previously been developed in the presence of the
compulsory license that the Council of Ministers deleted at the last moment, and in part by the
growing disinclination of both the European Union's and the United States' intellectual property
authorities to recognize fair use in the digital environment. See notes 144-66 and accompanying
text.
468. See Goldstein, Celestial Jukebox at 220-22 (cited in note 89); Gordon, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. at 1622-27 (cited in note 114).
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with respect to other objects of intellectual property protection. As in
other cases, publishers require state intervention in the marketplace
to enforce the fictitious portable fences on which the protection of
intangible literary productions depends. In this case, however, the
objects of protection-raw or elaborated data-are functionally de-
termined elements or particles of knowledge that fall well below the
"grain size" threshold of existing intellectual property laws.469 While
database publishers contribute no intellectual achievement for which
a reward is justifiable in terms of social costs, they have now staked a
claim to subject matter that world intellectual property law had left
unprotected as a building block of scientific and technological pro-
gress.
In seeking an unprecedented level of state intervention, there-
fore, it seems only logical that publishers exchange a measure of sup-
port for the public-good uses of scientific data for lessened risk aver-
sion and for a measure of artificial lead time in which to recoup their
investments and turn a profit. This logic is reinforced by the fact that
much, if not most of the data likely to be commercialized under a sui
generis regime will, at some stage, have been a product of public-good
undertakings funded largely by governments. Requiring publishers to
further the public-good aspects of scientific data hardly seems unrea-
sonable in this context, especially in view of the potential for rent-
seeking that inheres in a market structure dominated by sole-source
providers.
At the same time, one cannot push the concept of fair use to
the point of requiring the private sector to make up for diminished
government support of scientific research in general and of the gen-
eration of data in particular. Policymakers must, indeed, take pains
to avoid a worst-of-both-worlds outcome, in which government sup-
port for the production of scientific data declines, while private in-
vestment in the generation, distribution, and application of data lan-
guishes for lack of adequate incentives. To the extent that private
industry develops electronic information tools specifically to promote
scientific investigation or other educational endeavors, the imposition
of a subsidy favoring science becomes harder to justify and even coun-
terproductive, given that scientific and educational institutions must
pay for the other tools they use. This said, raw or elaborated data
nonetheless constitutes a peculiar kind of tool, and no amount of
469. See Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2385-86 (cited in
note 11) (discussing limits of legal protection for single features of computer programs).
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investment can justify its removal from the domain of scientific in-
quiry.
Appropriate fair use provisions should thus be seen as part of a
new cultural bargain that responds to serious concerns about the
ability of data publishers to control access to scientific data as such.
Implementing this bargain will require careful distinctions between
uses that are "free" and those that providers must permit, but on fair




Ascertaining fair uses that database owners must permit the
scientific and educational communities to make on more favorable
terms than those applicable to ordinary commercial users constitutes
a more delicate task. Discussions with scientists have at least identi-
fied a sensible point of departure for this analysis. In principle,
whenever a given database is substantially funded by government, a
bedrock concept of fair use should require that the scientific and
educational communities have access to its contents on the basis of
traditional cost-recovery formulas, irrespective of the prices that
providers and distributors may charge other users for other pur-
poses. 47
1
In other words, data generated by public funds should come
freighted with a built-in, cost-based discount for science and educa-
tion as a condition of its further commercialization by others. This
principle mainly preserves the status quo, at least for U.S. scientists,
without shifting the costs of generating and distributing raw or
elaborated scientific data onto private publishers. So long as
enlightened government policy continued to favor substantial funding
of the data-generating processes, this principle would promote science
and education by preserving the public-good aspects of the data thus
470. For example, scientists must freely be able to use the data underlying existing scien-
tific theories to verify or challenge those theories and to develop new ones. Similarly, research-
ers should have completely free use of their own notes and working files in the conduct of their
investigations, regardless of whether these files are embodied in electronic or print media. See,
for example, Letter from Ronald Wiggington (Jun. 31, 1996) (on file with the Authors). By the
same token, a scientist who creates a new database while using another lawfully obtained
database covered by a sui generis law, along with other data, should owe nothing but use or
access charges to the proprietary rightholder if he or she did not reproduce a substantial
component of the protected data in the new database. See, for example, Letter from Professor
Shelton Alexander (cited in note 303). Indeed, a sui generis law should never prevent any
scientist from reproducing or using an insubstantial part of the contents of a protected database
for any purpose whatsoever. In these and other cases, the public interest in scientific progress
trumps all other considerations.
471. See Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32); OMB Implementing Memo (cited in note
73). See also notes 302-03 and accompanying text. For the problem of leakage as a limit on
price discrimination, see Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32).
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collected, without unduly inhibiting private incentives to invest. By
the same token, it would prevent the private sector from displacing
(or appropriating) the public-good aspects of government-funded data
merely because sui generis legislation had been enacted to stimulate
investment in distribution or value-adding applications. While such a
policy may conflict with the E.C. Directive, depending on how the
European Union member states choose to implement the relevant
provisions, its adoption in the United States could influence other
countries, especially the European Union member states, which might
decide to exercise their implementing options in precisely this way.
472
Conversely, when the private sector or other nongovernmental
entities fund the generation or distribution of data, a different fair use
calculus should come into play. Here the problem is that the ability of
science to pay the going, commercial rates is not commensurate with
its resources or with the public interest in a strong, basic scientific
establishment. The solution is not to shunt the problems of science
onto publishers, who have their own business risks to manage, but to
ensure that publishers charge scientific and educational users fair
and reasonable prices that take account of the overriding public inter-
est at stake.
Achieving this goal, however, is complicated by the difficulties
of weaning sole-source providers from the rent-seekers' mentality if
market forces themselves do not compel more favorable treatment of
scientific and educational users. The appropriate response is to in-
corporate legal standards into the database law that can create suffi-
cient leverage for scientific and educational users to obtain such
treatment. The gentlest and least market-distorting form of leverage,
in turn, is the legal uncertainty with which legislatures can endow
the relevant fair use provisions. This strategy gives both sides the
maximum incentives to negotiate their own licenses providing for
price discrimination, product differentiation, 473 and other forms of
relief on terms that seek to reconcile the different interests at stake.
472. See E.C. Directive on Databases, art. 6(2), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 25 (cited in note 7)
(stating that Member States may opt to limit Article 5 reproduction, alteration, distribution,
communication, display, or performance rights in certain cases). See also notes 176-78 and
accompanying text.
473. See National Research Council, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32). For example,
"NASA and Orbital Sciences ... reached an agreement regarding the sea wifs mission for ocean
color data," a private endeavor "for which NASA provided upfront money for a data pur-
chase... [so that] the companies... [could] get financial backing." Under this Agreement, "the
company had exclusive rights to exploit the data for a number of days, after which the data
went to NASA for scientific purposes." Letter from Professor Gabrynowicz (cited in note 320).




Various technical devices, adopted singly or in combination,
can be employed to bring about this result. For example, a general
clause governing licenses in the database law can expressly provide
that all licensing and distribution agreements effected under such a
regime must be made "on fair and reasonable terms, with due regard
for the needs of the scientific and educational communities, for the
public interest in preserving competition, and for the needs of na-
tional economic development. 474  Such clauses, which have already
been used in some database transactions,475 would then be construed
in the light of other provisions favoring publishers, so as not unduly to
impair the commercial value of the database or the owner's return on
his or her investment.476 This approach should at least induce pub-
lishers to develop favorable subscription rates for academic and re-
search institutions rather than insisting on per use (or per access)
charges that may or may not apply in other circumstances.
A resort to compulsory licensing can also increase the bargain-
ing power of privileged users. As previously observed, a properly
crafted liability regime protecting investment in databases should
itself incorporate an automatic license favoring second comers and
value-adding users, which would kick in after an initial period of
guaranteed lead time.477 A refinement of this mechanism could then
allow the scientific and educational communities to license data for
essential needs in the event that publishers fail to supply the data on
NASA has not recently used this agreement as a model, however. Id. Moreover, for some
scientific disciplines, which depend on real-time observations, delay as a form of product differ-
entiation is not feasible. See, for example, Bits of Pouer at ch. 3 (cited in note 32). This, in
turn, suggests the importance of legal measures that permit providers and users to adjust the
concept of fair use (or fair and reasonable terms) to the needs of different categories of users.
474. For the general importance of such a clause in the post-TRIPS environment, especially
with regard to transfer of technology agreements, see Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair
Followers (cited in note 94).
475. For example, licenses "issued pursuant to federal law for private remote sensing
systems require that system operators make their commercially obsolete data available to the
National Data Archive on 'reasonable terms and conditions.' The government does not require
that they [be] give[n] ... the data, nor does it set the criteria by which the decision is made.
But if, and when, a company decides to purge data, it triggers the requirement,
[which] ... amounts to the government having the right of first refusal." Letter from Dr.
Gabrynowicz (cited in note 473). See also notes 288-90.
476. See, for example, E.C. Directive on Databases, arts. 7(5), 8(2), 1996 O.J. (L 77) at 26
(cited in note 7) (forbidding lawful user of database to perform acts that "conflict with normal
exploitation" or that "unreasonably prejudice [the maker's] legitimate interests"). See also H.R.
Rep. No. 3531 § 4(a), (b), 5 (cited in note 7) (listing prohibited acts and exceptions thereto).
477. See notes 436-42 and accompanying text.
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reasonable terms and conditions. 478 Should Congress ultimately adopt
an exclusive rights regime for database owners, rather than the un-
fair competition or modified liability models suggested above, such a
regime could nonetheless include non-voluntary license provisions to
meet the needs of these communities. In theory, this would permit
either side to seek a judicial decision triggering or blocking the com-
pulsory license for privileged uses. In practice, a built-in duty to
negotiate before seeking such a license,479 coupled with the uncer-
tainty inherent in the applicable legal standards (and the well-known
limits of judicial capability), should almost invariably lead to an ac-
commodation between publishers and scientists that would remove
the bone of contention.
Ideally, the database legislation should institutionalize these
and other fair-use related issues, together with an overall dispute-
resolution mechanism, within the larger framework of an apposite
collection society, which would mediate between funders, providers,
distributors, and users.480 Despite the appearance of an extra layer of
bureaucracy this creates, experience shows that the collection society
is the most efficient tool for overcoming the costs of countless single
transactions and also for representing the interests of different
classes of users.481 Digital technologies then make collection societies
478. See Goldstein, Celestial Jukebox at 230 (quoted in note 94). See also Ginsburg, 92
Colum. L. Rev. at 386-87 (cited in note 44) (deeming compulsory licenses indispensable under a
non-copyright protection scheme).
479. See TRIPS Agreement, art. 31(b), in Results of the Uruguay Round at 381 (cited in
note 1) (allowing states to impose compulsory licenses on foreign patentees only if, prior to the
grant, "the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the rightholder on rea-
sonable commercial terms and conditions").
480. There is reason to believe that collection societies have become indispensible instru-
ments for administering proprietary rights in information goods generally. See, for example,
Stanley M. Besen, Sheila N. Kirby, and Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Collectives, 78 U. Va. L. Rev. 383 (1992); Stanley M. Besen and Sheila N. Kirby, Compensating
Creators of Intellectual Property: Collectives That Collect, Rand Doc. R-3751-MF (March 1989);
Zentaro Kitagawa, Copymnart: A New Concept-An Application of Digital Technology to the
Collective Management of Copyright, in WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Impact of Digital
Technology on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 139 (1993) ("WIPO Worldwide Symposium");
WIPO, Collective Administration of Copyright and Neighboring Rights (1990). Studies also
suggest that there is an integral connection between a liability regime that protects
subpatentable innovation and a collection society to mediate between the shifting interests of
innovators and borrowers. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2555-57 (cited in
note 2) (explaining the increasing importance of agencies responsible for collective action where
potential returns to innovators and cost to borrowers from networked application of successful
embodiments of know-how become great and where blanket licensing needs result from the
evolution of technique repertories).
481. See, for example, Besen, Kirby, and Salop, Compensating Creators at 2-13 (cited in
note 480). For refinements in Nordic law, which extend the benefits of collection societies to
nonmembers on an "extended family" concept, see, for example, G. Karnell, The Nordic
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even more necessary while providing the technical means of cutting
both transaction costs and bureaucratic disruption.48 2 Because mem-
bers of the user community should be permanently represented in the
administration and governance of such a collection society, moreover,
scientists and educators would find themselves well-positioned to
resolve internally those questions about pricing, fair use and other
issues that courts would find taxing to adjudicate.
3. Long Term Considerations
The attention of the scientific and educational communities
must remain focused on the operational consequences of a sui generis
database law long after the above-mentioned issues have been re-
solved. The introduction of new legal instruments, and a shift toward
the commercialization of data, may profoundly change current institu-
tions, especially those bearing on the funding of scientific research,
and the effects of these changes need to be assessed and monitored
over time.
In this context, steps must be taken to ensure that new insti-
tutions suited to the maintenance of scientific progress are set in
place before existing institutions are undermined or eliminated. The
public funding of basic scientific data should remain sufficiently ro-
bust as to support the level of technological applications that has
enabled U.S. firms to retain a competitive edge in the global market-
place. If conciliatory efforts fail to dissuade foreign funding agencies
from overcharging for essential scientific data, countervailing pricing
strategies and other tactics may become unavoidable.43 In any event,
government agencies, the research communities, and database mak-
ers will have to cooperate at the implementation stage, with a view to
Catalogue Rule, in Dommering and Hugenholtz, eds., Protecting Works of Fact at 67-72 (cited in
note 104).
482. See, for example, Goldstein, Celestial Jukebox at 223-30 (cited in note 94). See also
Kitagawa, Copymart, in WIPO Worldwide Symposium at 143-47 (cited in note 480). The
extension of the collection society principle to the photocopying of books and journals has proved
a boon to academic users, although its long-run implications for fair use in copyright law remain
to be seen.
483. "Overcharging" in this context means charging more than would be allowed under
different cost-recovery formulas, including incremental and marginal cost pricing strategies.
See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 4 (cited in note 32). Because foreign users are far more
dependant on U.S. data than U.S. scientists are on foreign data-for the moment, at
least-discriminatory pricing against foreign users becomes feasible. The U.S. government




reconciling the greater role of the private sector with the public-good
aspects of national science policy.
From a long-term perspective, the research communities must
face up to the fact that new technologies for generating, evaluating,
and distributing data-especially digital technologies-may change
many institutions on which basic science has traditionally relied.
While certain to be disruptive, such changes need not produce wholly
undesirable outcomes and could foster new opportunities, provided
that the scientific and educational communities move to meet the
challenges in a timely and sustained fashion.
For example, new modes of organizing and distributing the
funds needed to generate data may be devised, while the prospects for
internalizing transmission and publication costs through the use of
electronic communications networks merit careful study.4 4 To the
extent that widespread commercialization of data does result from the
adoption of new intellectual property laws, it could stimulate the
scientific community to organize its own institutions for the collection
or dissemination of scientific data, which could operate outside the
commercial arena. Because the research communities are both pro-
ducers and consumers of data, collective action along these lines could
make science itself an increasingly important player in the market for
databases generally, as well as a stabilizing force in determining the
balance between public and private interests.485 How to organize such
large-scale undertakings, leading perhaps to universal data ar-
chives, 486 will require careful thought and study in order to avoid
sacrificing other goals of scientific endeavor or compromising tradi-
tional norms of science that emphasize objective pursuit of knowledge
based on the free and open exchange of information.
Meanwhile, the adoption of different legal regimes to protect
database makers by countries with different agendas and at varying
stages of economic development could further complicate the full and
unrestricted flow of scientific data across international frontiers.
Measures to harmonize the domestic database-protection laws, or at
least their effects on the transborder flows of scientific data, will,
therefore, require study, as will measures and proposals affecting the
regulation of national and global information infrastructures.487
484. See, for example, id. at ch. 4 (cited in note 32); Ginsparg, UNESCO Paper (cited in
note 62).
485. See, for example, Hunsuker, European Database Directive (cited in note 60).
486. See, for example, Bits of Power at ch. 3 (cited in note 32).
487. See, for example, Academy Presidents' Letter at 1-2 (cited in note 284). See also notes
268-78 and accompanying text.
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Pressures to integrate these and other international intellectual
property standards ever more deeply into the global trade apparatus
will certainly mount as countries move to implement and expand the
TRIPS Agreement and related international conventions within the
framework of the World Trade Organization.
488
VI. CONCLUSION
Most intellectual property laws have been formulated under
the myth that they do not protect investment as such. Rather, these
laws are supposed to implement the goal of encouraging or rewarding
some socially important form of creative contribution or achievement.
Until recently, when some countries, notably Switzerland and Japan,
began experimentally to bring subpatentable technological innovation
within reformed unfair competition laws based on modified liability
principles,489 the direct protection of investment had not been deemed
a sufficient justification for derogating from the norms of free compe-
tition.4
90
The standard mythology, however, leaves investment in sub-
patentable know-how largely at the mercy of trade secret laws, which
tend to break down under present-day conditions. This occurs be-
cause information goods, such as databases, typically bear design-rich
applications of know-how on their face, which makes it easy for free-
riders to duplicate the know-how without contributing to the costs of
research and development. The more that subpatentable innovation
falls through the cracks of the classical intellectual property system,
which rests on the mature patent and copyright paradigms, the more
governments multiply hybrid sui generis regimes of exclusive property
rights. The real purpose of these regimes is to protect investors
against the risk of market failure that results from a chronic shortage
of natural lead time. This proliferation of poorly conceived, hybrid
intellectual property rights has cumulatively begun to undermine the
competitive ethos on which market economies depend4 91 and the
488. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
489. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2472-76 (cited in note 2).
490. But see generally William Kingston, ed., Direct Protection of Innovation (Kliiwer
Academic Press, 1987). Professor Kingston was one of the first to call for a new approach. See
also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 897 (1988).
491. See, for example, Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2527-29 (cited in note 2) ("The
Public Interest Overwhelmed"). For a demonstration that all the hybrid regimes violate car-
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current database proposals represent the most recent (and perhaps
the most extreme) instance of this trend. Yet, protecting investment
in subpatentable innovation has become both a business priority and
an essential component of national innovation systems.
Against this background, the European Commission's frank
acknowledgment that its sui generis database law would protect in-
vestment as such amounts to a refreshing act of legal candor. The
Commission's early proposals were also a product of enlightened legal
tinkering, which manifested both a certain reluctance to interfere
unnecessarily with free competition and some concern for the larger
public interest. Unfortunately, these proposals were not accompanied
by any legal and economic analysis of what an investment-protection
law should consist, or how it should differ from regimes of exclusive
property rights based on modified patent and copyright principles.
Nor was there any explicit awareness that economic efficiency with
respect to public goods calls for minimalist incentives to invest that
will yield the lowest possible prices to users.
Because these proposals lacked any solid theoretical founda-
tion, the Commission's foray into liability principles was easily over-
come by special interest pressures, which produced the anomalous
database protection schemes analyzed in this Article. These schemes
are a monstrous caricature of true intellectual property laws.492
Unlike the other hybrid regimes that have cropped up in recent years,
which experimentally merge some innovative features with other,
obsolete components, the database laws set a new milestone for mis-
chief by virtually abolishing even the concept of a public domain 493 and
by abrogating the public interest components of intellectual property
policymaking. 494 While it is true that legislative commitment to bal-
ance the public and private interests has weakened everywhere since
the collapse of the patent-copyright dichotomy on which the nine-
teenth century intellectual property system was once firmly an-
chored, 495 the current database schemes represent a low point in the
history of intellectual property law.
dinal economic principles of the classical intellectual property system and most substitute over-
protection for underprotection, see Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 512-17 (cited in
note 3).
492. For a discussion of how these proposals harken back to medieval crown privileges and
guild monopolies, see note 281.
493. See note 146 and accompanying text (showing that the perpetual-exclusive-rights
potential of the E.C. Directive on Databases and the U.S. Proposal is perfected by protection of
previously compiled public domain material).
494. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
495. See, for example, Reichman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J. at 512-17 (cited in note 3)
(arguing that the breakdown of the classical trade secret approach has led to a system wherein
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Nevertheless, the problems these schemes were meant to ad-
dress will not go away, which is why it becomes more necessary than
ever to consider what the proper foundation for an intellectual prop-
erty regime to protect investment in subpatentable information goods
should really be. The right question, in other words, is how to over-
come the investor's risk of market failure without undermining either
the general public interest in competition or the special public inter-
est in promoting science and education. Approached this way, the
crucial differences between a law to reward intellectual creations and
a law to stimulate investment in intellectual goods begin to surface.
Classical intellectual property laws are meant to stimulate
certain forms of creative endeavor that would not ordinarily have seen
the light, or at least would not have been achieved so fast or so effi-
ciently, without a decision to derogate from the norms of free competi-
tion by instituting exclusive property rights.496 The difficulty inherent
in the creative or technical enterprise, or the social importance of the
ensuing creative contribution, thus induced governments to suffer the
short-term social costs of legal monopolies in return for these and
other long-term benefits.
In contrast, laws protecting investment as such deal with situ-
ations in which both the requisite level of creativity and the needed
quantum of investment would have been available as a matter of self-
interest and sound business strategy were it not for the risk that free
riders might appropriate the fruits of these investments without con-
tributing, directly or indirectly, to the costs of production. Removing
these obstacles from the entrepreneur's path presents a very different
and far more delicate problem than that of stimulating a technological
community to reach new heights. An investment law seeks to ensure
that those members of the relevant technical community that are
already at work on known technological paradigms will not suffer
from an artificial shortage of working capital. To achieve this result,
however, there is no need or justification for suspending the normal
principles of free competition. On the contrary, the goal is merely to
every new non-traditional object of legal protection receives its own ad hoc monopoly without
regard to the public interests involved).
496. See, for example, Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1977); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8
Research in L. & Econ. 31 (1986); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-unified Economic Theories of
Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 267 (1996) (discussing the "reward"
and "patent-induced" theories underlying classical intellectual property laws). See generally
Lunney, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483 (cited in note 3).
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remove those obstacles that prevent market principles from operating
in a fashion that engenders the fewest social costs.
This Article has offered two models for recasting sui generis
proposals concerning the legal protection of databases, either of which
would produce more social benefits with fewer social costs than the
exclusive property rights approach of current proposals. The more
modest solution would refine known principles of unfair competition
law to protect database contents. The more ambitious solution would
build on recent legal scholarship that seeks to clarify the conceptual
foundations of a modified liability approach to the legal protection of
subpatentable know-how that becomes embodied in mass-produced
information products. These studies suggest that a market-enhancing
liability regime can emulate some of the positive economic functions of
trade secret laws, which were used to regulate appropriations of data
throughout the Industrial Revolution, without imposing the social
costs of actual or legal secrecy and without creating legal barriers to
entry.4
97
The unusual nature of the database market, with its ingrained
sole-source structure, its traditional reliance on government funding,
and its importance for science, makes the application of liability prin-
ciples to solve the problem of market failure more delicate than it
would be under more competitive conditions. Nevertheless, the basic
principle remains that of "doing no harm," that is, of not substituting
a disproportionate level of overprotection, with its attendant social
costs, for a state of chronic underprotection. The exclusive property
rights regimes under review would create real barriers to entry and
ignore the public interest in competition and in the scientific and
educational enterprises. In contrast, a modified liability regime cre-
ates no barriers to entry, stimulates competition, and facilitates the
implementation of public interest goals, such as the promotion of
science and education.
Making the wrong choice could compromise the basic scientific
enterprise on which U:S. technological dominance has long depended.
Fortunately, the United States Constitution, with its insistence that
intellectual property rights be "limited in time" and advance "science
and the useful arts," points the way for basic Enlightenment
principles to prevail over narrow special-interest legislation.
497. See generally Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2519-44 (cited in note 2) ('Portable
Trade Secrets"); Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2378-429 (cited in
note 11).
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